Page:Cardozo-Nature-Of-The-Judicial-Process.pdf/74

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
HISTORY, TRADITION AND SOCIOLOGY

"has . . . been shifted. The will of the State, expressed in decision and judgment is to bring about a just determination by means of the subjective sense of justice inherent in the judge, guided by an effective weighing of the interests of the parties in the light of the opinions generally prevailing among the community regarding transactions like those in question. The determination should under all circumstances be in harmony with the requirements of good faith in business intercourse and the needs of practical life, unless a positive statute prevents it; and in weighing conflicting interests, the interest that is better founded in reason and more worthy of protection should be helped to achieve victory."[1] "On the one hand," says Gény,[2] as we are to interrogate reason and conscience, to discover in our inmost nature, the very basis of justice; on the other, we are to address ourselves to social

74
  1. Gmelin, supra; cf. Ehrlich, "Die juristische Logik," p. 187; Duguit, "Les Transformations du droit depuis le Code Napoléon," transl., Continental Legal Hist. Series, vol. XI, pp. 72, 79.
  2. Op. cit., vol. II, p. 92, sec. 159.