MOLINISM
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MOLINISM
ing parties, and in 1596 demanded that the docu-
ments be sent to the Vatican. To settle the con-
troversy he institutetl in 1598 a special "Congrcgatio
de auxiliis", which at the early stages of its investi-
gation sliowpd a clorided ojjposition to Molina's doc-
trine. Douljticss .Molina took to the grave the im-
pression that Molinism was doomed to incur the
censure of the Iluly See, for he did not hve to see his
new system exonerated by Paul V in 1607. (For fur-
ther details see the article Congregatio de Auxims.)
Undisturbed by the heat and bitterness of the at-
tack, Molina published a complete commentary upon
the first part of the Summa of St. Thomas, which
he had prepared at Evora during the years 1570-73
("Commentaria in primam partem D. Thomje",
2 vols., Cuenca, 1592). The chief characteristic of
this work, which has been repeatedly re-edited, is the
insertion where opportunity offered of most of the
dissertations of the "Concordia", which thus became
an integral part of the commentary. The increasing
bitterness and confusion of ideas occasioned by the
controversy induced Molina to publish a new edition
of the "Concordia" with numerous additions, in
which he endeavoured to correct the misconceptions
and misrepresentations of his doctrine, and at the
same time to dispel the important misgivings and
accusations of his adversaries. This edition bears
the title: " Liberi arbitrii cum gratia? donis etc. Concor-
dia, altera sui parte auctior" (Antwerp, 1.595, 1609,
1705; new edition, Paris, 1876). To-day this is the
only standard edition. After the lapse of nearly a
century the Dominican Fr. Hyacinth Serry, in his
"Historia Congregationis de auxiliis" (Louvain,
1700; Antwerp, 1709) accused Molina of having
omitted many assertions from his Antwerp edition of
the "Concordia", which were parts of the Lisbon
edition. But Father I.ivinus de Meyer, S.J., sub-
jected the two editions to a critical comparison, and
succeeded in showing that the omissions in question
were only of secondary moment, and that Serry's ac-
cusation was thus groundless. Meyer's work bears
the title, "Historia controversiarum de au.xiliis"
(Antwerp, 1708). De Molina was not less eminent as
a moralist and jurist than as a speculative theologian.
A proof of this is his work "De .Justitia et jure"
(Cuenca, 1593), which appeared complete only after
his death. This work is a classic, referred to fre-
quently even at the present time (7 vols., Venice,
1614; 5 vols., Cologne, 1733). On broad lines Molina
not only develops therein the theory of law in general
and the special juridical questions arising out of the
political economics of his time (e. g., the law of ex-
change), but also enters very extensively into the
questions concerning the juridical relations between
Church and State, pope and prince, and the like. It
is a sad fact, that, in order to justify the brutal per-
secution of the Jesuits in France, the Benedictine
Clemencet ("Extracts des assertions pernicieuses "
etc., Paris, 1672) ransacked even this solid work
and fancied he found therein lost i)rinciples of moral-
ity. This is but one of the many misfortunes which
at that time of unrest fell so heavily, and as a rule so
undeservedly, on the Society of Jesus (cf. Dollinger,
, "Moralstreitigkeiten", I, Munich, 1889, p. 337).
The work "De Hispanorum primigeniorum origine
et natura" (Alcala, 1573; Cologne, 1588) is often at-
tributed to Molina; in reality it is the work of another
jurist of the same name, who was bom at Ursaon in
Andalusia.
As a man, priest, and religious, Molina commanded the respect and esteem of his bitterest adversaries. During his whole life his virtues were a source of edi- fication to all who knew hira. To prompt obedience he joined true and sincere humility. On his death-bed, having been asked what he wished done with his writ- ings, he answered in all simplicity: "The Society of Jesus may do with them what it wishes ' ' . His love for .
evangelical poverty was most remarkable; in spite of
his bodily infirmity, brought on by overwork, he never
sought any mitigation in the matter of either clothing
or food. He was a man of great mortification to the
very end of his life.
A biography and bibliography together with a portrait of Mo- lina may be found in the Cologne edition of his De justitia et jure, I (1733). It bears the title L. Molina:, S.J . vitce niorumque brevis adumbralio atque operum Catalogus. There is no modern critical biography. See Morqott in Kirchenlex., a. v.; Sommervogel, Bibl. des ecrivains de to C. de J., V, 1167-79; Hurter. Nomencla- tor, I (2nd ed.), 47 sqq. J. PoHLE.
Molinism, the name used to denote one of the systems which purpose to reconcile grace and free will. This system was first developed by Luis de Molina, and was adopted in its essential points by the Society of Jesus. It is opposed by the Thomistic doctrine of grace — the term Thomism has a somewhat wider meaning — whose chief exponent is the Domini- can Banez. Along lines totally different from those of Molina, this subtile theologian endeavours to har- monize grace and free will on principles derived from St. Thomas. Whereas Molinism tries to clear up the mysterious relation between grace and free will by starting from the rather clear concept of freedom, the Thomists, in their attempt to ex])lain the atti- tude of the will towards grace, begin with the obscure idea of efficacious grace. The question which both schools set themselves to answer is this: Whence does efficacious grace (gratia efficai), which includes in its very concept the actual free consent of the will, derive its infallible effect; and how is it that, in spite of the infallible efficacy of grace, the freedom of the will is not impaired? It is evident that, in every attempt to solve this difficidt problem. Catholic theologians must safeguard two principles : first, the supremacy and cau- sality of grace (against Pelagianism and Semipela- gianism), and second, the unimpaired freedom of con- sent in the will (against early Protestantism and Jansenism). For both these principles are dogmas of the Church, clearly and emphatically defined by the Council of Trent. Now, whilst Thomism lays chief stress on the infallible efficacy of grace, without de- nying the existence and necessity of the free co- operation of the will, Molinism emphasizes the unre- strained freedom of the will, without detracting in any way from the efficacy, priority, and dignity of grace. As in the tunnelling of a mountain, galleries started by skilful engineers from opposite sides meet to form but one tunnel, thus it might have been (•xi)ecf ed that, in spite of different and opposite start iiig-jioints, the two schools would finally meet and reach one and the same scientific solution of the important problem. If we find, however, that this is not the case, and that they passed each other along parallel lines, we are inclined to attribute this failure to the intricate nature of the subject in question, rather than to the in- efficiency of the scholars. The problem seems to lie so far beyond the horizon of the huMian mind, that man will never be able fully to penetnif c its mystery. In the following we shall first consider Molinism as it came from its author's hands, and then briefly review the phases of its later historical development.
I. MoLiNLSM IN Its OjU(ii.\AL FoKM. — Alolini.sm combats the heresy of the Hcformers, according to which both sinners and just have lost free<lom of will. It maintains and slrenuouslv defends the Tridentine dogma uliic-h teaches: (I ) ih.at freedom of will lias not been destroyed by original sin, and (2) that this free- dom remains unimjiaired under the influence of Divine grace (cf. Se.ss. VI, can. iv-v, in Denzinger, "Enchiri- dion", ed. Bannwart, Freiburg, 1908, nn. 814-15). Freedom is the power of the will to act or not to act, to act this or that way; whereas it is the characteristic of necessary causes, as animals and inanimate beings, to produce their effects by an intrinsic necessity. Freedom of the will ia-a consequence of intelligence, and as such the most precious gift of man, an endow-
