PHILOSOPHY
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PHILOSOPHY
movement of the mind towards the causes or objects
of the phenomena which confront it.
B. Deductive, or Synthetic a Priori, Method. — At the opposite pole to the preceding, the deductive method starts from very general principles, from higher causes, to descend (Lat. deducerc, to lead down) to more and more complex relations and to facts. The dream of the Deductionist is to take as the point of departure an intuition of the Absolute, of the Supreme Reality — for the Theists, God; for the jNIonists, the Universal Being — and to draw from this intuition the synthetic knowledge of all that depends upon it in the universe, in conformity with the metaphysical scale of the real. Plato is the father of deductive philosophy: he starts from the world of Ideas, and from the Idea of the Sovereign Good, and he would know the reahty of the world of sense only in the Ideas of which it is the reflection. St. Augustine, too, finds his satisfaction in stud\'ing the universe, and the least of the beings which com- pose it, only in a synthetic contemplation of God, the exemplary, creative, and final cause of all things. So, too, the Middle Ages attached great importance to the deductive method. "I propose", writes Boethius, "to build science by means of concepts and maxims, as is done in mathematics." Anselm of Canterbury draws from the idea of God, not only the proof of the real existence of an infinite being, but also a group of theorems on His attributes and His relations with the world. Two centuries before Anselm, Scotus Eriugena, the father of anti- Scholasticism, is the completest type of the Deduc- tionist: his metaphysics is one long description of the Divine Odyssey, inspired by the neo-Platonic, monist ic conception of the descent of the One in its successive generations. And, on the very threshold of the thir- teenth century, Alain de Lille would apply to phi- losophy a mathematical methodologj'. In the thir- teenth century Raymond LuUy beUeved that he had found the secret of "the Great Art" (ars magna), a sort of sjdlogism-machine, built of general tabu- lations of ideas, the combination of which would give the solution of any question whatsoever. Des- cartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz are Deductionists: they would construct philosophy after the manner of geometry {more geometrico). Unking the most special and complicated theorems to some very simple axioms. The same tendency appears among the Ontologists and the post-Kantian Pantheists in Ger- many (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), who base their philosophy upon an intuition of the Absolute Being.
The deductive philosophers generally profess to disdain the sciences of obser\-ation. Their great fault is the compromising of fact, bending it to a preconceived explanation or theorj' assumed a priori, whereas the observation of the fact ought to precede the assignment of its cause or of its adequate reason. This defect in the deductive method appears glaringly in a youthful work of Leibniz's, "Specimen demon- strationum politicarum pro rege Polonorum eli- gendo", published anonymously in 1669, where he demonstrates by geometrical methods (more geo- metrico), in sixty propositions, that the Count Pala- tine of Neuburg ought to be elected to the Polish Throne.
C. Analytico-Synthetic Method. — This combination of analysis and synthesis, of observation and deduc- tion, is the only method appropriate to philosophy. Indeed, since it undertakes to furnish a general explanation of the universal order (see section I), philosophy ought to begin with complex eflfeets, facta known by observation, before attempting to include them in one comprehensive explanation of the universe. This is manifest in psychology, where we begin with a cajeful examination of activities, notably of the [)henomena of sense, of intelligence, and of appetite; in cosmology, where we observe the
series of changes, superficial and profound, of bodies;
in moral philosophy, which sets out from the observa-
tion of moral facts ; in theodicy, where we interrogate
religious beUefs and feelings; even in metaphysics,
the starting-point of which is really existing being.
But observation and analysis once completed, the
work of synthesis begins. We must pass onward
to a synthetic psychology that shall enable us to
comprehend the destinies of man's ^ntal principle;
to a cosmology that shall explain the constitution
of bodies, their changes, and the stability of the laws
which govern them; to a synthetic moral philosophy
establishing the end of man and the ultimate ground
of duty; to a theodicy and deductive metaphysics
that shall examine the attributes of God and the
fundamental conceptions of all being. As a whole
and in each of its divisions, philosophy applies the
analytic-synthetic method. Its ideal would be to
give an account of the universe and of man by a
synthetic knowledge of God, upon whom all reality
depends. This panoramic view — the eagle's view
of things — has allured all the great geniuses. St.
Thomas expresses himself admirably on this sjTithetic
knowledge of the universe and its "first cause.
The analj-tico-synthetic process is the method, not only of philosophy, but of every science, for it is the natural law of thought, the proper function of which is unified and orderly knowledge. "Sapientis est ordinare." Aristotle, St. Thomas, Pascal, Newton, Pasteur, thus understood the method of the sciences. Men hke Helmholtz and ^^'undt adopted sjTithetic views after doing anal3-tical work. Even the Posi- ti\-ists are metaphysicians, though they do not know it or wish it. Does not Herbert Spencer call his philosophy sjTithetic? and does he not, by reasoning, pass beyond that domain of the "observable" within which he professes to confine himself?
V. The Gre.\t Historical Currents. — Among the many peoples who have covered the globe phil- osophic culture appears in two groups: the Semitic and the Indo-European, to which may be added the Egyptians and the Chinese. In the Semitic group (Arabs, Babj'lonians, Assj'rians, Aramaeans, Chal- deans) the Arabs are the most important; neverthe- less, their part becomes insignificant when compared with the intellectual life of the Indo-Europeans. Among the latter, philosophic life appears succes- sively in various ethnic divisions, and the succession forms the great periods into which the history of philosophy is divided; first, among the people of India (since 1500 B. c); then among the Greeks and the Romans (sixth century B. c. to sixth century of our era); again, much later, among the peoples of Central and Northern Europe.
A. Indian Philosophy. — The philo.sophy of India is recorded principally in the sacred books of the Veda, for it has always been closely united with religion. Its numerous poetic and religious produc- tions carry within themselves a chronologj' which enables us to assign them to three periods. (1) The Period of the Hymns of the Rig Veda (1500-1000 B. c). This is the most ancient monument of Indo- Germanic civilization; in it may be seen the progres- sive appearance of the fundamental theory that a single Being exists under a thousand forms in the multipHed phenomena of the universe (Monism). (2) The Period of the Bnlhmdnas (1000-.500 b. c). This is the age of Brahminical civilization. The theory of the one Being remains, but little by little the concrete and anthropomorphic ideas of the one Being are replaced by the doctrine that the basis of all things is in oneself (dtman). Psychological Monism appears in its entirety in the Upanishads: the absolute and adequate identity of the Ego — which is the constitutive basis of our individuality (dlman) — and of all things, with Brahman, the eternal being exalted above time, space, number,
