RATIONALISM
652
RATIONALISM
ornamented with diamonds, and worn over the chas-
uble. It is frequently met with in pictures of the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and is generally
square, seldom round in form. Its use was discon-
tinued in the course of the thirteenth century, and it
is only at Reims that its use can be traced to the
beginning of the sixteenth century. It originated
undoubtedly in the pomp developed in episcopal vest-
ments during the tenth century, and took its name
from the breast ornament of the Jewish high-priest.
Braun, Die liturgische Gewandung im Occident und Orient (Freiburg. 1907).
Joseph Braun.
Rationalism (Latin, rah'o-reason, the faculty of the mind whitli forms the ground of calculation, i.e. discursive reason. See Apologetics: Atheism; Bi- ble; Deism; Empiricism; Ethics; Exegesis, Bibli- cal; Faith; Materiaus.m; Miracle; Revelation). The term is used: (1) in an exact sense, to designate a particular moment in the development of Protestant thought in Germany; (2) in a broader, and more usual, sense to cover the view (in relation to which many schools may he classed as rationalistic) that the human reason, or understanding, is the sole source and final test of all truth. It has further: (3) occasionally been applied to the method of treating revealed truth theologically, by casting it into a reasoned form, and employing philosophical categories in its elaboration. These three uses of the term will be discussed in the present article.
(1) The German school of theological Rationalism formed a part of the more general movement of the eighteenth-century "Enlightenment". It maybe said to owe its immediate origin to the philosophical system of Christian Wolff (1679-17.54), which was a modification, with Aristotelean features, of that of Leibniz, especially characterized by its spirituaUsm, determinism, and dogmatism. This philosophy and its method exerted a profound influence upon con- temporaneous German religious thought, providing it with a rationalistic point of view in theology and exegesis. German philosophy in the eighteenth cen- tury was, as a whole, tributary to Leibniz, whose "Th^odic^e" was written principally against the Rationalism of Bayle : it was marked by an infiltration of English Deism and French MateriaUsm, to which the Rationalism at present considered had great affin- ity, and towards which it progressively developed: and it was \iilgarized b}' its union with popular litera- ture. Wolff himself was exToelled from his chair at the University of Halle on account of the Rationalistic nature of his teaching, principally owing to the action of Langs (1670-1774; cf. "Causa Dei ct religionis naturalis adversus atheismum", and "Modesta Dis- putatio", Halle, 1723). Retiring to Marburg, he taught there until 1740, when he was recalled to Halle by Frederick II. Wolff's attempt to demonstrate natural religion rationally was in no sense an attack upon revelation. Asa "supranaturalist" he admitted truths above reason, and he attempted to support by reason the supernatural truths contained in Holy Scripture. But his attempt, while it incensed the pietistic school and was readily welcomed by the more liberal and moderate among the orthodox Lutherans, in reality turned out to be strongly in favour of the Naturalism that he wished to condemn. Natural religion, he asserted, is demonstrable; revealed religion is to be found in the Bible alone. But in his method of proof of the authority of Scripture recourse was had to reason, and thus the human mind became, logicallj', the ultimate arbiter in the case of both. Supra- naturalism in theology, which it was Wolff's intention to uphold, proved incompatible with such a philo- sophical position, and Rationalism took its place. This, however, is to be distinguished from pure Naturalism, to which it led, but with which it never became theoretically identified. Revelation was not
denied by the Rationalists; though, as a matter of
fact, if not of theory, it was quiet Iv suppressed by the
claim, with its ever-increasing application, that reason
is the competent judge of all truth. Naturalists, on
the other hand, denied the fact of revelation. As with
Deism and Materialism, the German Rationalism in-
vaded the department of Biblical exegesis. Here a
destructive criticism, very similar to that of the
Deists, was levelled against the miracles recorded in,
and the authenticity of the Holy Scriptures. Never-
theless, the distinction between Rationalism and
Naturalism still obtained. The great Biblical critic
Seniler (172.5-91), who is one of the principal repre-
sentatives of the school, was a strong opponent of the
latter; in company with Teller (1734-1804) and others
he endeavoured to show that the records of the Bible
have no more than a local and temporary character,
thus attempting to safeguard the deeper revelation,
while sacrificing to the critics its superficial vehicle.
He makes the distinction between theology and reli-
gion (by which he signifies ethics).
The distinction made between natural and revealed religion necessitated a closer definition of the latter. For Supernaturalists and Rationalists alike religion was held to be "a way of knowing and worshipping the Deity", but consisting chiefly, for the Rational- ists, in the observance of God's law. This identifica- tion of religion with morals, which at the time was utilitarian in character (see Utilitarianism), led to further developments in the conceptions of the nature of religion, the meaning of revelation, and the value of the Bible as a collection of inspired writings. The earlier orthodox Protestant view of religion as a body of truths published and taught bj* God to man in revelation was in process of disintegration. In Sem- ler's distinction between religion (ethics) on the one hand and theology on the other, with Herder's similar separation of religion from theological opinions and religious usages, the cause of the Christian religion, as they conceived it, seemed to be put beyond the reach of the shock of criticism, which, by destroying the foundations upon which it claimed to rest, had gone so far to discredit the older form of Lutheranism. Kant's (1724-1804) criticism of the reason, however, formed a turning-point in the development of Ration- alism. For a full understanding of his attitude, the reader must be acquainted with the nature of his pietistic upbringing and later scientific and phil- osophical formation in the Leibniz-Wolff school of thought (see Kant, Philosophy of). As far as con- cerns the point that occupies us at present, Kant was a Rationalist. For him religion was coextensive, with natural, though not utilitarian, morals. When he met with the criticisms of Hume and undertook his famous "Kritik", his preoccupation was to safe- guard his religious opinions, his rigorous morality, from the danger of criticism. This he did, not by means of the old Rationalism, but by throwing dis- credit upon metaphysics. The accepted proofs of the existence of God, immortality, and liberty were thus, in his opinion, overthrown, and the well-known set of postulates of the "categoric imperative" put forward in their place. This, obviously, was the end of Ration- alism in its earlier form, in which the fundamental truths of religion were set out as demonstrable by reason. But, despite the shifting of the burden of religion from the pure to the practical reason, Kant himself never seems to have reached the view — to which all his work pointed — that religion is not mere ethics, "conceiving moral laws as divine commands", no matter how far removed from Utilitarianism — not an affair of the mind, but of the heart and will; and that revelation does not reach man by way of an exterior promulgation, but consists in a personal adap- tation towards God. This conception was reached gradually with the advance of the theory that man possesses a religious sense, or faculty, distinct from
