PENANCE
623
PENANCE
dogmatic£e", Freiburg, 1897; De San, "De poeniten-
tia", Bruges, 1899; Pohle, "Lehrb. d. Dogmatik".
Regarding the form of the sacrament^ both the Coun-
cil of Florence and the Council of Trent teach that it
consists iiTthe words of absolution. "The form of the
SacramehTof "Penance, wherein its force principally
"consists, is placed in those words of the minister: 'I
absolve thee, etc. '; to these words indeed, in accord-
ance with the usage of Holy Church, certain prayers
are laudably added, but they do not pertain to the
essence of the form nor are they necessary for the ad-
ministration of the sacrament" (Council of Trent,
Sess. XIV, c. 3). Concerning these additional prayers,
the use of the Eastern and Western Churches, and the
question whether the form is deprecatory or indicative
and personal, see Absolution. Cf. also the writers
referred to in the preceding paragraph.
Effect. — "_The effect of this sacrament is deliverance from sin" (Council of Florence). The same definition in somewhat different terms is given by the Council of Trent (Sess. XIV, c. 3): " So far as pertains to its force and efficacy, the effect {res ct effectus) of this sacrament is reconciliation with God, upon which there some- TTines follows, in pious and devout recipients, peace and calm of conscience with intense consolatioiv of spirit". This reconciliation implies first of all that the guilt of sin is remitted, and consequently also the eternal punishment due to mortal sin. As the Council of Trent declares, penance requires the performance of satisfaction "not indeed for the eternal penalty which is remitted together with the guilt either by the sacrament or by the desire of receiving the sacrament, but for the temporal penalty which, as the Scriptures teach, is not always forgiven entirely as it is in bap- tism" (Sess. VI, c. 14). In other words baptism frees the soul not only from all sin but also from all indebt- edness to Divine justice, whereas after the reception of absolution in penance, there may and usually does remain some temporal debt to be discharged by works \ of satisfaction (.see below). ^'ciiiMl sins by which we A are not deprived of the grac^if (ioil and into which ^we very frequently fall are rightly and usefidly de- cEretTm confession; but mention of them may, with- ' out any fault, be omitted and they can be expiated "by many other remedies" (Council of Trent, Sess. ' XIV, c. 3). Thu s, an act of contrition suffices to ob- - tain forgiveness ciTvenial sin, and the same effect is_ -'product'd by the worthy reception of sacraments other
than penance, e. g., by Holy Communion. ."V" " The reconciliation of the sinner with God has as a
- / furfTISTTonsequence the revival of those merits which
he had obtained before committing grievous sin. Good works performed in the state of grace deserve a reward Tr'om God, but this is forfeited by mortal sin, so that if the sinner should die unforgiven his good deeds avail him nothing. So long as he remains in sin, he is incapable of meriting: even works which are good in "'{hemselves are, in his case, worthless: they cannot revive, because they never were alive. But once his sin is cancelled by penance, he regains not only the state of grace but also the entire store of merit which had, before his sin, been placed to his credit. On this point theologians are practically unanimous: the only hindrance to obtaining reward is sin, and when this is removed, the former title, so to speak, is revalidated. On the other hand, if there were no such revalidation, the loss of merit once acquired would be equivalent to an eternal punishment, which is incompatible with the forgiveness effected by penance. As to the further question regarding the manner and extent of the re- vival of merit, various opinions have been proposed; but that which is generally accepted holds with Suarez (De reviviscentia meritorum) that the revival is com- plete, i. e., the forgiven penitent lias to his credit as much merit as though he had never sinned. See De Augustinis, "De re sacramentaria", II, Rome, 1887; Pesch, op. cit., VII; Gottler, "Der hi. Thomas v.
Aquin u. die vortridentinischen Thomisten iiber die
Wirkungen d. Busssakramentes", Freiburg, 1904.
The Minister, i. e., the confessor. — From the ju- dicial character of this sacrament it follows that not every member of the Church is qualified to forgive sins; the administration of penance is reserved to those who are invested with authority. That this power does not belong to the laity is evident from the Bull of Martin V "Inter cunctas" (1418) which among other questions to be answered by the followers of Wyclif and Huss, has this: "whether he believes that the Christian ... is bound as a necessary means of salvation to confess to a priest only and not to a lay- man or to laymen however good and devout" (Den- zinger-Bannwart, "Enchir.", 670). Luther's proposi- tion, that "any Christian, even a woman or a child" could in the absence of a priest absolve as well as pope or bi.shop,was condemned (1520) by Leo X in the Bull "E.xurge Domine" (Enchir., 7.53). The Council of Trent (Se.ss. XIV, c. 6) condemns as "false and as at variance with the truth of the Ciospel all doctrines which extend the ministry of the keys to any others than bishops and priests, imagining that the words of the Lord (Matt., xviii, 18; John, xx, 23) were, contrary to the institution of this sacrament, ad- dressed to all the faithful of Christ in such wise that each:iiiil (•\(iy oiii' has thi' power of remitting sin".
Ilhollr ,1.
Til
and prii': Is can
These decaer;
the usage, whic
time in the Mid
tli^
icfore, is that only bishops
MTcisc flio power:
iKiroover put an end, practically, to had sprung up and lasted for some e .\ges, of confessing to a layman in case of necessity. This custom originated in the con- viction that he who had sinned was obliged to make_. known his sin to some one — to a priest if possible, otherwise to a layman. In the work "On true penance and false" (De vera et falsa poenitentia), erroneously ascribed to St. Augustine, the counsel is given: ">So great is the power of confession that if a priest be not at hand, let him (the person desiring to confess) con- fess to his neighbour." But in the same place the explanation is given: "although he to whom the con- fession is made has no power to absolve, nevertheless he who confesses to his fellow (socio) becomes worthy of pardon through his desire of confessing to a priest" (P. L., XL, 1113). Lea, who cites (I, 220) the asser- tion of the Pseudo-Augustine about confession to one's neighbour, passes over the explanation. He con- sequently sets in a wrong light a series of incidents illustrating the practice and gives but an imperfect idea of the theological discussion which it aroused. Though Albertus Magnus (In IV Sent., dist. 17, art. .58) regarded as sacramental the absolution granted by a layman while St. Thomas (IV Sent., d. 17, q. 3, a. 3, sol. 2) speaks of it as "quodammodo sacramentalis", other great theologians took a quite different view. Alexander of Hales (Summa, Q. xix, De confe.s.sione memb., I, a. 1) says that it is an "imploring of abso- lution"; St. Bonaventure ("Opera", VII, p. 345, Lyons, 1668) that such a confession even in cases of necessity is not obligatory, but merely a sign of contri- tion; Scotus (IV Sent. ,d. 14,q.4) that there is no pre- cept obliging one to confess to a layman and that this practice may be very detrimental; Durandus of St. Pourcain (IV Sent., d. 17, q. 12) that in the absence of a priest, who alone can absolve in the tribunal of penance, there is no obligation to confess; Prierias (Summa Silv., s. v. Confessor, I, 1) that if absolution is given by a layman, the confession mu.st be repeated whenever possible; this in fact was the general opin- ion. It is not then surprising that Dominicus Soto, writing in 1.564, should find it difficult to believe that such a custom ever existed: "since (in confession to a layman) there was no sacrament ... it is incred- ible that men, of their own accord and with no profit to themselves, should reveal to others the secrets of their conscience" (IV Sent., d. 18, q. 4, a. 1). Since,
