is further described in this declaration as the deputy station chief of UBL station, the CIA unit that was involved in preventing the visa information regarding Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar from being passed to the FBI.
In May of 2018, I interviewed a former FBI Special Agent, whose identity is known to me and herein referred to as CS-15. CS-15 told me that stated that he/she began his/her employment with the FBI in the 1980’s. CS-15 stated that he/she served on the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) prior to his/her appointment as the chief of the FBI’s Bin Laden Unit. CS-15 stated that in January of 2000, there was “key meeting” of Al-Qaeda members in Kuala Lampur, Malaysia. CS-15 recalled that the CIA was able to get photographs of the meeting’s participants. CS-15 related that sometime after the meeting, the CIA shared the photographs with the FBI. However, according to CS-15, the CIA never told the FBI in what context the photographs had been taken. Instead, the CIA merely showed FBI officials the photos and asked if they (the FBI) knew the identities of the individuals in the photos. CS-15 recalled that the CIA was not able to conduct any electronic surveillance of the meeting.
CS-15 recalled that the CIA never provided subscriber information to the FBI of the phone number in Yemen used as an Al Qaeda messaging center. CS-15 explained that had the FBI been provided with this information, FBI agents might have collected enough material prior to 9/11 to prevent the attacks. CS-15 related that the former head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit prevented the FBI from seeing key information related to the 9/11 attacks.
During February of 2018, I interviewed a former senior FBI official whose identity is known to me and is herein referred to as CS-16. CS-16 stated that leads developed by the FBI connected Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar to Ahmed Al-Hada. CS-16 stated that Al-Mihdhar was the son in law of Al-Hada. CS-16 recalled that Al-Hada was connected to the 1998 East Africa bombings by FBI Special Agents assigned to the New York Field Office. CS-16 stated FNU Al-Owhali provided significant information to the FBI regarding the 1998 bombings. CS-16 recalled that the FBI obtained a telephone number for Al-Hada during the course of the East Africa bombing investigation. CS-16 told me that the above information was then given to a CIA case officer. According to CS-16, the case officer passed the number to the National Security Agency, who then exploited the information to obtain significant information about Al-Qaeda’s operations. CS-16 stated that the FBI Field Office in New York City was not told about the presence of Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar in the United States until August 26, 2001. CS-16 stated that the CIA withheld the information that the two hijackers had entered the country in 2000 from the FBI on orders from two CIA employees, Richard Blee and Tom Wilshire. CS-16 stated that it was his/her opinion that the information was withheld as the CIA was attempting to recruit Al-Hazmi and/or Al-Mihdhar as intelligence sources while they were in the U.S.
During the Spring of 2021, I interviewed a Confidential Source. The identity of the source is known to me and is herein referred to as CS-22. CS-22 is a former FBI Special Agent with extensive experience in terrorism and counter intelligence matters. CS-22 told me that following
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