ligation. Community of goods (Acts, iv, 32), collections in church (Acts, xi, 29 sqq.; I Cor., xvi, 1; Gal., ii, 10), the ministry of deacons and deaconesses were simply the inauguration of that world-wide system of Christian charity which has circumscribed the globe and added another testimony to the Divinity of that Church which directs her ministrations towards the alleviation of human misery in every shape and form (Lecky, History of European Morals, II, 100, 3d ed., New York, 1891). The Fathers of the Church frequently and unequivocally inculcated the necessity of almsgiving. To this matter St. Cyprian devoted a complete treatise (De Opere et Eleemosynâ, P.L., IV, 601 sqq.). St. Basil recounts how St. Lawrence distributed the treasures of the Church to the poor. Questioned by a pagan governor regarding the treasures which he had promised to transmit, Lawrence pointed to the poor, saying: They are treasures in whom is Christ, in whom is faith. Contrary to the envy of the Arians, St. Ambrose lauds the breaking and selling of sacred vessels for the redemption or captives (De Officiis Ministrorum, xxviii, xxx, P. L., XVI, 141 sqq.). The more effectively to urge the precept of almsgiving, the Fathers teach that the wealthy are God's stewards and dispensers, so much so that where they refuse to aid the needy they are guilty of theft (St. Basil, Homil. in illud Lucæ, No. 7, P.G., XXXI, 278; St. Gregory of Nyssa, De Pauperibus Amandis, P.G., XLVI, 466; St. Chrysostom, in Ep. I ad Cor., Homil. 10, c. 3, P.G., LXI, 86; St. Ambrose, De Nab. lib. unus, P.L., XIV, 747; St. Augustine, in Ps. cxvii, P.L., XXXVII, 1922). Discretion in almsgiving is counseled in the Apostolic Constitutions: "Alms must not be given to the malicious, the intemperate, or the lazy; lest a premium should be set on vice" (Const. Apost., ii, 1–63; iii, 4–6). St. Cyprian asserts that adherents of other religions must not be excluded from a share in Catholic charity (De Opere et Eleemosynâ, c. xxv, P. L., IV, 620). After the Patristic epoch the teaching of the Church regarding almsgiving did not vary throughout the ages. St. Thomas Aquinas has admirably summarized this teaching during the medieval period (St. Thomas, Summa Theol., II-II, QQ. xxx–xxxiii, De Misericordiâ; De Beneficentiâ; De Eleemosynâ). No writer of modern times has so admirably epitomized the position of the Church as Leo XIII (Encyclicals, Rerum Novarum, 15 May, 1891; Graves de Communi, 18 Jan, 1901). In so much as the obligation of almsgiving is coextensive with the obligation of charity, everyone falls under the law. The donor, however, must be entitled to dispose of what he contributes, because almsgiving usually implies that the beneficiary acquires a title to whatever his benefactor gives. Ecclesiastics are bound in a special way to observe the precept of almsgiving, because they are constituted fathers of the poor, and are besides obliged by their example to lead the laity to entertain correct views concerning the importance of this duty. As a general rule, the indigent of every class, saint or sinner, countrymen or foreigners, friend or foe, have their claims upon the charity of those competent to give alms (Proverbs, xxv, 21; Romans, xii, 20; Sylvius, Summa, II-II, Q. xxxii, art. 9; De Conninck, Disp. xxvii, Dub. 6, No. 70). The conjunction of genuine indigence in the poor and ability to minister relief in the rich, is necessary to concrete the obligation of almsgiving (St. Thomas, op. cit., II-II, QQ. xxxii, art. 5, ad 3am). Diversity of actual conditions circumscribing the needy, specify the character of indigence. Where the necessaries of life are wanting, or where imminent peril threatens vital interests, indigence is extreme. Where the absence of aid leads to serious reverses, in goods or fortune, indigence is serious or pressing. Where the quest for the necessaries of life involves considerable trouble, indigence is common or ordinary. The obligation of almsgiving extends to this triple indigence. Scripture and the Fathers speak indiscriminately of the poor, the needy, and the indigent without restricting the obligation of almsgiving to any particular species of indigence. Nearly all theologians adopt this view. Nevertheless, the better to determine the character of this obligation in the concrete, it is necessary to consider the character of temporalities in those who hold property. In the first place, property necessary to maintain vital interests is indispensably necessary. Property without which vital interests are not jeopardized is considered superfluous thereunto. Property required to maintain social prestige, i.e. to live in keeping with one's position in society, to educate offspring, to engage domestics, to entertain, etc., is considered equally indispensable from a social standpoint. Property without which social prestige is not endangered is reputed superfluous thereunto. Accordingly, there is never any obligation of using the necessaries of life for almsgiving, because well-regulated charity ordinarily obliges everyone to prefer his own vital interests to those of his neighbour. The only exception occurs when the interests of society are identified with those of a needy member (Müller, Theol. Moralis, II, tr., i, sect. 30, 112). To a neighbour in extreme indigence relief must be ministered by using such commodities as are superfluous to vital interests, even though such should be required for social advantages (St. Thomas, Summa Theol., II-II, Q. xxxii, art. 6; St. Alphonsus Liguori, Theol. Moralis, III, no. 31). For charity demands that the vital interests of an indigent neighbour should supersede personal advantages of a much lower order (Suarez, De Charitate, Disput. vii, § 4, no. 3). The transgression of this obligation involves a mortal sin. Nevertheless no one, however wealthy, is obliged to take extraordinary measures to assist a neighbour even in direful straits, e.g. a wealthy citizen is not bound to send a dying pauper to a more salubrious clime, or to bear the expense of a difficult surgical operation for the betterment of a pauper (Suarez, loc. cit., sect. 4, no. 4). Nor is a wealthy individual obliged to imperil his social standing to aid a neighbour in extreme need (La Croix, Theol. Moralis, II, no. 201). For charity does not bind anyone to employ extraordinary means in order to safeguard his own life (St. Alphonsus, op. cit., III, no. 31). To a neighbour in serious or pressing indigence, alms must be given by using such commodities as are superfluous in relation to present social advantages. Nay, more likely in the more acute forms of such indigence those commodities which may in some measure tend to future social advantages must be taxed to succour this indigence (Suarez, loc. cit., no. 5; De Conninck, loc. cit., no. 125; Viva, in prop. xii, damnatam ab Innoc. XI, no. 8). The transgression of this obligation likewise involves a grievous sin, because well-regulated charity obliges one to meet the serious needs of another when he can do so without serious personal disadvantage (St. Alphonsus, H. Ap. tr., iv, no. 19). In the ordinary troubles confronting the poor alms must be given from such temporalities only as are superfluous to social requirements. This does not imply an obligation of answering every call, but rather a readiness, to give alms according to the dictates of well-regulated charity (Suarez, loc. cit., § 3, nos. 7, 10). Theologians are divided into two schools regarding the character of this obligation. Those holding that the obligation is serious seem to espouse a cause in harmony with the teaching of Scripture and the authority of the Fathers (St. Alphonsus, op. cit., III, no. 32; Bouquillon, Institutiones Theol. Moralis Specialis, III, no. 488). At all events, such affluent
