NOMINATION
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NOMINATION
ternal things, since they are produced exclusively by
the structural functions (a priori forms) of our mind.
Time and space, in which we frame all sensible im-
pressions, cannot be obtained from experience, which
is individual and contingent; they are schemata which
arise from our mental organization. Consequently,
we have no warrant for establishing a real correspond-
ence between the world of our ideas and the world of
reality. Science, which is only an elaboration of the
data of sense in accordance with other structural de-
terminations of the mind (the categories), becomes a
subjective poem, which has a value only for us and not
for a world outside us. A modern form of Platonic or
Exaggerated Realism is found in the ontologist doc-
trine defended by certain Catholic philosophers in the
middle of the nineteenth century, and which consists
in identifying the objects of universal ideas with the
Divine ideas or the archetypes on which the world was
fashioned. As to Moderate Realism, it remains the
doctrine of all those who have returned to Aristotele-
anism or adopted the neo-Scholastic philosophy.
III. The Claims of Moderate Realism. — This system reconciles the characteristics of external ob- jects (particularity) with those of our intellectual representations (universality), and explains why sci- ence, though made up of abstract notions, is valid for the world of reality. To understand this it suffices to grasp the real meaning of abstraction. When the mind apprehends the essence of a thing (quod quid est; t4 Ti ^v chai), the external object is perceived without the particular notes which attach to it in na- ture {esse in singularibus), and it is not yet marked with the attribute of generality which reflection will bestow on it (esse in uilcllniii). The abstract reality is apprehended with perfect, indifference as regard.s both the individual state without and the universal state within: abstrahit ab utroque esse, secundum quam considerationem consideratur natura lapidis vel cujus cumque alterius, quantum ad ea tantum qua; per se competunt ilh naturie (St. Thomas, "Quod- libeta", Q. i, a. 1). Now, what is thus conceived in the absolute state (absolute considerando) is nothing else than the reality incarnate in any given individual : in truth, the reality, represented in my concept of man, is in Socrates or in Plato. There is nothing in the abstract concept that is not applicable to every individual; if the abstract concept is inadequate, be- cause it does not contain the singular notes of each being, it is none the less faithful, or at least its ab- stract character does not prevent it from correspond- ing faithfully to the objects existing in nature. As to the universal form of the concept, a moment's consid- eration shows that it is subsequent to the abstraction and is the fruit of reflection: "ratio speciei accidit na- turiE humanse". Whence it follows that the univer- sality of the concept as such is the work purely of the intellect: "unde intellectus est qui facit universalita- tem in rebus" (St. Thomas, "De enteet essentia", iv).
Concerning Nominalism, Conceptualism, and Ex- aggerated Realism, a few general considerations must suffice. Nominalism, which is irreconcilable with a spiritualistic philosophy and for that very reason with Scholasticism as well, presupposes the ideological theory that the abstract concept does not differ essen- tially from sensation, of which it is only a transforma- tion. The Nominalism of Hume, Stuart Mill, Spen- cer, Huxley, and Taine is of no greater value than their ideology. They confound essentially distinct logical operations — the simple decomposition of sen- sible or empirical representations with abstraction properly so called and sensible analogy with the pro- cess of universalization. The Aristoteleans recognize both of these mental operations, but they distinguish carefully between them. As to Kant, all the bonds that might connect the concept with the external world are destroyed in his Phenomenalism. Kant is imablc to explain why one and the same sensible im-
pression starts or sets in operation now this, now that
category; his a priori forms are unintelUgible accord-
ing to his own principles, since they are beyond experi-
ence. Moreover, he confuses real time and space,
limited like the things they develop, with ideal or
abstract time and space, which alone are general and
without limit. For in truth we do not create whole-
sale the object of our knowledge, but we beget it within
us under the causal influence of the object that reveals
itself to us. Ontologism, which is akin to Platonic
Realism, arbitrarily identifies the ideal types in our
intellect, which come to us from the sensible world by
means of abstraction, with the ideal types consubstan-
tial with the essence of God. Now, when we form our
first abstract ideas we do not yet know God. We are
so ignorant of Him that we must employ these first
ideas to prove a posteriori His existence. Ontologism
has lived its life, and our age so enamoured of obser-
vation and experiment will scarcely return to the
dreams of Plato.
Zeller, Die Philosophic der Griechen (.5 vols., 5th ed., Tiibingen, 1903), tr. CosTELLOE AND MuiRHEAD, Aristotle and the earlier PeH- patetics (2 vols., London and New York, 1897); Piat, Aristote (Paris, 1903) : Brochard, Sur la logique des stoiciens in ArcMv fur Gesch. der Philos. (1892) ; LoEWE, Der Kampf zw. dem Realismus u. Nomiiialismus im Mittelalter in Abhandl. d. k. bdhm. Gesellschaft d. Wissenschaft, VIII (1876) ; De Wulf, Hist, of Medieval Philos., tr. Coffey (New York and London, 1909); Idem, Lr pmhlime des universaux dans son evolution historiqiir .-fu TX- 'i' XTIT"
siicle in Archiv fur Gesch. d. Philos., IX, iv ( 1 ^ Ii ^ ' i , l/ist.
of Philos. (Boston, 1903); Reinebs, Der .;,. /. • >/» tn
d. Frilhscholastik (Aachen, 1907); Idem, Drr .\ , -. . , in d.
Friihscholastik in Beitrtlge zur Gesch. d. Philu.i.. \ 111. i t.Miaiater, 1910) ; Stockl, Hist, of Philos., tr. Finlat (Dublin, 1BU3) ; De- hove, Qui prfTCLTpui fuerint labente XII smculo ante introductam arabum philosophiam temperati realismi antccessores (Lille, 1908) ; Mercieb, Criteriologie ginirale (Louvain, 190.5).
M. De Wulf.
Nomination. — The various methods of designating persons for ecclesiastical benefices or offices have been described under Benefice; Bishop; Election; In- stitution, Canonical. All these methods are more or less included in the ordinary sense of the terra nom- ination; but in its strict canonical sense, nomination is defined as the designation of a person for an ecclesi- astical benefice or office made by the competent civil authority and conferring on the person named the right to be canonically instituted by the ecclesiastical superior. It follows the rules of patronal presentation, being based on the same grounds as the right of pat- ronage, viz. the endowment of churches or benefices by kings, princes, or communities. Its method of ac- tion is designed to keep the prerogatives of the two powers clearly separated, the intervention of the secu- lar power taking effect in the free choice of a fit person, the spiritual jurisdiction being reserved intact to the ecclesiastical superior, who alone can give canonical institution. At the present time appointments to ben- efices by right of nomination, esijecially to bishop- rics, is generally settled by negotiation and previous understanding between the two powers. I'niler the old regime tlic noniinati'il person himself a])plied for canonical institution; the .superior made inijuiry as to the applicant and, unle.ss the inquiry disclosed un- worthiness or unfitness, granted canonical institution according to the customary forms — mo.st ofleii by con- sistorial preconiz.ation. Whatever procedure may be followeil, the person named by the civil iinwer luis no spiritual juri.sdiclion until he has been caminicaUy in- stituted; and if li<' should dare to intrude in the admin- istration of the dioiMsc with no other title than his nomination by the secular authority, not only would all iiis acts l)c riull and void, but he, and with him those who should li.ave coiisiMiled to his acts, would incur exconiiiiunication and (jther penalties; moreover, he would forfeit the right resulting from his nomination (Const. "Romanus pontifex", 28 Aug., 1873, and the texts there cited. Cf. Excommunication, vol. V, p. G91, col. 1).
The most important apphcation of the right of iiom-
