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as this bears on the problem of reason, we may briefly
state the case. It is true that our reason works pur-
posively — that is, reason is selective of our subject-
matter, but it is not creative or transforming. Nature
is an ordered cosmos of which we form a part, so that
everj- object in it has a "practical" bearing on our
lives, is cormected with our rational, sensitive, or
natural appetency. The known is never completely
out of resonance with our vohtions and emotions. To
affirm anything, or to reason about a subject, is at
once to take up a position before it. This is especially
true of moral and reUgious matter, and indeed the
emotional genesis of ethical convictions has often been
urged as a proof of their irrationality. But we should
not forget that the hability to be influenced by emo-
tional causes is not confined to ethical or religious
reasoning. To put the case generally, we may ask:
What precisely is meant by regarding feeling (or will)
as forming ^\-ith reason a co-ordinate source of knowl-
edge? (Cf. G. E. Moore, "Principia Ethica", sec.
79-80.) It may be meant that to have a certain feeling
towards a conclusion is the same as to have reasoned
it; and this is true in the sense that the comple.x
"feeling" may include ratiocination. But when I
draw a conclusion, I do not mean that I prefer it or
am affected by it. And the fact that the two things
can be distinguished is fatal to the assumed co-ordina-
tion between emotion and reason. As St. Thomas
urged against the pseudo-mystics and Augustinians
of all ages. voUtion is possible only in so far as it
includes cognition; and, we may add, emotion is a
mode of experience, only inasmuch as it presupposes
knowledge.
Again, it may be meant that, without certain ex- periences of feeling and willing, we should not be able to draw certain ethical conclusions. This may be ad- mitted as a psychological fact, viz. that there are many exercises of reason which we shall not correctly perform without an ethical habituation {iSLcrixQi tipi, as Aristotle says). In this connexion it is interesting to note that Cardinal Newman's object in ■nTiting the "Grammar of Assent" was "to show that a right moral state of mind germinates or even generates good intellectual principles". This is verj' far from coun- tenancing the Kantian view of the practical reason. The School admits a practical reason or "sjTiteresis" (Gewissen, psychological conscience), in the sense of a natural habit of moral principles. But St. Thomas strenuously denies that it is specialis potentia ratione alitor (a special faculty higher than reason).
Anim.\ls axt> Re.\son. — Finally, a word may be added on the so-caUed reason of animals. Man is called animal rationale: this expression stands for what Aristotle might caO fi?ov XoyKrriKbv. The word iifov (in German, Lebewesen) , which Aristotle appUed even to God. does not mean "animal", but "living being". Is there, then, any rational animal? Catholic philosophy attributes to animals a faculty (tis CFstimativa) whose function, analogous to that of reason, might, for want of a better name, be called "estimation". Such a faculty also exists in man, but in a higher form, and was called by the Scholastics ratio particularly or vis cogitativa. Unless animals had this organic faculty, it is hard to see how they could apprehend those pragmatic relations (intentioncs), such as utihty, danger, etc., which are not objects of external sense. To this extent we may allow that the psychic life of brute animals is one of "meanings" and "values". In some way they apprehend aspects and relations. Otherwise such complex co-ordinations as those required for nest-architecture and food-quest would be inconceivable. The extreme \-iews of Bethe, Uexkiill, and others almost imply a return to Cartesian Mechanicism, and really refute themselves. The danger lies rather in the anthropomorphic exaggeration of the powers of the animal mind. E.xperience has shown how fatally easy it is to read human feeUngs
and reasonings into the "mind" of one's favourite eat
or pet lapdog. Continuous, patient observations, like
those of Mrs. Msltv Austin on sheep or of Professor
Yerkes on the dancing-mouse, are worth any number
of isolated anecdotes. It may be safely affirmed that
there is not a single unambiguous record of animal
ratiocination. Such experiments ;is those of Thorn-
dike (on hungn,- cats shut up in a cage and forced to
learn the way out to food) are easily explained by the
gradual stereot>-ping of association between \-isual
impression and motor response, to the exclusion of
other random associations. That animals are in-
capable of rational valuation is confirmed by the
recent observations of Forel, Plateau, and others, who
have shown that bees (and probably all insects) have
no memorj' of facts, but only of time and distance.
Reason, therefore, is stOl the exclusive prerogative of
man. (See Deduction; IxDrcTiox; Instinct; In-
tellect; Intuition; Knowledge.)
History. — For .Aristotle see Bo.nitz, Index Arislolelicus (Berlin, 1870): KappE3, AHsMeles-Lexikon (Paderbom. 1894), s. w. Adyos; voO? etc.; Tben-dei.exburg. Elementa logices Aristotelea (7th ed.. Berlin. 1874); Mater. Die Syllogistik des Arislolelei (Tubingen. 1896-1900). For the Scholastic view, sec ScHMtD. ErkenrUnUUhre (Freiburg, 1890), I. iji; Stockl. Ge^ch. der Philoso- phiedes MiUelaUers (Mainz, 1864-66), tr. F1N1.AT (2 vols.. Dublin, 1903-) ; ScHUTZ, Thomas-Lexicon (2nd ed., Paderbom, 1S95), 8. w. Inteliedus ; Ratio ; Synesis, SuiUeresis. For general history-, see EisLEB. Worterbuchder philosoph. Begriffe (3rd ed.. BerUn, 1910), s. %T. Vernunft; Verstand. The Kantian \-iew is explained in Caikd, Critical Philosophy of Kant, I (Glasgow. 1SS9), x; DEI.BO8, La philosophic pratique de Kant (Paris. 1905). especially the introduction. Cf. also Coleridge. Aids to Reflection (On the Difference in Kind of Reason and the Understanding). The Scholas- tic expression <rvt-nJpjj(Ti9 comes from a false reading in a passage of St. Jerome (P. L., XXV. 22). and should be trvvei&y,ai.i; the derivation trvv and TTjpijffts (observ'ation) has also been stiggested; on its meaning see .\ppel, Die Lehre der Scholastiker ton der Synteresis (Rostock, 1891); Jahxel in Theolog. Quartalschr. (1870); NrrzscH in Zeilschr. fur Kirc-hengesch. (1897-8).
Gexer,\l Works. — Besides the ordinar\* manuals of logic: Newman-, Grammar of Assent (London. 1870), and Habpeb's criticisms in The Month (1870); Macleaxe, Reason. Thought and Language (London. 1906); Baldwix. Diet, of Philosophy and Psychology (New York and London. 1901-2), s. w. Nous; Reason; Understanding: Keaet, The Pursuit of Reason (Cambridge. 1910); Gr-vtrt, Logique (Paris. 1855) ; RocssELOT. VinteUedualisme de Saint-Thomas (Paris, 1908); Lachelier, Etudes sur le syllogisme (Paris, 1907); Gardair, La connaissancc (Paris. 1895); Oli.^ Lapritxe, La raison et le rationalisme (Paris. 1906) ; Idem, Les sources de la paix iniellectuelle (5th ed.. Paris. 1906) ; JtrxOMAXN, Das Gemot (2nd ed., Freiburg, 1885); Getser, Grundlagen der Logik und Erkenntnistheorie (Munster, 1909).
PsTCHOLOGT. — J.AMES, The Sentiment of Rationality in Mind (July, 1879). reprinted in The Will to Beliere (New York and London, 1897); Dewet, Studies in Logical Theory (2nd ed., Chicago, 1909) ; Bi.vET, Psychology of Reasoning (2nd ed., Chi- cago, 1907); PiLLSBCBT. Psychology of Reasoning (New Y'ork and London, 1910); Titchexer, Experimental Psychology of the Thought- Processes (New York and London. 1909); Ribot, La logique des sentiments (3rd ed., Paris. 1908); Getser, Einfuhrung in die Psychologie der Denkrorgdnge (Paderbom, 1909); ^IESSEB, Empfindung u. Denken (Leipzig. 1908). The work of the Wurz- burg School will be foimd recorded in the Archir far die gesamte Psychologie. IV (1905-); the only experimental investigation of the syllogistic process appears to be that of Storrixg, Experi- mentelle Untersuchungen uber einfache ScMussprozesse, ibid., XI (1908), but it has thrown no new light on the subject.
.Animals .vxd Re.vsox. — Mrv.uiT, The Origin of Human Reason (London, 1889); Wasmaxx, Psychology of Ants and of Higher Animals (St. Louis and London, 1905); Idem. Instinct and Intelligence in the .\nimal Kingdom (St. Louis and London, 1903); MrcKEBUAXX. The Humanizing of the Brute (St. Louis. 1906); Washburx. The .Animal Mind (New York, 1908); PFrXGST. Das Pferd des Herrn ton Osten (der kluge Ham) (Leipzig. 1907); Edixger axd Cl.vpabede, Ueber Tierpsy- chologie (Leipzig. 1909); Bohx. La naissance de rinteUigence (Paris, 1909); Domet de Vobges, L'estimalite in Revue nio- scolastic, XI (1904).
Alfred J. R.ahillt.
Recanati and Loreto, Diocese of (Recineten- sis), province of .A.ncona, Central Italy, so called from the inhabitants of ancient Recina, capital of Picenum, who, after the devastation of their country by Alaric, established Recanati. Claudius, who attended the Council of Rimini, is believed to have been Bishop of Recina. Recanati was subject to the Diocese of Umana untO 1240, when Gregorj' IX deprived Osimo of its see and transferred it to Recanati. Ranieri, Bishop of Osimo, was the first Bishop of Recanati. In 1263, Recanati, ha%nng espoused the cause of
