RELATIVISM
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RELATIVISM
logue between Hylas and Philonus". As stated by
Foasegrive, it is as follows: "the concept of an object
which should be at the same time in-itself and an
object of knowledge is clearly contradictory. .
For "object of knowledge' means 'known', . . .
but it is quite e\-ident that the known, qua known, is
not in-itself, since it is qua linown" (p. ISO). Hence
what we know is never the object as it is in itself, but
only as it is in our knowledge of it. Of course, if the
notions "being in itself" and "being as known" are
mutually exclusive, the above argument is valid; but
as conceived by the Realist or the anti-Relati\'ist, this
is not so. Being in-itself merely means being as it
exists, whetlier it be known or not. It implies there-
fore that the nature and existence of being is prior to
our knowledge of it (a fact which, by the way, Fon-
segrive stoutly maintains); but it does not imph' that
being as it exists cannot be known. Fonsegrive's
argument proves nothing against the view that the
real nature of objects is knowable; for, though in the
abstract the thing qua exLstent is not the thing qua
known, in the concrete there is no reason why its
really existing nature cannot become known, or, in
other words, why it cannot be known as it is.
The argument by which absolutists seek to prove the relativity of Reality is preciselj- similar to the above. We cannot think of real things, savs Tavlor ("Elem. of Metaph.", 23, 69, 70; cf. Bradley, "Ap- pearance and Reality", 1-14— to), except as objects of experience; hence it is in coimexion with mind that their reality lies. Surely this argument is fallacious. All that it proves is that things must either be or else become objects of experience in order to be thought of by mind, not that they must be of their very essence objects of experience. Unless realitj' is intelligible and can enter into experience, it cannot become the object of thouglit; but in no other sense does the possibility of loiowing it suppose its "connexion with mind". True, to conceive anj'thing is "eo ipso to bring it into consciousness", but from this it follows merely that to be conceivable things must be capable of becoming objects of consciousness. Psychological considerations force us to admit that Reality, when it enters experience, becomes, or better is reproduced as psychical fact; but we cannot conclude from this that Reality itself, the realitj' which is the object of experience and to which our experience refers as to something other than itself, is of necessity psychical fact. Experience or perception is doubtless a condition without which we could not think of things at all, still less think of them as existing, but it is not a condition without which things could not exist. Nor again, when we think, do we ordinarily think of things as objects of experience; we think of them simply as "things", real or imaginary, and the properties which we predicate of them we think of as belonging to them, not as "superinduced by our minds".
Our natural way of thinking may, however, con- ceivably be -KTong. Granted that what "appears" is reality, ajjpearanees may none the less be fallacious. It is possible that they are due wholly or in part to our minds, and so do not reveal to us the nature of reality, but rather its relation to our percei\'ing selves, our faculties and our organs. Most of the arguments advanced in support of this \new are based on psy- chologj-, and though the psychology is good enough, the arguments are hardly conclusive. It is urged, for instance, that abstraction and generalization are sub- jective processes which enter into every act of knowl- edge, and essentially modify its content. Yet ab- straction is not falsification, unless we assume that what we are considering in the abstract exists as such in the concrete — that is. exists not in connexion with and in mutual dependence upon other things, but in isolation and independence just as we conceive it. Nor is generalization fallacious, unless we assume,
without proof, that the particulars to which our con-
cept potentially applies actually exist. In a word,
neither these nor any other of the subjective processes
and forms of thought destroy the validity of knowl-
edge, provided what is ptu-ely formal and subjective
be distinguished, as it should be, from what pertains
to objective content and refers to the real order of
causes and purposes.
A further argument is derived from the alleged relativity of sensation, whence in the Scholastic theory all knowledge is derived. The quality of sensation, it is said, is determined largely by the character of otu- nervous system, and in particular by the end- organs of the different senses. It is at least equally probable, however, that the quality of sensation is determined by the stimulus; and in any 'case the ob- jection is beside the point, for we do not in judgment refer our sensation as such to the object, but rather as qualities, the nature of which we do not know, though we do know that they differ from one another in varying degrees. Even granted then that sensa- tion is relative to our specialized organs of sense, it by no means follows that the knowledge which comes through sensation in any way involves subjective determination. Secondly, sense-data do not give us merely qualitative differences, but also spatial forms and magnitudes, distance, motion, velocity, direction; and upon these data are based not only mathematics but also physical science, in so far as the latter is con- cerned with quantitative, in distinction from qualita- tive, variations. Thirdly, sense-data, even if they be in part subjective, suppose as their condition an objective cause. Hence, a theory which explains sense-data satisfactorily assigns to them conditions which are no less real than the effects to which in part at least they give rise. Lastly, if knowledge reallj- is relative in the sense above explained, though it may satisfy our practical, it can never satisfy our specula- tive stri\-ings. The aim of speculative research is to know Reality as it is. But knowledge, if it be of ap- pearances only, is without real meaning and signifi- cance, and as conceived in an Idealism of the a priori type, also it would seem without purpose.
Experience .\s a System of Relations. — It is commonly taught by neo-Kantians that relation is the Categorj- of categories (cf. Renouvier, "Le per- sonnalisme", pref. \-i). Qualities are but relations in disguise (Caird, "The Phil, of Kant ", 329; Green, Pro- legom.", 20). flatter and motion "consist of" re- lations (Prolegom., 9). In fact Reality, as we know it, is nothing but a system of relations, for "the nature of mind is such that no knowledge can be acquired or expressed, and consequently no real existence con- ceived, except by means of relation and as a sj'stem of relations" (Renou\-ier, "Les dilemmes de la metaph.", 11). This form of Relativism may be called objective to distinguish it from the Relativism which we have been discussing above, and with which, as a matter of fact, it is generally combined. Primar- ily it is a theory of the nature of knowledge, but with Green and others (e. g., Abel Rev, "La theorie de la physique", VI, 2), who identify knowledge and reality, it is also a metaphysic. Such a view supposes a theory of the nature of relation very different from that of the Scholastics. For the latter relation is essentially a irpis n (rx^cu, an ordo ad, which implies (1) a subject to which it belongs, (2) a special some- thing in that subject on account of which it is pred- icated, and (3) a term, other than itself, to which it refers. A relation, in other words, as the moderns would put it, presupposes its "terms". It is not a mysterious and in\'isible link which somehow joins up two aspects of a thing and makes them one. A relation may be mutual; but if so, there are really (u)o relations fe. g., paternity and sonship) belonging to different subjects, or, if to the same subject, arising from different fundamenta. True, in science as in
