SCHADOW
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SCHADOW
wholly to discredit its validity, for our beliefs are
largely determined by non-rational causes, and, even
when"e\'idence is their motive, what we regard as evi-
dence is settled by circumstances altogether beyond
our control (c. xiii).
Critical Examixation of Scepticism. — A reply to the copious arguments of the Sceptic enumerated above, might take the following hne:
(1) The Sceptic fails to distinguish between prac- tical moral certainty which excludes all reasonable grounds for doubt, and absolute certainty which ex- cludes all possible grounds for doubt. The latter can be had only when evidence is complete, proof wholly adequate, obvious, and conclusive, and when all diffi- culties and objections can be completely solved. In mathematics this is sometimes possible, though not alwaj's; but in other matters "practical certainty" as a rule is all we can get. And this is sufficient, since "practical certainty ' ' is certainty for reasonable beings.
(2) Axiomatic, or self-evident, truth must be in- sisted on. The truth of an axiom can never be proved, j'et may become manifest, even to those who for the time being doubt it, when its meaning and its application are clearly understood.
(3) Perceptual judgments refer qualities (not sensa- tions) to things, but they do not declare what is the nature of these quaUties, and hence do not contradict scientific theory.
(4) Perception is trustworthy in that it reveals to us the general character and behaviour of things — both of ourselves and of external objects. We do not often mistake a spade for a table-knife or a turkey for a hippopotamus. The senses do not pretend to be ac- curate in detail (unless assisted by instruments) or in abnormal circumstances.
(5) The "normal" working of our faculties can be determined independently of any question as to the truth of their deliverances. The work of our facul- ties is "normal", (1) when they are free from the influ- ence of subjective factors, other than those which be- long to their proper nature (i. e. free from disease, impediment, the influence of prejudice, expectancy, desire, etc.), and (2) when they are exercised upon their own proper objects. In the case of the senses this means upon objects we meet with day by day under ordinary circumstances. If the circumstances are extraordinary, our senses are still trustworthy, however, provided the circumstances be taken into account.
(6) Alleged contradictions inherent in philosophical terms are due to ambiguity, misunderstanding, the lack of precise definition, or the influence of a false philosophy. For instance, the contradictions which Mr. Bradley points out (Appearance and Reality, bk. I) in terms such as time, space, substance and ac- cident, causality, self, are not to be found in these terms as defined by the Scholastics.
(7) Contradictions between different philosophical theories may be (a) accounted for, and (b) eliminated, (a) They arise from ambiguity, variety of definition, misconception, misinterpretation, careless inference, groundless assumption, unv(Tifie<l hypothesis, and the neglect of relevant facts. Yet (b) all error contains an element of truth, and contradictions suppose a common principle already granted anterior to their divergence; and thfise underlying principles and ele- ments of truth contained in all theories can be dis- tingui.shed from the errors in which they are wrapped up.
(8) Beliefs arising from non-rational or from un- known grounfis should either be re-established on ratif)nal grounds or discarded. All beliefs should be evident either (1) immediately, as in the ca.se (e. g.) of our belief in external reality, or (2) metiiately by in- ference from known truth, or (3) on the ground of adequate testimony.
(9) The Sceptic assumes the capacity of the intel-
lect to criticize the faculty of knowledge, and thus, in
so far as he denies its capacity to know anything, im-
pficitly contradicts himself.
St. .\ugu8Tine, De uUlitate credendi in Corp. scrip, eccl. lat., VI (Vienna, 1891) ; Balfour, Defence of Philosophic Doubt (London, 1879); Idem, Foundations of Belief (8th ed., London, 1901); Brochard, Les Sceptigues grecs (Paris, 1887); Charron, De la sagesse (Paris, 1820); Cicero, Academica II. De natura deorum; Dillon, Sceptica of the Old Testament (London, 1895) ; Flint, Agnosticism (Edinburgh, 1903); Glanville, Scepsis scicntifica, ed. Owen (London, 1885); Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, tr. (Lon- don, 1891); Hume, Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding (Boston, 1854); Idem, Treatise on Human Nature, ed. Selby- BiGGE (Oxford, 1888) ; Huxley, Collective E.^says, VI (London. 1873) ; Janet and S^ailles, History of the Problems of Philosophy, tr. (London, 1902); Jourdain, Se.rtus Empir. et la philosophic scolastique (Paris, 1858) ; Maccoll, Greek Sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus (London and Cambridge, 1869) ; Mansel, Limits of Re- ligious Thought (5th ed., London, 1870); McCosh, Intuitions of the Mind (London, 1860); Mivart, On Truth (London, 1889); Montaigne, Essais, ed. Hazlitt (London, 1877) ; Owen, Even- ings with the Sceptics (4 vols., London, 1881); Idem, The Skeptics of the French Renaissance (London, 1893); Idem, The Skeptics of the Italian Renaissance (London, 1893) ; Paschal, Pensees, ed. Faugere (Paris, 1897), tr. Paul (London, 1885); Pillon in L' Annie Philosophique (1867-8); Saisset, Le scepticisme (Paris, 1867); Sertillangbs, Agnosticisme ou Anthropomorphismef in Rev. de Phil. (Febr.-August, 1906); Sextus Empiricus, Contra Mathematicos; Idem, Institutiones Pyrrhonicw; Stephen, An Agnostic's Apology (London, 1893); Waddington, Pyrrhon et le Pyrrhonisme (Paris, 1877) ; Wells, Scepticism of the Instru- ment in Mind, new series, XL (July, 1904) ; Zeller, Stoics, Epi- and Sceptics, tr. Reichel (London, 1880).
Leslie J. Walker.
Schadow, Friedrich Wilhelm, painter, b. at Ber-
lin, 1789; d. at Diisseldorf, 1862. He was the son
of the sculptor, Johann Gottfried Schadow of Berlin.
The year after Cornelius left Diisseldorf, Friedrich
Wilhelm Schadow took his place as director of the
Diisseldorf Academy of Painting. He had been with
Cornelius at Rome among those who gathered around
Overbeck, and while at Rome had become a Catholic.
In 1819 he was appointed professor in the Academy
of Berlin. He was a capable and poinilur teacher, and
a large number of pupils followed him to Dusseldorf,
where he went in 1826 and where he had great success.
He was more in harmony with the artists of the Rhine
than his predecessors at Diisseldorf had been. He
laid stress on realism, colour, and a sober modera-
tion, all based upon a through technic, whereby his
school gained many friends at home and abroad.
After the founding of the Art Association in 1829 the
graceful, animated pictures of the Diisseldorf school,
which appealed either to Christian devotion or every-
day taste, and were greatly admired by the friends of
the school, found acceptance in all directions. Scha-
dow did not at first take up the ideal fresco, as did the
masters at Munich, but devoted himself to oil-paint-
ing; nor did he attempt great historical subjects, but
the more modest forms of art. In addition to devo-
tional pictures, Schadow and his pupils gave their at-
tention to portraits, landscape, and genre pictures.
His principles differed from those of Cornelius, with-
out his advancing, howev(>r, to those maintained to-
day. In his opinion, the value of a picture rested
upon form, colour, and poetic conception. The pupil
must first learn to draw, especially after plaster copies
of antiques, and not until after this was he to learn
to draw from nature, and to make studies of drapery
and colour after old i)aiiitiiigs. After the ])ui)il had
been thoroughly grounded he was not to neglect draw-
ing from nature or the model, at first under the strict
supervision of a teacher, and then later to work
independently.
Schadow held fast to the principle of the Romantic school, that more weight, should be placcKl upon the conception than the form. He had much skill in arousing interest both in his pupils and the general public. For his own work he chose religious painting and some of his paintings of this kind fully meet the aims of art and of (ulification; among these arc the "Ascension of the Virgin", the "Wise and Foolish
