need and danger, when time was the dominant factor, he was obliged to pay as much as 12 and even 16 per cent, for loans. As time went on the revenues of the Netherlands were similarly pledged in advance.
The revenues of the Duchy of Milan in time of peace might have been considerable. In time of war they were whatever the army could raise from the impoverished inhabitants; and before the war was over the state of the country was such that not only was there no superfluous wealth, but the army and the inhabitants alike seemed in a fair way to perish of starvation. The case of Naples and of Sicily was not quite so desperate, in spite of two rather serious risings in Sicily which we have not had occasion to mention. But here a considerable army of occupation had to be kept up and a fleet, if possible, for the protection of the coast, if not from the French and the Genoese, at any rate from the pirates of Algiers. The surplus revenues of the southern kingdoms cannot have been large, and although very often in an emergency Lannoy produced money to content some starving troops or to move some paralysed army, the sums which are mentioned are almost always small, and give but a poor idea of the capacity of the kingdoms to assist their King. Here also the same ruinous policy was pursued as in Castile, of pledging everything in advance, of selling everything that could be sold; and years of peace would be required before the kingdoms could recover.
In Italy another valuable source of occasional revenue was the subsidies raised from the lesser Italian States, which, unless actually at war with the Emperor, could generally be coerced into payment, and, if in his alliance, were expected to contribute handsomely. The Pope was the largest giver, but Venice could sometimes be bled, and Florence, Lucca, Siena, Ferrara, Mantua, were often in a condition which made refusal difficult.
The King of France had a better financial system and was not troubled like the Spanish King by the necessity of consulting his Estates. His entire revenue was somewhat less than the joint revenues of Spain and the Netherlands, but on the other hand he could increase it more rapidly by raising the taille, and it was entirely at his disposal; nor was he troubled like Charles by the necessity of difficult financial operations before he could fit out an army. On the other hand, when his army was abroad these obstacles confronted him also. His financial ministers were not conspicuous for honesty, and the institution of the Trésor de T'Épargne in 1523, to receive all casual and unexpected sums of revenue and to build up a reserve fund to be at the King's absolute disposal, was not so great a success as was hoped. The deficits during the years of war reached an alarming figure, and it is difficult to see how they were met. For the credit system in France was not developed as it was in Augsburg, Genoa, and Antwerp. The first public loans in France were raised on the security of the revenues of particular towns; and it was not until 15e2 that the King began to build up Lyons as a
