utter failure of his ambitious efforts, Adonias would be satisfied with the peaceful obscurity of a private life. Solomon was now in possession of the royal power, and although his first exercise of it had been an act of clemency towards his rival, it could hardly be supposed that he would treat with the same leniency a second attempt of Adonias to secure the crown. Gratitude, fidelity, and due regard for his own safety should, therefore, have caused Adonias to give up his ambitious dreams. He seems, however, to have looked upon Solomon's deed of clemency as an act of weakness, and to have thought that he might be more successful in another attempt to reach the throne. In fact, soon after his father's death he adroitly petitioned, through Bethsabee, the queen mother, to be allowed to marry the Sunamitess, Abisag, one of the wives of the deceased monarch. The petition was made with a view to reassert his claim to the royal dignity, and he apparently relied on Solomon's supposed weakness of character not to dare to refuse his request. But again the event soon proved how greatly mistaken he was in his calculation. Scarcely had his request reached Solomon when the king's wrath broke forth against Adonias' perfidy. With the most solemn oath the monarch pronounced him worthy of death, and without the least delay the sword of Banaias carried out the royal sentence (III Kings, ii, 13–24), Thus did Adonias perish, a victim of his own heedless ambition. The Scriptural account of his vain efforts to deprive Solomon of the throne which God had expressly intended for him (II Kings, vii, 12–16; I Paralip., xxii, 7–10) teaches how divine Providence overrules man's ambitious schemes. It is a model of vivid narration and of perfect faithfulness to Oriental life. In particular, if it nowhere charges Solomon with excessive severity in putting Adonias to death, it is because, according to Eastern notions, the latter's conduct fully deserved that punishment.
II. Adonias, one of the Levites sent by King Josaphat to teach the people in the cities of Juda (II Paralip., xvii, 8).
Adoption.—In the Old Testament.—Adoption, as defined in canon law, is foreign to the Bible. The incidents in Exod., ii, 10, and Esther, ii, 7, ii, 15, cannot be adduced as examples to the contrary, for the original text contains but a vague expression instead of the word "adopted", and the context merely implies that Moses and Esther were the protégés of their respective benefactors. The people of Israel enjoyed a similar privilege at the hands of God. The facts mentioned in Gen., xlviii, 5, however, bear close resemblance to adoption taken in its strict sense.
In the New Testament.—St. Paul introduces the word adoption (υἱοθεσία) into the New Testament (Rom., viii, 15, 23; Gal., iv, 5; Eph., i, 5), and applies it to a special relationship (sonship) of man towards God, brought about by the indwelling in our soul of the "Spirit of God". This Spirit gives us a new, a supernatural life, the life of grace, together with the consciousness (Rom., viii, 16) that this new life comes from God and that we are consequently the children of God, endowed with the privilege of calling Him Abba, "Father", and of being His heirs (Rom., viii, 17; Gal., iv, 6). This adoption will be consummated when to the "first fruits of the Spirit", of which our soul is made the recipient in this life, is added the "redemption of our body" (Rom., viii, 23) in the life to come.
Cornely, Epistola ad Romanos (Paris, 1896); Estius, In Pauli Epistolas (Mainz, 1858); Van Steenkiste, In Pauli Epistolas (Bruges, 1886); Lightfoot, St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians (Cambridge, London, 1865); Sanday, Epistle to the Romans (New York, 1895); Zöckler, Galaterbrief (Munich, 1894); Luthardt, Der Brief Pauli an die Römer (Munich, 1894); Many in Vig., Dict. de la Bible (Paris, 1895) s.v.
Adoption, Canonical.—In a legal sense, adoption is an act by which a person, with the cooperation of the public authority, selects for his child one who does not belong to him. In Roman law adrogatio was the name given to the adoption of one already of full age (sui juris); datio in adoptionem, when one was given in adoption by one having control or power over him. The adoption was full (plena) if the adopting father was a relative in an ascending scale of the one adopted; less full (minus plena) if there was no such natural tie. Perfect adoption placed the adopted under the control of the adopter, whose name was taken, and the adopted was made necessary heir. The adoption was less perfect which constituted the adopted necessary heir, in case the adopter should die without a will. The rule was that a man, not a woman, could adopt; that the adopter should be at least 18 years older than the adopted; that the adopter should be of full age, and older than 25 years. In Athens the power of adoption was allowed to all citizens of sound mind. Adoption was very frequent among the Greeks and Romans, and the custom was very strictly regulated in their laws.
The Church made its own the Roman law of adoption, with its legal consequences. Pope Nicholas I (858–867) spoke of this law as venerable, when inculcating its observance upon the Bulgarians. Hence adoption, under the title cognatio legalis, or "legal relationship", was recognized by the Church as a diriment impediment of marriage. This legal relationship sprang from its resemblance to the natural relationship (and made a bar to marriage): 1° civil paternity between the adopter and the adopted, and the latter's legitimate natural children, even after the dissolution of the adoption; 2° civil brotherhood between the adopted and the legitimate natural children of the adopter, until the adoption was dissolved, or the natural children were placed under their own control (sui juris); 3° affinity arising from the tie of adoption between the adopted and the adopter's wife, and between the adopter and the adopted's wife. This was not removed by the dissolution of the adoption. The Church recognized in the intimacy consequent upon these legal relations ample grounds for placing a bar on the hope of marriage, out of respect for public propriety, and to safeguard the morals of those brought into such close relations. The Code of Justinian modified the older Roman law by determining that the rights derived from the natural parentage were not lost by adoption by a stranger. This gave rise to another distinction between perfect and imperfect adoption. But as the modification of Justinian made no change in the customary intimacy brought about by the adoption, so the Church at no time expressly recognized any distinction between the perfect and less perfect adoption as a bar to marriage. There arose, however, among canonists a controversy on this subject, some contending that only the perfect adoption was a diriment impediment to marriage. Benedict XIV (De Syn. Diœc., I, x, 5) tells of this discussion and, while giving no positive decision, lays down the principle that all controversies must be decided in this matter in accord with the substantial sanctions of the Roman law. This is a key to the practical question which today arises from the more or less serious modifications which the Roman, or Civil, law has undergone in almost all the countries where it held sway, and hence flows the consequent doubt, at times, whether this diriment impediment of legal relationship still exists in the eyes of the Church. Wherever the substantial elements of the Roman law are retained in the new codes, the Church recognizes this relationship as a diriment impediment in accord with the principle laid down by Benedict XIV. This is thoroughly recognized by the Congregation of the Holy Office in its positive decision with regard
