PHILOSOPHY
33
PHILOSOPHY
adhered, though it rose to its greatest height in the
EngUsh-speaking countries. In fact, England may
be said to have been the second fatherland of Posi-
tivism; John Stuart Mill, Huxley, Alexander Bain,
and Herbert Spencer expanded its doctrines, com-
bined them with Associationism and emphasized its
criteriologioal aspect, or attempted (Spencer) to
construct a vast synthesis of human sciences. The
Associationist philosophy at this time was con-
fronted by the Scotch philosophy which, in Hamil-
ton, combined the teachings of Reid and of Kant,
and found an American champion in Noah Porter.
Mansel spread the doctrines of Hamilton. As-
sociationism regained favour with Thomas Brown
and James Mill, but was soon enveloped in the larger
conception of Positivism, the dominant philosophy in
England. Lastly, in Italy, Hegel was for a long time
the leader of nineteenth-century philosophical thought
(Vera and d'Ercole), whilst Gioberti, the ontologist,
and Rosmini occupy a distinct position. More
recently. Positivism has gained numerous adherents
in Italy. In the middle of the century, a large Krau-
sist School existed in Spain, represented chiefly by
Sanz del Rio (d. 1869) and N. Salmeron. Balmes
(1810-48), the author of "Fundamental Philosophy",
is an original thinker whose doctrines have many
points of contact with Scholasticism.
VI. Contemporary Orientations. — A. Favourite Problems. — Leaving aside social questions, the study of which belongs to philosophy in only some of their aspects, it may be said that in the philosophic interest of the present day psychological questions hold the first place, and that chief among them is the problem of certitude. Kant, indeed, is so important a factor in the destinies of contemporary philosophy, not only because he is the initiator of critical formal- ism, but still more because he obliges his successors to deal with the preliminary and fundamental ques- tion of the limits of knowledge. On the other hand, the experimental investigation of mental processes has become the object of a new study, psycho- physiology, in which men of science co-operate with philosophers, and which meets with increasing suc- cess. This study figures in the programme of most modern universities. Originating at Leipzig (the School of Wundt) and Wiirzburg, it has quicldy be- come naturalized in Europe and America. In America, "The Psychological Review" has devoted many articles to this branch of philosophy. Psycho- logical studies are the chosen field of the Americans (Ladd, William James, Hall).
The great success of psychology has emphasized the subjective character of aesthetics, in which hardly anyone now recognizes the objective and metaphysi- cal element. The solutions in vogue are the Kantian, which represents the aesthetic judgment as formed in accordance with the subjective, structural functions of the mind, or other psychologic solutions which reduce the beautiful to a psychic impression (the "sympathy", or Einfiihlung, of Lipps; the "con- crete intuition " of Benedetto Croce) . These explana- tions are insufficient, as they neglect the objective aspect of the beautiful — those elements which, on the part of the object, are the caiise of the aesthetic impression and enjoyment. It may be said that the neo-Scholastic philosophy alone takes into account the objective ajsthetic factor.
The absorbing influence of psychology also mani- fests itself to the detriment of other branches of philosophy; first of all, to the detriment of meta- physics, which our contemporaries have unjustly ostracized — unjustly, since, if the existence or pos- sibility of a thing-in-itself is considered of importance, it behooves us to inquire under what aspects of reality it reveals itself. This ostracism of metaphysics, moreover, is largely due to misconception and to a wrong understanding of the theories of substance, XII.— 3
of faculties, of causes etc., which belong to the tra-
ditional metaphysics. Then again, the invasion of
psychology is manifest in logic : side by side with the
ancient logic or dialectic, a mathematical or symbolic
logic has developed (Peano, Russell, Peirce, Mitchell,
and others) and, more recently, a genetic logic which
would study, not the fixed laws of thought, but the
changing process of mental life and its genesis
(Baldwin).
We have seen above (section II, D) how the increasing cultivation of psychology has produced other scientific ramifications which find favour with the learned world.
Moral philosophy, long neglected, enjoys a renewed vogue notably in America, where ethnography is devoted to its service (see, e. g., the publications of the Smithsonian Institution). "The International Journal of Ethics" is a review especially devoted to this line of work. In some quarters, where the atmosphere is Positivist, there is a desire to get rid of the old morality, with its notions of value and of duty, and to replace it with a collection of empiric rules subject to evolution (Sidgwick, Huxley, Leslie Stephen, Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl).
As to the history of philosophy, not only are very extended special studies devoted to it, but more and more room is given it in the study of every philosophic question. Among the causes of this exaggerated vogue are the impulse given by the Schools of Cousin and of Hegel, the progress of historical studies in general, the confusion arising from the clash of rival doctrines, and the distrust engendered by that con- fusion. Remarkable works have been produced by Deussen, on Indian and Oriental philosophy ; by Zcller, on Greek antiquity; by Denifle, Haureau, Hiiumker, and Mandonnet, on the Middle Ages; by ^^'indelband, Kuno Fischer, Boutroux and Hoffding, on the modern period; and the list might easily be considerably prolonged.
B. The Opposing Systems. — The rival systems of philosophy of the present time may be reduced to various groups: Positivism, neo-Kantianism, Mon- ism, neo-Scholasticism. Contemporary philosophy lives in an atmosphere of Phenomenism, since Posi- tivism and neo-Kantianism are at one on this impor- tant doctrine: that science and certitude are possible only within the limits of the world of phenomena, which is the immediate object of experience. Posi- tivism, insisting on the exclusive rights of sensory experience, and Kantian criticism, reasoning from the structure of our cognitive faculties, hold that knowledge extends only as far as appearances; that beyond this is the absolute, the dark depths, the existence of which there is less and less disposition to deny, but which no human mind can fathom. On the contrary, this element of the absolute forms an integral constituent in neo-Scholasticism, which has revived, with sobriety and moderation, the funda- mental notions of Aristotelean and Medieval meta- physics, and has succeeded in vindicating them against attack and objection.
(1) Positivism, under various forms, is defended in England by the followers of Spencer, by Huxley, Lewes, Tyndall, F. Harrison, Congreve, Beesby, J. Bridges, Grant Allen (James Martineau is a reaction- ary against Positivism) ; by Balfour, who at the same time propounds a characteristic theory of belief, and falls back on Fideism. From England Posi- tivism passed over to America, where it soon dethroned the Scottish doctrines (Carus) . Dc Roberty, in Russia, and Ribot, in France, are among its most distinguished disciples. In Italy it is found in the writings of Ferrari, Ardigo, and Morselli; in Ger- many, in those of Laas, Riehl, Guyau, and Durkheim. Less brutal than Materialism, the radical \'ice of Positivism is its identification of the knowable with the sen.sible. It seeks in vain to reduce general idea.s to collective images, and to deny the abstract
