REVELATION
REVELATION
If the existence of a personal God be once estab-
lished, the physical possibiUty at least of Revelation
is undeniable. God, who has endowed man with
means to communicate his thoughts to his fellows,
cannot be destitute of the power to communicate His
own thoughts to us. [Martineau, it is true, denies that
we possess faculties either to receive or to authen-
ticate a divine revelation concerning the past or the
future (Seat of Authority in Religion, p. 311); but
such an assertion is arbitrary and extravagant in the
extreme.] However, numerous difficulties have been
urged on grounds other than that of physical possibil-
ity. In estimating their value it seems desirable to
distinguish three aspects of Revelation, viz: as it
makes known to us (1) truths of the natural law, (2)
mysteries of the faith, (3) positive precepts, e. g.
regarding Di%-ine worship.
(1) The revelation of truths of the natural law is certainh' not inconsistent with God's wisdom. God BO created man as to bestow on him endowments amply sufficient for him to attain his last end. Had it been otherwise, the creation would have been im- perfect. If over and above this He decreed to make the attainment of beatitude yet easier for man by placing within his reach a far simpler and far more certain way of knowing the law on the observance of which his fate depended, this is an argument for the Di\-ine generosity; it does not disprove the Divine wisdom. To assume, with certain Rationalists, that exceptional intervention can only be explained on the ground that God was unable to embrace His ultimate design in His original scheme is a mere petilio prin- cipii. Further, the doctrine of original sin supphes an additional reason for such a revelation of the natural law. That doctrine teaches us that rnan by the abuse of his free will has rendered his attainment of salvation difficult. Though his intellectual facul- ties are not radically vitiated, yet his grasp of truth IB weakened; his recognition of the moral law is con- stantly clouded by doubts and questionings. Revela- tion gives to his mind the certainty he had lost, and so far repairs the evils consequent on the catastrophe which had befallen him.
(2) Still more difficulty has been felt regarding mysteries. It is freely as.serted that a myster>' is something repugnant to reason, and therefore some- thing intrinsically impossible. This objection rests on a mere misunderstanding of what is signified by a mystery. In theological terminology a conception involves a mysterj' when it is such that the natural faculties of the mind are unable to see how its elements can coalesce. This does not imply anything contrary to reason. A conception is only contrary to reason when the mind can recognize that its elements are mutually exclusive, and therefore involve a contradic- tion in terms. A more subtle objection is that urged by Dr. J. Caird, to the effect that every truth that can be partially communicated to the mind by anal- ogies is ultimately capable of being fully grasped by the understanding. "Of all such representations, un- less they are purely illusfjrj', it must hold good that implicitly and in unrlevelftped form they contain rational thought and thr;refore thought which human intelligence may ultimately fre<- from its sensuous veil. . . . Nothing that is absf)!i]t^ly inscrutable to reason can be ma/ie known U) faith" (Philosrjphy of Religion, p. 71). The objection rests on a wholly exaggerated view regarfiing the powers of the human intellect. The a>gnitive faculty of any nature is proportionate to its gra/le in the scale of being. The mtelligenre oi a finite intellect can only penetrate; a finite ohjr'ft; it is incapable of comprehending the Infinite. The finite t>TX« through which the Infinite is made known to it can never under any circumstances lead to more than analogous knowledge. It is further frequently urgf^d that the revelation of what the mind cannot underBtand would be an act of violence to the intel-
lect; and that tliis faculty can only accept those truths
whose intrinsic reasonableness it recognizes. This
assertion, based on the alk^ged autonomy of reason,
can only be met with denial. The function of the in-
tellect is to recognize and admit any truth which is
adequately presented to it, whether that truth be
guaranteed bj^ internal or by external criteria. The
reason is not deprived of its legitimate activity be-
cause the criteria are external. It finds ample scope
in weighing the arguments for the credibility of the
fact asserted. The existence of mysteries in the
Christian religion was expressly taught by the Vatican
Council (De Fide Cath., cap. ii, can. ii). "If anj^one
shall say that no mysteries properly so called are con-
tained in the Divine revelation, but that all the
dogmas of the faith can be understood and proved
from natural principles by human reason duly culti-
vated — let him be anathema."
(3) The older (Deist) School of Rationalists denied the possibility of a Divine revelation imposing any laws other than those which natural religion enjoins on man. These writers regarded natural religion as, so to speak, a political constitution determinmg the Divine government of the universe, and held that God could only act as its terms prescribed. This error like\\ase was proscribed at the same time (De Fide Cath., cap. ii, can. ii). " If any one shall say that it is impossible or that it is inexpedient that man should be instructed regarding God and the worship to be paid to Him by Di\ine revelation — let him be anathema."
It can hardly be questioned that the "autonomy of reason" furnishes the main source of the difficulties at present felt against Revelation in the Christian sense. It seems desirable to indicate very briefly the various ways in which that principle is understood. It is explained by M. Blondel, an eminent member of the Immanentist School, as signifying that "nothing can enter into a man which does not proceed from him, and which does not correspond in some manner to an interior need of expansion ; and that neither in the sphere of historic facts nor of traditional doctrine, nor of commands imposed bj^ authority, can any truth rank as valid for a man or any precept as obhgatory, unless it be in some way autonomous and autochtho- nous" (Lettre sur les exigences, etc., p. 601). Although M. Blondel has in his own case reconciled this prin- ciple -wath the acceptance of Catholic belief, yet it may readily be seen that it affords an easy ground for the denial not merely of the possibilitj^ of external Revelation, but of the whole historic basis of Chris- tianity. The origin of this erroneous doctrine is to be found in the fact that within the sphere of the natural speculative reason, truths which are received purely on external authority, and which are in no way connected with principles already admitted, can scarcely be said to form part of our knowledge. Science asks for the inner reason of things and can make no use of truths save in so far as it can reach the principles from which they flow. The extension of this to religious truths is an error directly traceable to the assumption of the eiglilceiilli-cenlury j)liiloso- phers that there are no religious t rut lis save t lio.'^e which the human intellect can attain unaided. The prin- ciple is, however, sometimes applied with a less ex- tensive signification. It may be understood to involve no more than that reason cannot be compelled to ad- mit any religious doctrine or any moral obligation merely because they possess extrinsic guarantees of truth; they must in every case be able to justify their validity on intrinsic grounds. Thus Prof. J. Caird writes: "Neither moral nor religious ideas can be simply transferred to the human spirit in the form of fact, nor can they be verified by any evidence outside of or lower than themselves" (Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, p. 31). A somewhat different meaning again is impUed in the canon of the Vatican Council
