OBLATION
189
OBLIGATION
after St. Philip Neri, their protector), founded by
lUitiho Brandi, had the care of 100 poor girls, whom
they brought up until they either married or em-
braced religion. These oblates began reUgious ob-
servance at S. Lucia della Chiaviea, were transferred
to Monte Citorio, and, when the convent there was
pulled down by Innocent XII in 169.3, returned to S.
Lucia. They adopted the Augustinian Rule.
(4) The Daughters of the Seven Dolours of the Blessed Virgin, a development out of some confraternities of the same name, founded by St. Philip Benizzi, estab- lished a house at Rome in 16.52. Their object was to take in infirm women who would not be received in other congregations. They followed the Augustinian Rule and promised stability, conrersio morum, and obedience according to the constitutions.
Congregations OP Obl.\tes. Men. — (1) Earliest in origin of the societies or congregations of priests known as oblates is that of St. Charles Borromeo. It is an institute of regular clerks, founded by the saint in 1578 for the better administration of his diocese and to enable the more spiritual-minded of his clergy to lead a more detached and unworldly life. They live, whenever and wherever it is possible, in common. They make a simple vow of obedience to their bishop and, by doing so, bind themselves to exceptional service and declare their willingness to undertake labours for the salvation of souls which are not usually classed among the duties of a parish priest. From their constitution it is evident that their use- fulness and develo]]ment, and even existence, depend on the bishop and the interest he takes in them. At present, they are nowhere a large or important body, and perhaps do not meet with the encouragement they deserve.
(2) The greatest and best-known congregation of oblate priests, that of Mary Immaculate (O.M.I.), is dealt with in a special article. Connected with the institute and under its direction are the Oblate Sisters of the Holy Family.
(3) The Oblates of Mary, not to be confounded with those of Mary Immaculate or with the Marists, are a society of Piedraontese priests founded in 1.S4.5. They have houses at Turin, Novara, and Pinerolo, and send missionaries to Burma, Ava, and Pegu in the East Indies.
(4) By a decree of Pope Leo XIII, dated 17 June, 1898, the Oblati seculares O.S.B.— that is, those who have received the privilege of the scapular, and, for their friendliness and good offices, have been admitted as confratres of any Benedictine monastery or congre- gation — are now granted all the indulgences, graces, and privileges conceded to those of any other congre- gations, more particularly the Cassinese. The pope further states that, since "Benedictine Oblates cannot, at the same time, be tertiaries of the Franciscan or any other order, it is "congruous" that they should have peculiar privileges. He, therefore, grants them the plenary indulgence on the day of clothing and the chief feasts of oblates etc.; twice a year the blessing in the encyclical letters of Pope Benedict XIV; the general absolution which tertiaries are able to receiveon certain days during confession, with the jileiiary in- dulgence annexed to it {adhibita formula pro Trrtiafiis pTiTscripta) ; the special plenary indulgence at the hour of death (observetur ritus et formula a constitutione P. P. Bened. XIV "Pia Mater"); an indulgence of seven years and seven quarantines every time they hear Mass cnrde sallem contrili — in a word, all and each of the privileges and favours granted to the lay ter- tiaries of St. Francis and of other orders.
Mlyot, Hisl. drs ordm mnn.: MloHE. Did.des ord.Te!.: Goscn- l.ER, Diet, cncyd. de la IhfnI. ailh.. s. v. Oblate: ClLMET, Comment. in Rea- S. P. BeiiedicH: Hei.mbucheh, Z)ie Orden u. Kongreg. der kalh. Kirche (Paderborn, 1907-8).
J. C. Almond. Oblation. See Host (Canonico-Liturgical).
Obligation, a term derived from the Roman civil
law, defined in the "Institutes" of Justinian as a
"legal bond which by a legal necessity binds us to do
something according to the laws of our State" (III,
13). It was a relation by which two persons were
bound together (ohligati) by a bond which the law
recognized and enforced. Originally both parties were
considered to be under the obligation to each other;
subsequently the term was restricted to one of the
parties, who was said to be under an obligation to do
something in favour of another, and consequently
that other had a correlative right to enforce the fulfil-
ment of the obligation. The transference of the term
from the sphere of law to that of ethics was easy and
natural. In ethics it acquired a wider meaning and
was used as a synonym for duty. It thus became the
centre of some of the fundamental problems of ethics.
The question of the source of moral obligation is per-
haps the chief of these problems, and it is certainly
not one of the easiest or least important. We all
acknowledge that we are in general under an obliga-
tion not to commit murder, but when we ask for the
ground of the obligation, we get almost as many dif-
ferent answers as there are systems of ethics.
The prevailing Catholic doctrine may be explained in the following terms. By moral obligation we under- stand some sort of necessity, imposed on the will, of doing what is good and avoiding what is evil. The necessity, of which there is question here, is not the physical coercion exercised on man by an external and stronger physical force. If two strong men seize me by the arms and drag me whither I would not go, I act under necessity or compulsion, but this is not the necessity of moral obligation. The will, which is the seat of moral obligation, is incapable of being physically coerced in that manner. It cannot be forced to will what it does not will. It is indeed possible to conceive that the will is necessitated to action by the antece- dent conditions. The doctrine of those who deny free will is easily intelligible although we deny that it ia true. The will is indeed necessitated by its own na- ture to tend towards the good in general; we cannot wish for what is evil unless it presents itself to us under the appearance of good. We also necessarily wish for happiness, and if we found ourselves in presence of some object which fully satisfied all our desires, and contained in itself nothing to repel us, we should be necessitated to love it. But in this life there is no such object which can fully satisfy all our desires and thus make us completely happy. Health, friends, fame, wealth, pleasures, singly or all com- bined, are incapable of filling the void in our hearts. Though in their mca,sure desirable, all earthly goods are limited, and man's (Mpai'il y for good is unlimited. .411 earthly goods arc (I. r.Tti\ r; we recognize their defects and the evil whirli the pursuit or po.ssession of them entails. Considered with their defects, they repel as well as attract us; our wills therefore are not necessitated by them. In the i)re.sence of any earthly good our wills are free, at least after the first involun- tary tendency to what attracts theni; they are not necessitated (o full and deliberate action.
Theneiis^itv, I lien, which constitutes the e.s.sence of moral oliliual n^n must be of the kind which an end that must lie .itlaiued lays upon us of adopting the necessary means towards obtaining that end. If I am bound to cross the ocean and I am unable to fly, I must go on board ship. That is the only means at my disposal for attaining the end which I am bound to obtain. Moral obligation is a necessity of this kind. It is the necessity that I am under, of employing the necessary means towards the obtaining of an end which is also necessary. The necessity, then, which moral obligation lays upon us is the necessity, not of the determinism of nature, nor of the physical coercion of an external and stronger force, but it is of the same general character as the necessity that we are under
