POVERTY
326
POVERTY
the religious can say to himself, "the superior, who is
acquainted with the facts, will approve of my acting
in this way ■without being informed of my intention".
The case is more difficult, when he knows that the
superior would expect to be informed, and asked for
permission, even though he would ^Nnllingly have
given his consent : if it seems probable t hat he regards
the request for permission as a condition of his ap-
proval, the inferior offends against the vow of poverty,
if he acts -n-ithout asking leave; but there is no offence
if he knows that the superior and himself are agreed
as to the essential nature of the act; and the question
whether the presumption is reasonable or otherwise
may depend on the customs of different orders, the
importance of the object, the frequent necessitj' of the
act, the age and prudence of the inferior, his relations
with his superior, the facility of obtaining access to
him, and other similar considerations. Any admission
of luxun.' or superfluity in daily hfe is derogatory to
the reUgious state and the first conception of voluntary
■ poverty; but it is not clear that this want of strictness
is necessarily contrary to the vow. To decide this,
regard must be had to the manner in which each par-
ticular vow, with all its circumstances, is generally
understood.
A sin against the vow of poverty is necessarily an offence against the virtue of religion, and when com- mitted in connexion with religious profession it is even a sacrilege. It may be a grave or a slight offence. The question, what matter is grave, causes great difficulty to moral theologians; and while some regard the ap- propriation of one franc as a grave matter, others are more lenient. Most theologians are inclined to com- pare the sin against the vow of poverty with the sin of theft, and say that the same amount which would make theft a mortal sin would, if appropriated contrary to the vow, constitute a grave offence against poverty. With the exception of Palmieri (Opus morale, tr. IX, c. i, n. 123) and Genicot (Theol. mor., II, n. 9S) moral- ists admit that as in the case of sins against justice, so here circumstances may be considered. While many persons consider the importance and the wealth or poverty of the community in which the offence is committed, we are of opinion that it is rather the extent of the vow that should be considered, since the act does not violate the vow by reason of the harm it causes, but by its being a forbidden appropriation. If the fault is aggravated by injustice it must, as an un- just act, be judged according to the usual rules; but when considered as an offence against the vow, its gravity will be measured by the condition of the per- son who commits it. Thus a sum which would be very large for a beggar will be insignificant for a man who had belonged to a higher class. The social posi- tion should be considered; is it that of the poor or mendicant class? One cannot without grave fault dispose independently of a sum which without grave fault one could not take away from a beggar. For many existing congregations, the matter will be that of a mortal sin of theft committed to the detri- ment of a priest of honourable condition. It fol- lows that in the case of incomplete appropriation, we must consider the economical value of the act in question; whether, for example, it is an act of simple use of administration; and when the religious does nothing but give away honourably goods of which he retains the ownership, the amount must be very large before the reasonable disposal of it can be regarded as a grave sin for want of the required authorization. If the sin consists, not in an independent appropria- tion, but in a life of too great lux-ury, it will be neces- sary to measure the gravity of the fault by the oppo- sition which exists between luxury and the poverty which is promised by vow.
Variety in the Votes of Poverty. — The vow of poverty is ordinarily attached to a religious profession; a person may however bind himself to a modest and
frugal life, or even to follow the direction of an adviser
in the use of his property. The vow may be perpetual
or temporary. It may exclude private possession, or
even to a certain point possession in common. It may
entail legal disability or be simply prohibitive. It
may extend to all goods possessed at present, or ex-
pected in the future; or it may be limited to certain
classes of property; it may require the complete re-
nunciation of rights, or simply forbid the application
to personal profit, or even the independent use of the
property. According to the present discipline of the
Church, the vow of poverty taken b}' religious always
involves a certain renunciation of rights: thus the
religious is understood to give up to his order for ever
the fruit of liis work or personal industry, stipends of
Masses, salary as professor, profits of any publication
or invention, or savings from money allowed him for
personal expenses. The independent disposal of any
of these would be contrary not only to the vow, but
also to justice. We have, moreover, to distinguish in
the religious life between the solemn vow of poverty
and the simple vow. The latter may be a step towards
the solemn vow, or it may have a final character of its
own.
The Solemn Vow of Poverty. — The solemn vow by common law has the following special characteristics: it extends to all property and rights; it renders one incapable of possessing property, and therefore of transferring it ; it makes all gifts or legacies which a religious receives, as well as the fruits of his own work, the property of the monastery; and in case prop- erty is inherited, the monasten,' succeeds in place of the professed religious, in accordance with the maxim: Quicquid monachus acquirit monasterio acquirit. Some orders are incapable of inheriting on such occasions, e. g., the Friars Minor Observantines, the Capuchins, and the Society of Jesus. The inheritance t hen passes to those who would succeed under the civil la%v in def.ault of the professed religious. Sometimes before solemn vows are made by a religious, his monastery gives up its right of inheritance by arrangement with the fam- ily, and sometimes the religious is allowed to dispose of his share in anticipation. (As to these arrange- ments and their effect, see Vermeersch, "De relig. instit. et pers.", II, 4th ed., supp. VI, 70 sqq.) As long as monasteries were independent, the monastery which inherited in place of the professed monk was the house to which he was bound by his vow of stabil- ity; but in more recent orders, the religious often changes his house, and sometimes his province, and has therefore no vow of stability, except as to the entire order; in such cases, the monastery according to the common usage is the whole order, unless some arrangement is made for partition among provinces or houses. (See Sanchez, "In decalogum", VII,_ x.xxii sqq.; De Lugo, "De iustitia et iure", d. iii, nn. 226 sqq.) We have already said that the religious of Belgium preserve their capacity to acquire property and dispose of it' their acts therefore are valid, but they will only be licit if done with the approval of their superior. It will be the duty of the latter to sec that the rigoiu- of observance and especially the common life do not suffer by this concession, which is, indeed, in other respects most important for their own civil security.
The 'Simple Vmo of Religious Poverty.— The simple vow of poverty has these common characteristics: it leaves the capacity to acquire intact, and permits the reUgious to retain certain rights of ownership. In ex- ceptional cases the simple vow may involve incapac- itv, as is characteristic of the last simple vows of the Society of Jesus. We have now to distinguish between the simple vow which is preparatory to the solemn vow, and the final simple vow.
(a) The simple vow in preparation for the solemn vow. — The Decree "Sanctissimus" of 12 June, 1858, with the subsequent declarations, constitutes the
