SCRUTINY
641
SCULPTURE
out in futile combat, and then not unfrequently the
scrupulous person makes shipwreck of salvation either
on the Scylla of despair or the Charybdis of unheeding
indulgence in vice.
It is of great importance to be able to make a correct diagnosis of this disease. Hence especially guides of consciences should be familiar with the symptoms that betray its presence as well as with the causes which commonly give rise to it. For one thing, the con- fessor should not confound a delicate with a scrupu- lous conscience, neither should he interpret the rea- sonable solicitude sometimes discernible in those who .are trying to emerge from a life of sin as a sign of scrupulosity. Then, too, ordinarily he ought not to hastily reach this conclusion on the very first experi- ence of his penitent. It is true there are cases of scruples which may be recognized from the start, but this is not the rule. Some special indications that per- sons are really scrupulous, generally adopted by theo- logians, are those enumerated by Lacroix. Among these is a certain rooted attachment to their own opinion which makes them unwilling to abide by the judgment of those whom they consult, even though these latter have every title to deference. In conse- quence, they go from one confessor to another, change their convictions with hardly a shadow of motive, and are tortured by an overshadowing dread that sin lurks in everything they do, and say, and think. The scrupulous may, and ought to, act in defiance of their misgivings, i. e. against their so-called con- science. Nor can they, therefore, be impeached as acting in a state of practical doubt. The unreal phantasm that affrights their imagination, or the un- substantial consideration that offers itself to their disturbed reason, has no validity against the con- science once formed upon the pronouncement of the confessor or in some other equally trustworthy fash- ion. In the various periJlexities as to the lawfulness of their actions they are not bound to employ any such scrutiny as would be incumbent upon persons in a normal condition. They are not bound to repeat anything of former confessions unless they are sure, without protracted examination, that it is a mortal sin and has never been properly confessed.
Their chief remedy is, having reposed confidence in some confessor, to obey his decisions and commands entirely and absolutely. They are counselled also to avoid idleness, and thus to close the avenue of ap- proach to the wild conjectures and strange ponderings responsible for so many of their worries. They should remove the cause of their scruples in so far as it may have been of their own choosing. Hence they are to guard against the reading of ascetical books of a rigorist trend and any intercourse with those afflicted in the same way as themselves. If the source of their scruples be ignorance — for example, with regard to the obligation of some commandment — they are to be instructed, discretion being used in the imparting of the necessary information. If it be a propensity to melancholy, certain harmless pleasures and rational enjoyments may be employed with advantage. Con- fessors to whom falls the difficult task of receiving the confessions of these harassed souls are to carefully in- quire into the origin of the anxieties laid before them. They are to treat their unhappy penitents in general with great kindness. Occasionally, however, some de- gree of severity may be useful when the penitent shows an extreme tenacity in adhering to his own unreasonable view of the situation. As a rule, the confessor's an- swers to the innumerable troubles submitted should be clear, unaccompanied by reasons, and so unhesitating as to inspire courage. He should not permit the pres- entation indefinitely of the various doubts, much less, of course, the repetition of past confessions. Finally, he may sometimes do what should hardly ever be done in any other instance, that is, forbid the penitent to have recourse to another confessor, XIII.— 41
Slater, Manical of Moral Theology {New York, 1908); St.
Alphonsus Liouori, Theologia moralis (Turin, 1888) ; Genicot,
TheologicB moralis instituiiones (Louvain, 1898) ; Ballerini, Opus
Iheologicum morale (Prato, 1898).
Joseph F. Delany.
Scrutiny (Lat. scrutinium from scrutari to search, to investigate), a term variously employed in canon law. (1) In promotion to orders a scrutiny or ex- amination of the candidate is to be made according to the warning of the Apostle: "Impose not hands lightly upon any man" (I Tim., v, 22). That the practice is ancient is testified to by St. Cyprian (who died in 258) in his thirty-eighth epistle. The ninth canon of the Council of Nicsea (325) supposes the scru- tiny of candidates to be already in use. Many later synods enforced and defined more exactly this scru- tiny of those who aspired to orders. The present discipline is laid down by the Council of Trent (Sess. XXIII, Cap. v, de ref.), though its observance in every detail has not been reduced to practice in all countries. A three-fold scrutiny is ordered: first, through the inquiry into the qualities of the candi- dates by the parish priest and teachers and by public proclamation in the Church. The information thus obtained is to be embodied in a testimonial letter to the bishop. Secondly, shortly before ordination through the bishop himself and ecclesiastical persons appointed to examine into the morals, faith, and doc- trine of the candidates. Thirdly, through the cere- monial form prescribed by the Pontificale Romanum for the ordination of a deacon or priest. (2) Scru- tiny is also a form of ecclesiastical election and is made either by written ballot or by pronouncing the chosen name before legitimate scrutators alone. It is the usual form for electing the pope. (See Papal Elec- tions.) (3) Scrutiny is also the term for the exam- ination of catechumens before baptism. In ancient times there were three such scrutinies and later on the number was increased to seven. From the Middle Ages onwards owing to the fact that most who re- ceived baptism were infants the prescribed scrutinies were reduced to that now found in the ritual for con- ferring baptism. The subject-matter of these scru- tinies was the faith and dispositions of the candidate.
Wernz, Jus Decretalium, II (Rome, 1899).
William H. W. Fanning.
Sculpture. — In the widest sense of the term, sculp- ture is the art of representing in bodily form men, ani- mals, and other objects in stone, bronze, ivory, clay and similar materials, whether the objects repre- sented actually exist in nature or are the creation of the imagination of the artist. A more concise and ex- act definition of sculpture is the art which represents beauty in bodily form by means of figures entirely or partly in the round. Sculpture therefore depicts the beauty of the corporeal world, not as docs painting by means of an illusory representation upon a flat col- oured surface, but by imitating in a solid substance these bodies in their entirety, and achieving the effect by means of form alone. This effect is called plastic beauty. Sculpture therefore does not include land- scape with its accompanying vegetation, nor the phenomena of light and shade, which play such an important part in painting. Inasmuch as sculpture represents bodies in their actual form and contours, its favourite subject, in contrast to painting, is the single figure. And as the single figure never appears in close relation with its surroundings the significance of its personaUty is presented in a more effective and powerful manner, particularly so because it is usu- ally raised above its surroundings by means of a pedestal, and is placed in the most advantageous hght by a suitable background. By these means the statue becomes a monument, in which the character- istic traits of a personality are perpetuated with ar- tistic charm. These attributes of the statue render it
