RESTITUTION
789
RESURRECTION
an injury which in a certain sense is irreparable. He
should make what reparation he can. In this and
similar cases it is a di.sputed point among theologians
whether the adulterer is obliged to offer a money com-
pensation for the injury. If he is convicted and
sentenced to pay damages by lawful authority, he
will certainly be bound to do so in conscience. But
apart from such a sentence, he cannot be obliged to
compensate the injured husband in money, because
there is no common measure between such injuries
and compensation in goods of another order.
Commutative justice looks at objective equality, and prescribes that it be preserved. For this reason Aristotle called this species of justice corrective, inas- much as it corrects and remedies the inequality which an act of injustice produces between the injurer and the party injured. The one has less than he ought to have, because the otlier has taken it away, and they will not be quits until restitution is made. In cases where an injury is irreparable, the injurer will be bound to do what he can so that the injured party may be content. This is called making satisfaction, to distinguish it from making restitution in the strict sense. We are thus bound to make satisfaction to God for the injury which our sins do Him; we cannot make Him restitution, nor did He suiTer damage on account of our sins. A violation of commutative justice alone imposes the obligation of making restitu- tion, for when charity or obedience or any of the other virtues is violated, there is indeed a consequent obliga- tion of repenting for the sin, but there is no obligation of performing the omitted act of charity or obedience now. The obligation was urgent at the particular time and in the particular circumstances in which the sin was committed. Now the need of relief which called for the act of charity, and the reason for the command which was disobeyed no longer exist, and 80 there is no reason for supplying now for the omitted acts.
The grounds on which restitution becomes obliga- tory are either the possession of something belonging to another, or the causing of unjust damage to the property or reputation of another. These are called by divines the roots of restitution, for it is due on one of those two grounds if it is due at all. The moral obligations of one who finds himself in possession of another person's property, and who on that account is bound to make restitution, will depend on whether he had possession of the property hitherto in good faith, or in bad faith, or in doubtful faith. If hitherto he thought in good faith that the property was his own, and he now discovers that it belongs to someone else, it will be sufficient to restore the property itself to the owner, together with any fruits that still re- main. If while he was in good faith he consumed the fruits, or even the property itself perished, the pos- sessor will not be bound to make restitution for what no longer exists. If the possessor consumed what he thought was his own property, possession in good faith justified him in doing so; and if the property has per- ished or been lost, the owner must bear the loss. But if possession was begun in bad faith, the possessor must not only restore all that remains of the property or of its fruits, but he must also compensate the owner for any loss or damage that the latter suffered on ac- count of being deprived of his property. For the unjust possessor must make compensation for all the damage that he ha-s caused the owner by unwarrant- ably retaining his property. If possession was begun in doubtful faith, inquiry as to title should first of all be made. In this way, or by the use of presumptions, the doubt may often be settled. If it cannot thus be settled the common opinion of divines is that restitu- tion must be made to the doubtful owner of a portion of the property corresponding to the probability of his right, while the possessor may keep a portion corresponding to the probability of his title. A few
recent theologians think that the possessor in such a
case may keep possession of the property, provided
that he is ready to hand it over to the true owner if
and when the latter's title is proved. If the doubt
about the title arises subsequently to the beginning of
possession, inquiry should be made, and if the doubt
cannot be solved, the possessor may keep the property,
for in doubt the pos.sessor has the better claim.
Fruits, as a general rule, follow the property, on the
principle." Accessorium sequilur principals.
The deliberate causing of unjust damage to the property, reputation, or other strict rights of another imposes on him who does the damage the obligation of making restitution for it, as we have seen. For, although in this case there is no possession of what belongs to another, still the wronged person has not what in justice he should have, and that through the unjust action of him who did the damage. The latter therefore has unjustly taken away what belonged to the former, and he must restore to him something which is equivalent to the loss which he has suffered and which will balance it, so that equality between them may be restored. However, as a man is not in conscience responsible for damage which he caused inadvertently and by accident, the action which caused the damage must be voluntary, with at least some confused foreknowledge of its probable effects, in order that an obligation in conscience may arise to make compensation for the damage caused. Even though in a particular case there was no theological fault of this kind, as it is called by divines, yet some- times if the amount of diligence was not u.sed which the law requires in the case, the law imposes the obli- gation of making compensation to the injured party. There is then said to be juridical fault, and after the sentence of a competent authority has imposed the obligation of making compensation, it will be matter of conscience to obey the sentence. Besides being voluntary, the injurious action must be against com- mutative justice in order that an obligation to make restitution may arise from it. If while exercising my own right, as by putting on the market a new patent machine, I cause loss to others, I do not offend against justice, nor am I bound to make compensation for the loss caused to others. Neither is one responsible for damage to others of which he was the mere occa- sion, not the cause. Thus if the arrival in a city of some great personage causes a crowd to gather, and there is a crush, and an accident, by which damage is done to persons and to property, the great personage is the occasion of the damage, not the cause; and he ia not bound to make restitution for it.
The foregoing principles are applicable whenever a strict right of another has been violated. Not only when property rights, or reputation, have been in- jured, but when spiritual rights to innocence, or true doctrine, or religious vocation, or any others of mind or body, intrinsic to man's nature or extrinsic, have been unjustly violated, restitution as far as possible must be made. The efficacy of the confessional in bringing about restitution of ill-gotten property and the reparation of injuries of whatever sort is too well-known to need more than mention here.
Aquinas, .S'ummo theologica, II-II. Q. Ixii (Parma, 1852); Luao, De Juslitia el Jure (Paris, 1868); Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus morale (Prato, 1892) ; Slater, A Manual of Moral Theology (New York, 1908).
T. Slater.
Restitution, Edict of. See Augsbiirg; Ferdi- nand II; Ger.many.
Resurrection is the rising again from the dead, the resumption of life. The Fourth Lateran Council teaches that all men, whether elect or reprobate, "will rise again with their own bodies which they now bear about with them" (cap. "Firmiter"). In the language of the creeds and professions of faith this return to life is called resurrection of the body
