POPE
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POPE
clares the meaning of the first, and the power signified
in the first clause by the metaphor of the keys is
supreme. It is worthy of note that to no one else save
to Christ and His chosen vicegerent does Holy Scrip-
ture attribute the power of the keys.
Certain patristic passages are further adduced by non-Catholics as adverse to the meaning given by the Church to Matt., xvi, 19. St. Augustine in several places tells us that Peter received the keys as repre- senting the Church — e. g. "In Joan.", tr. 1, 12, in P. L., XXXV, 1763: "Si hoc Petro tantum dictum est, non facit hoc Ecclesia ... ; si hoc ergo in Ecclesia fit, Petrus quando claves accepit, Ecclesiam sanctam significavit" (If this was said to Peter alone, the Church cannot exercise this power . . . ; if this power is exercised in the Church, then when Peter received the keys, he signified the Holy Church) ; cf . tr. cxxiv, 5, in P. L., XXXV, 1973; "Serm.", ecxcv, in P. L., XXVIII, 1349. It is argued that, according to Augustine, the power denoted by the keys resides primarily not in Peter, but in the whole Church. Christ's gift to His people was merely bestowed on Peter as representing the whole body of the faithful. The right to forgive sins, to exclude from communion, to exercise any other acts of authority, is really the pre- rogative of the whole Christian congregation. If the minister performs these acts he does so as delegate of the people. The argument, which was formerly em- ployed by Galilean controversialists (cf.Febronius,"De statu eccl.", i, § 6), however, rests on a misunderstand- ing of the passages. Augustine is controverting the Novatian heretics, who affirmed that the power to remit sins was a purely personal gift to Peter alone, and had disappeared with liim. He therefore asserts that Peter received it that it might remain for ever in the Church and be used for its benefit. It is in that sense alone that he says that Peter represented the Church. There is no foundation whatever for saying that he desired to affirm that the Church was the true recipient of the power conferred. Such a view would be contrary to the whole patristic tradition, and is expressly reprobated in the Vatican Decree, cap. i.
It appears from what has been saitl that, when the popes legislate for the faithful, when they try offenders by juridical process, and enforce their sentences by censures and excommunications, they are employing powers conceded to them by Christ. Their authority to exercise jurisdiction in this way is not founded on the grant of any ci\dl ruler. Indeed the Church has claimed and exercised these powers from the very first. AVhen the Apostles, after the Council of Jerusalem, sent out their decree as vested with DiWne authority (Acts, XV, 28), they were imposing a law on the faith- ful. When St. Paul bids Timothy not receive an accusation against a presbyter unless it be supported by two or three witnesses, he clearly supposes him to be empowered to judge him in foro extenio. This claim to exercise coercive jurisdiction has, as might be expected, been denied by various heterodox writ- ers. Thus ^larsilius Patavinus (Defensor Pacis, II, iv), Antonius de Dominis (De rep. eccl., IV, vi, vii, ix), Richer (De eccl. et pol. potestate, xi-xii), and later the Synod of Pistoia, all alike maintained that coer- cive jurisdiction of every kind belongs to the ci\-il power alone, and sought to restrict the Church to the use of moral means. This error has always been condemned by the Holy See. Thus, in the Bull "Auctorem Fidel", Pius VI makes the following pro- nouncement regarding one of the Pistoian proposi- tions: "[The aforesaid proposition] in respect of its insinuation that the Church does not possess author- ity to exact subjection to her decrees otherwise than by means dependent on persuasion: so far as this signifies that the Church 'has not received from God power, not merely to direct by counsel and persuasion, but further to command by laws, and to coerce and compel the delinquent and contumacious by external
and salutary penalties' [from the brief 'Ad assiduas'
(1755) of Benedict XIV], leads to a system already
condemned as heretical." Nor may it be held that
the pope's laws must exclusively concern spiritual
objects, and their penalties be exclusively of a spiritual
character. The Church is a perfect society (see
Chitrch, XIII). She is not dependent on the per-
mission of the State for her existence, but holds her
charter from God. As a perfect society she has a right
to all those means which are necessary for the attain-
ing of her end. These, however, will include far more
than spiritual objects and spiritual penalties alone:
for the Church requires certain material possessions,
such, for example, as churches, schools, seminaries,
together with the endowments necessary for their sus-
tentation. The administration and the due protection
of these goods will require legislation other than what
is hmited to the spiritual sphere. A large body of
canon law must inevitably be formed to determine the
conditions of their management. Indeed, there is a
fallacy in the assertion that the Chm-ch is a spiritual
society; it is spiritual as regards the ultimate end to
which all its activities are directed, but not as regards
its present constitution nor as regards the means at
its disposal. The question has been raised whether
it be lawful for the Church, not merely to sentence a
delinquent to physical penalties, but itself to inflict
these penalties. As to tliis, it is sufficient to note that
the right of the Church to invoke the aid of the civil
power to execute her sentences is expressly asserted
by Boniface VIII in the Bull "Unam Sanctam". This
declaration, even if it be not one of those portions of
the Bull in which the pojie is defining a point of faith,
is so clearly connected with the parts expressly stated
to possess such character that it is held by theologians
to be theologically certain (Palmieri, "De Romano
Pontifice", thes. xxi). The question is of theoretical,
rather than of practical importance, since civil Gov-
ernments have long ceased to own the obligation of
enforcing the decisions of any ecclesiastical authority.
This indeed became inevitable when large sections of
the population ceased to be Catholic. The state of
things supposed could only exist when a whole nation
was thoroughly Catholic in spirit, and the force of
papal decisions was recognized by all as binding in
conscience.
(2) In the Constitution "Pastor ^Eternus", cap. iii, the pope is declared to possess ordinary, immediate, and episcopal jurisdiction over all the faithful: "We teach, moreover, and declare that, by the disposition of God, the Roman Clmrch possesses supreme ordi- nary authority over all Churches, and that the juris- diction of the Roman Pontiff, which is true episcopal jurisdiction, is immediate in its character" (Enchir., n. 1827). It is further added that this authority ex- tends to all alike, both pastors and faithful, whether singly or collectively. An ordinary jurisdiction is one which is exercised by the holder, not by reason of any delegation, but in virtue of the office which he himself holds. All who acknowledge in the pope any primacy of jurisdiction acknowledge that jurisdiction to be ordinary. This point, therefore, does not call for dis- cussion. That the papal authority is hkewise imme- diate has, however, been called in question. Jurisdic- tion is immediate when its possessor stands in direct relation to those with whose oversight he is charged. If, on the other hand, the supreme authority can only deal directly with the proximate superiors, and not with the subjects save through their intervention, his power is not immediate but mediate. That the pope's jurisdiction is not thus restricted appears from the analysis already given of Christ's words to St. Peter. It has been shown that He conferred on him a primacy over the Church, which is universal in its scope, ex- tending to all the Church's members, and which needs the support of no other power. A primacy such as this manifestly gives to him and to his successors a direct
