PAPAL
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PAPAL
1752. They never fully recovered from this blow,
and were already on the decline when the Jesuit
order w:is expelled from Mexico in 1767 and the mis-
sions were turned over to the Franciscans, among
whom, in this region, the most noted was Father
Francisco Carets, first Franciscan missionary at San
Xavier del Bac and author of a journal of explora-
tion among the tribes of the Lower Colorado River.
San Xavier had dwindled from S30 souls in 1697 to 270 in 1772, while the other missions had de- clined in proportion, their former tenants, whose numbers were constantly diminishing by neglect and Apache raids, having scattered over the desert. In 1828 the revolutionary Government of Mexico con- fiscated the missions, and for many years even San Xa\aer was left without attention, except for oc- casional visits by a secular priest from Sonora. In 1864 a Catholic school was once more re-established in connexion with the ancient church, and continues in successful operation. The Pdpago, including most of the descendants of the Sobaipuri, number now alto- gether about 5500 souls, of whom all but about 1000 are in Arizona, the rest being in Sonora, Mexico. Those in Arizona are on two reservations at Gila Bend and San Xav-ier, established in 1874 and 1882, or scattered in villages throughout Pima County. They are farmers, stock raisers, and general labourers, practically all civilized and Catholic. See Kino ; Pim.\.
B-vNCROFT, Hist. North Mex, States and Texas (San Francisco, 1886); Idem, Hist, of Arizona and New Mex. (San Francisco, 1889); CoUES (ed.). Cards Diary (New York, 1900); Ohteqa. Apost. afanes de la C. de J. (Barcelona. 1754), repub. as Hist, del Nayarit (Mexico, 1887); Ortega (?), Rudo ensayo , . . descripcion oeographica de . . . Sonora, ca. 1762 (St. Augustine, 1863), tr. Gui- teras in Am. Cath. Hist. Soc. Records, V (Philadelpliia, 1894); Commissioner of Indian Affairs, annual reports (Washington) ; Bur. Cath. Ind. Miss., annual reports of director (Washington).
James Mooney.
Papal Arbitration, an institution almost coeval with the papacy itself. The principle of arbitra- tion presupposes that the individuals or groups of individuals submitting to arbitrament are united in some common bond. As soon therefore as this com- mon bond has come prominently before public opin- ion, there necessarily results a tendency to settle dis- putes by reference to it. Thus the growth of law, i. e. the gradual evolution from private revenge or vendelta to the judgment, of some public authority, can in the history of any known nation or tribe be traced parallel with the awakening feeling of social solidarity. It was just because men began to realize, however rudely, that they were not single units but members of a society, that they understood how every tort or wrong-doing disturbed not merely the individual di- rectly affected, but the whole body of which he was a member. It was this recognition of the social dis- advantages of disorder that led to compromise, to mutual pledges, to trials by combat, to ordeals, and eventually to the regulations of courts of law. This is most patently manifest among the Northern na- tions in the primitive history of the jury system.
Now this same principle was bound to operate inter- nationally whenever the various groupings of E\irope realized their solidarity. The same undoubted ad- vance would be made when men became conscious that the theory into which law had developed as an adjudication between individuals by the society, was applicable also in matters of international dispute. But this consciousness required to be preceded by the recognition of two principles: (1) that nations were moral persons (2) tliat they were united in some com- mon organism. The first principle was too abstract in its nature to be professed explicitly at once (Figgis, "From Gerson to Grotius", vi, 177). The second would be very quickly recognized if only some con- crete symbol of it could become evident to public opinion. This concrete symbol was fortunately at hand, and the result was arbitration. For the medie-
val papacy directing the conscience of Europe, legis-
lating for the newly-converted pcojjles, drawing to
itself the representatives of (vuli naliimal episcopate,
con.stiditing a sacred shrine for myal jiilgrimages, could
not fail to impress on the Christian nations a sen.se of
their common faith. It was the pap;iry which there-
fore at one and the same time, by trc;iting eadi nation
as a separate unit, expressed in a primate with his
suffragan bishops, and yet by legislating identically
in matters of faith and morals for all the nations, ex-
pounded the double thesis of nationalism and inter-
nationalism. It was a standing concrete exjiression
of the two principles aforesaid, viz. that the nations
were separate individuals, yet members of a Christian
brotherhood, moral persons yet subject to the com-
mon law of Christendom. Hence, owing to the cir-
cumstances of Western politics, papal arbitration
was a necessary consequence of the very idea of
the papacy. In treating of papal arbitration, three
points must be set out: (A) the principles on which the
popes claimed the right to arbitrate, i. e. the papal
theory of the relationship between the Holy See and
the temporal powers; (B) the most important cases of
historical arbitration by the popes; (C) the future
opportunity for this arbitration.
A. The Papal Theory. — It is evident that before the conversion of Constant ine there could have been little question of the relations between Church and State. The Church was undeniably conscious of her independence, but up to that date Christianity had practically none but spiritual duties to perform. The Apostolic writings preach submission to authority and do not at all raise the problem of the adjustment of the relationship between pope and Ca;sar. The con- version of Constantine therefore opened up a large field of speculation. This begins indeed from the as- sembling of the General Council of Nica;a (325). Here, according to Rufinus (H. E., I, ii, in P. L., XXI, 470), the emperor himself laid the basis of all develop- ment in this direction. He declared that God had given to the priests (i. e. to the whole ecclesiastical corporation) power to judge even emperors (et idea nos a I'obis rede judicamur).
Hosius of Cordova, who had been president of that council, in his defence of Athanasius has the same thought, noting that God had given to Constantine the empire and to the priesthood He had confided the Church (quoted by St. Athanasius, "History of the Arians", xliv, inP. G., XXV, 717). This entire separa- tion of the two powers, ecclesiastical and lay, is gen- erally laid down with very definite clearness by the earlier writers (Lucifer of Cagliari, "Pro Athanasio", in P. L., XIII, 826; St. Optatus, " De Schismate Dona- tistarum", III, iii, in P. L., XI, 999). Not that any slight is put upon the imperial dignity, for to the prince first of all is applied the title which subsequently be- comes proper to the popes alone. He is called Vicarius Dei (.\mbrosiaster, "Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Tes- tamenti XCI", in P. L., XXV, 2284; Sedulius Scotus, "De Rectoribus Christianis", 19 in P. L., CXII, 329). Yet he has no jurisdiction over the spiritual functions of his .subjects, "for who", says St. Ambrose (Ep., XXI, 4, ad Valenrinum, II, in P. L., XVI, 1046), "would venture to deny that in matters of faith, it is the bishops who sit in judgment over emperors, and not the emperors who sit in judgment over bishops?"; and the two popes who first have any prominent teaching on the matter, Felix III (483) and Gelasius I (492), use precisely the same language, describing the Church and the State as two parallel powers, en- tirely separate.
"The emperor", says Gehwius in an epigram (Ep. XV, 95, ad Episcopos Orientales, in P. L., LIX), "is the Church's son, not sovereign " {Filius est non prirnul ecclesicc). This pope has fortunately left us two com- plete treatises on this question. In his Fourth Trac- tate and his Eighth Letter (P. h., LIX, 41), he formu-
