PERSON
726
PERSON
pope and the British Govornnient. He obtained
British recognition for Catliolic rights.
He was I'onseerated bishop on 8 March, 1S54, anti nominatetl bisliop-auxiliary to Bisliop Hartniann; but the next year he was appointed visitor of the Vicariate of Agra, anil afterwards vicar Apostohc of that district. During the Indian Mutiny he was sev- eral times in danger of his life. The anxieties of this period told upon his health and in 1860 he w;vs com- pelled to return to Italy. Sent in 1800 on a mission to the United .Stales, he took part in the Council of Bal- timore. On 20 March, 1S70, he was nominated Bishop of Savannah; but his health again failing, he resigned in 1S73. In 1874 he was sent as Apostolic delegate to Canada; and in 1877 he was commissioned to settle the alTairs of the Malabar schism. On 20 March, 1879, he was appointed Bishop of Aquino in Italy; but in March, 1887, he was promoted to the titular Arch- bishopric of Tamiatha and sent as Apostolic delegate to Ireland to report upon the relations of the clergy with the political movement. He quickly saw that the question must be considered not merely in relation to present politics but also in relation to the past history of Ireland, ami he d(-laycd his final report in order to consider the (|uesti(in in this brciailer aspect. Mean- while the Ildly Sec issued its (■ondeinnation of the Plan of Campaign. I'ersico returned to Rome much disap- pointed. He was at once nominated Vicar of the Vati- can Chapter. On 10 January, 1893, he was created cardinal priest of the title of St. Peter in Chains.
Armlecta Ord. Min. Capp., XII, 30-32; see also letters of Persico in United Irishman (23 April, 1904).
Father Cuthbert.
Person. — The Latin word persona was originally used to denote the mask worn by an actor. From this it was applied to the role he assumed, and, finally, to any character on the stage of life, to any individual. This article discusses (1) the definition of "person", especially with reference to the doctrine of the In- carnation; and (2) the use of the word persona and its Greek equivalents in connexion with the Trinita- rian disputes. For the psychological treatment see Personality.
(1) Definition. — The classic definition is that given by Boethius in "De persona et duabus naturis", c. ii: Naluroe rationalis individua substantia (an in- dividual substance of a rational nature). "Sub- stance" is used to exclude accidents: "We see that accidents cannot constitute person" (Boethius, op. cit.). Substantia is used in two senses: of the con- crete substance as existing in the individual, called substantia prima, corresponding to Aristotle's oiirla vpiiTTi; and of abstractions, substance as existing in genus and species, called substantia secunda, Aris- totle's oiffla oevT4pa. It is disputed which of the two the word taken by itself here signifies. It seems prob- able that of itself it prescinds from substantia prima and substantia secunda, and is restricted to the former signification only by the word individua.
Individua, i. e., indivisum in sc, is that which, unlike the higher branches in the tree of Porphyry, genus and species, cannot be further subdivided. Boethius in giving his definition does not seem to attach any further signification to the word. It is merely synony- mous with singutaris.
Rationalis naturoE. — Person is predicated only of intellectual beings. The generic word which includes all individual existing substances is suppositum. Thus person is a subdivision of suppositum which is applied equally to rational and irrational, living and non- living individuals. A person is therefore sometimes defined as suppositum naturw rationalis.
The definition of Boethius as it stands can hardly be considered a satisfactory one. The words taken literally can be applied to the rational soul of man, and also to the human nature of Christ. That St.
Thomas accepts it is presumably due to the fact
that he found it in po.ssession, and recognized as the
traditional definition, lie explains it in terms that
praclicaiiy constitute a new definition. Individua
subslanlid signifies, he says, .•iiibstarttia, comphta, per
se subsistcns, st-parata ah aliis, \. e., a substance, com-
plete, subsisting per se, existing apart from others
(III, Q.xvi, a. 12, ad 2""'). If to this be added ratio-
nalis natura, we have a definition comprising the five
notes that go to make up a person: (a) substantia —
this excludes accident; (b) comjikta — it must form a
complete nature; that which is a ])urt, either actually
or "aptitudinally" does not .■satisfy the definition;
(c) per se subsistens — the person exists in himself and
for himself; he is sui juris, the ultimate possessor of
his nature and all its acts, the ultimate subject of
predication of all his attributes; that which exists in
another is not a person; (d) separata ab aliis — this
excludes the universal, substajilia secunda, which has
no existence apart from the individual; (e) rationalis
naturce — excludes all non-intellectual supposita. To
a person therefore belongs a threefold incommunica-
bility, cx'pre.s.sed in notes (b), (c), and (d). The
human soul belongs to the nature as a part of it, and
is therefore not a person, even when existing sepa-
rately. The human nature of Christ does not exist
per se scorsum, but in alio, in the Divine Personality
of the Word. It is therefore communicated by as-
sumption and so is not a person. Lastly the Divine
Essence, though subsisting per sr, is so communicated
to the Three Persons that it does not exist apart from
them; it is therefore not a iierson.
Theologians agree that in the Hypostatic Union the immediate reason why the Sacred Humanity, though complete and individual, is not a person is that it is not a subsistence, not p(r sc scorsum subsistens. They have, h()we\iT, (liNputnl fur centuries as to what may be the ultimate (leteniiiiialion of the nature which if present would make it a subsistence and so a per.son, what in other words is the ultimate foundation of personality. According to Scotus, as he is usually understood, the ultimate foundation is a mere nega- tion. That indixidual intellectual nature is a person which is neither of its nature destined to be commu- nicated — as is the humtui soul — nor is actually com- municated — as is the Sacred Humanity. If the Hy- postatic Union ceased, the latter would ipso facto, without any further determination, become a person. To this it is objected that the person possesses the na- ture and all its attributes. It is difficult to believe that this possessor, as distinct from the objects possessed, is constituted only by a negative. Consequently, the traditional Thomists, following Cajetan, hold that there is a positive determination which they call the "mode" of subsistence. It is the function of this mode to make the nature incommunicable, terminated in itself, and capable of receiving its own esse, or exis- tence. Without this mode the human nature of Christ exists only by the uncreated esse of the Word.
Suarez also makes the ultimate foundation of per- sonality a mode. In his view, however, as he holds no real distinction between nature and esse, it does not prepare the nature to receive its own existence, but is something added to a nature conceived as al- ready existing. Many theologians hold that the very concept of a mode, viz., a determination of a substance really distinct from it but adding no reality, involves a contradiction. Of more recent theories that of Tipha- nus (" De hypo.stasi et persona", 1634) has found many adherents. He holds that a substance is a suppositum, an intelligent substance a person, from the mere fact of its being a whole, totum in se. This totality, it is contended, is a positive note, but adds no reality, as the whole adds nothing to the parts that compose it. In the Hypostatic Union the human nature is perfected by being assumed, and so ceases to be a whole, being merged in a greater totality. The Word, on the other
