SPINOZA
219
SPINOZA
the first prinriple in the manner of mathematical
entities; the things come from it by mathematical
sequence; for only in this way, says the philosopher,
can the immutability of the first principle be niain-
tained, only thus is a relation of the infinite to the
finite thinkable; and only in this way is the unit}' of
nature jireserved, without fusing the substance of
God with that of finite things. Yet the axiom " God =
Nature" is valid because the things necessarily
following from the Being of God belong in some way
to God. Only the Being of God is independent;
Spinoza calls this Being alone substance. All things
(modi) must be founded in the attributes of God.
This is one approach to Spinozism.
Another is the following: Spinoza observed in nature, on the one side, only systems of motion and rest which were derived from one another in an end- less series of causes and effects; on the other side, running exactly parallel to these, but not influenced by them, a series of ideas. These systems of motion and ideas cannot be understood of themselves alone, but (inly with the aid of the notions of extension and thought, and these two notions contain in themselves the characteristic of infinity. Thus we are brought to a necessarily existing Being on whom all other beings must depend in their existence and nature. The facts of experience, as conditio sine qua non, lead us to the knowledge that the change which we observe can only be explained by an instinct of self-preserva- tion existing in all things, which constitutes their individual nature. This instinct, then, is the relative factor in the scientific construction of ethics and poUtics. The Absolute, which corresponds to it and establishes it, consists of the immanently working, countless attributes of the universal substance. This is the second approach to Spinozism.
We now come to a third: Scepticism is completely overcome only when the idea is nothing else than the objective side of the process of movement which is identical with it under another point of view. Only then does the succession of things full}- coincide with the succession of ideas. Thus truth and certainty are the same. The fact that there are ill-defined and false ideas can, accordingly, only be ex"plained in that these ideas, so far as they do not prove themseh'cs to be arbitrary combinations and fictions, are merely part-knowledge. Such part-knowledge, however, sig- nifies that the one with such knowledge is in some sense jiart of an absolute intelligence. Therefore the part-extension identical with and corresponding with the part-knowledge is only a part of an infinite and indivisible extension. Consequently, in the infinite also, extension and thought are, absolutely considered, identical; as relative things they are different. Ap- plied to ethics this doctrine signifies that good and evil have meaning only from the point of view of an incomplete part -knowledge; applied to pohtics it sets up for the individual life the axiom right is might, and a.scribes to the State the creation of right.
Lastly, ethics as a doctrine of happiness, which is really Spinoza's starting-point, leads to the same result. His main question was, how is perfect hap- piness possible? Xow he could only conceive of per- fect peace and happiness on the supposition that all earthly hajipenings proceed as the necessary conse- quence of the nature of the absolutely infinite Being; whoever recognizes this and rests lovingly in this knowledge enjoys perfect peace. The aim of life is to attain this knowledge cognitio sub specie ceter- nilnlis. From this opinion, however, it follows necessarily that the individual acts of knowledge proceed in some manner from (iod's own thought (the .soul therefore is no substance), that the nature of the Individual soul is an individual in.stinct towards perfection (ronnlus in mio t'.s.sc pirsfrerntiili — in order to pre.serve the continuity of all self-consciousne.ss), that evil proceeds from a lack of adequate knowledge,
that the material is only another side of the spiritual,
because otherwise Spinoza would have had to suppose
a second source of evil besides imperfect knowledge.
These statements show also the way in which Spinoza can be refuted. It must be shown that God's unchangeableness does not involve the necessitj' of all Divine action ; it must be pro\ed that t he dependence of the finite upon the infinite does not demand a counter- relation in the infinite, and that there is a metaphysic world of pure possibility and universal conceptions. Further, it must be shown that an objectively true knowledge is possible, even though the order of ideas does not run strictly parallel to the order of things, and though the two orders are not identical. The positive contradictions of this identity in the finite must be revealed, and it must be shown that in the Spinozistic psj'chology the continuity of self-con- sciousness, notwithstanding the instinct of self- preservation, is destroyed, and that the part-knowl- edge of Spinoza, with the system of happiness built upon it, involves an impenetrable mystery and therefore is untenable as a philosophical view of the world. Some friends and later admirers of Spinoza thought thej' could combine his philosophy with Christianity. A hopeless attempt in this direction is made in the introduction to the "Opera posthuma" wTitten by Ludwig Meyer. Jarrig Jellis, Spinoza's friend, also exerted himself to bring Spinozism and Christianity together. More ingenious and profound but also exceedingly sophistical is the treatise issued anonymousl)' in 1684 by Abraham Cuffeler, "Speci- men artis ratiocinandi naturalis et artificialis ad pantosophiae principia manuducens". A number of ^\Titers leave one in doubt as to whether they did not use Christianity merely as a cloak. Others, e. g. Bredenburg, and Wittich in his "Anti-Spinoza", adopted only individual principles of Spinozism. When in the second half of the eighteenth century the reputation of Spinoza was again revived both in Germany and France simultaneously, the effort was once more made to reconcile Spinozism and Chris- tianity. Mention might here be made of Heyden- reich, Herder, and Sabatier de Castrcs.
That in the present time Spinoza has again become very modern is traceable to nine reasons: his criticism of the Scriptures, his doctrine of free-thought, his theory of the State as the source of right, his doctrine of happiness founded on necessity, his doctrine of morals dissociated from positive religion, his axiom Dens sine Nalura and the justification of this axiom, his conception of the identity of thought and movement in the Absolute, his distinction of absolute and relative knowledge, finally his realism in the theory of knowl- edge to which many modern philosophers are returning.
The bibliography prepared by tan dek Linde extends only to 1871. It has been partially supplemented by Gbunwald, Spinoza in Deulschland(Ber\ia, 1S97), by Weo. A'a(a(o(;«9(Leipzig, 1893), which contained the collection of works on Spinoza that had been sold for America, and by the Katolog "Spinoza", No. .598 (Frankfort, 1912). The relatively best but in no way complete edition of his works is that of van Vloten and Land (2nd ed.. The Hague, 1895). Of this publication the " Ethics " alone has appeared in a third edition ( 1905) . English translations of Spinoza, omitting the defective one of WiLUS. are: Fdllerton. £(Aics (New York. 1894), Hale White and Hutchinson .Stiblino (3rd ed., London, 1899); this edition includes also the De intcU Uctu9 emendatione; Elwes ha-s edited the chief works (London, 1883-84), but with the letters freely abridged; Gilungbam Robinson, Korte YerhandeUng (Chicago. 1909), defective, see below Wolf. An excellent translation into Dutch of all the works of Spinoza is that of Meter (.Amsterdam. 1897- 1905); the best French translation is that of Appihn (Paris, 1907-09). the correspondence and the theologico-political and the political treatises have yet to be publislied. Among the German translations should be mentioned the one made for the Philosophical Library' by B.ANsrH. BrcHENAr. and Gebhabdt. An excellent facsimile edition of all the letters was issued by Meijrr in numbered copies at The Hague. A facsimile of the notes in handwriting to the theologico-political treatise waa published by ALTKiRrn in the Journal 0»( unit ItV.if (1901).
Fhkpdenthal, Die Lebensgtiichxrhle Spino2aH in QiielUnschri- ften. Vrkundtn und nichlamllichrn \\irhrirhlrn (Leipzig. IS99). and Sii<nr,:n I. Dns Lebrn Spinoza (Stuttgart. 1904). A quantity of new material is in Meinbma, S-pinoiaen n>n Kring (The Hague).
