STATE
2r)3
STATE
ivil duties of the State towards religion and the
'huroh. The Church, because of the useleosness of
er insistence, or because of greater evils to be so
voided, may waive the exercise of this jurisdiction;
ut in principle it is hers.
In practice we distinguish, from a religious point of iew, four kinds of civU authority. First, in a Cath- lic State, in which, namely, the physical persons instituting the moral personality of the State are 'atholic, the Church's jurisdiction in matters of her jmpetency is in every way complete. Secondly, in
non-Christian State, for instance that of the Turks, here the constituency is not even baptized, the Ihurch claims no jurisdiction over the State as such: le foundation of such jurisdiction is lacking. Third, 1 a Christian but non-Catholic State, where the con-
ituency, though by baptism subjects, are not meni- ers of the Church, per se the jurisdiction of the ihurch would stand, but per accidens its exercise is npossible. Fourth, a mixed State, one, namely, the jnstituents of whose moral personality are neces- irily of diverse religions, practically lies outside the ■ach of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, since the affiliation f some of the constituents could not make a subject
- the Church out of the moral personality constitu-
onally made up of elements not all of which share ich affihation. The subordination here indicated is idirect: not that the Church does not directly reach liritual and mixed matters, but that in their regard
directly reaches only its immediate subjects and in- irectly through them the State which they consti- ite. Again, the State as such does not in such mat- ■rs directly act for the supernatural purpose of the hureh (the eternal happiness of its subjects), but for s own temporal purpose inasmuch as such action will lake for their temporal happiness; and so it acts for le Church by indirection.
There is no parallel argument to give the State in- ireetly jurisdiction over the Church in matters purely ^mporal, and therefore of the State's sole compe- ^ncy. The Church is universal and cannot be a lember or subject of any particular State. Even ere there but one universal State in the world, the hurch would not be a member thereof, for its mem- Brs are not citizens of the State to the extent that in ,'ery capacity they must submit their activities for le purpose of the State, particularly not the activi- es concerned directly w"ith the higher purpo.se of ernal life. Moreover, the Church i.s not consti- ited merely by the exercise of the natural rights of le men who are citizens of the State, but by the ipernatural endowment of the Divine Positive Law. inally, the Church in its corporate capacity is not 3und to seek the temporal happiness of her members i a means to their eternal welfare, while the State as ich is bound to Divine wor.ship and to the protection id promotion of the Church in the interests of re- gion, because this is a necessary element involved in le perfect temporal happiness of the Catholic citizen, he State, therefore, has not, either in temporal or in )iritual things, any authority over the Church as ich, however much it may have in things purely mporal over the members of the Church, who are ibjects of the State. The State can, as was said )Ove, demand its rights of the Church: it cannot )mmand them.
IV. Union of Church and St.^te. — There is some infusion in the pubhc mind about the meaning of the lion of Church and State. The essential idea of ich union is a condition of affairs where a State recog- les its natural and supernatural relation to the hurch, professes the Faith, and practises the wor- lip of the Church, protects it, enacts no laws to its jrt, while, in ca.se of necessity and at its instance, iking all just and requisite civil measures to forward 16 Divinely appointed purpose of the Church — in so J as all these make for the State's own essen-
tial purpose, the temporal happiness of its citizens.
That this is in principle the normal and ethically
proper condition for a truly Catholic State should be
evident from the religious obligations of the Catholic
State as above declared. That in practice it has in
the past sometimes worked evil to both Church and
State, is an accidental effect consequent upon the
frailty and passion of the human instruments then
ruling in Church, or in State, or in both. As a partial
attempt at security against such evil consequences,
the Church has for centuries established concordats
with Catholic States; but even these have not always
saved the situation. For concordats, like all other
agreements, however firm in principle, are in practice
only as strong as the conscientiousness of those whose
duty it is to observe them. The conscienceless can
destroy them at pleasure. Between the Church and a
non-Christian or a Christian, but non-Catholic, State
a condition of separation, as meaning a condition of
indifference of the State towards the Church, is to be
expected, as the foundation of the specific obligations
involved in union are wanting. Such a separation for
a Catholic State would be criminal, as ignoring the
sacred obligations of the State.
For a State once Catholic and in union with the Church to declare a separation on the ground that it has ceased to be Catholic is an action which as a mat- ter of objective right has no standing; for in objective truth the duty of the people would be to regain their lost faith, if they had really lost it, or to live up to it, if in reality it were not lost. But on the supposition that the essential constituency of a State has been transformed from Catholics to those who, not by hypocritical pretence, but in the fulness of good faith, are not Catholics — a condition easier of supposition than of reahzation — the State through such mistaken conscience might seek for separation without sub- jective fault, provided the separation were effected without the summary dissolution of existing contracts, without the violation of vested rights of the Church or its members. It may be noted in passing that in the recent instances of separation in France and Portugal, i. e. the breaking up of an existing condition of union between Church and State, the separation has been effected where the bulk of the people is still Catholic, has been conducted in violation of rights and con- tracts both natural and positive, and has resulted, as it was aimed to do, in an attempt at complete subjec- tion of the Church and of all civil subjects in the mat- ters of religion to the tyranny of administrations which scoff at all religion. That in States whose per- sonahty is constitutionally made up of every com- plexion of religious faith, much of it in its diversity sincere, there should be a governmental abstention from any specific denominational worship or profes- sion of behef, and a general protection and encourage- ment of the individual in the practice of religion ac- cording to his own religious principles within the limits of the Natural Law, or of a general acceptance of Christianity, seems a practical necessity of evil times, when unity of faith is so widely lacking, and a modus Vivendi which, if sincerely carried out, seems to work as little harm to objective right as can be ex- pected in a condition of consciences sincerely differing in the matter of right established by the Divine Posi- tive Law.
V. Counter Theories. — The theories opposed to the Catholic position on the true relations oetween the Church and State are threefold, differing in lati- tude of negation of ecclesiastical right.
A. Absolute Liberalism is the most extreme. Hav- ing its source in the principles of the French Revolu- tion and beginning with those who denied the exist- ence of God, it naturally takes the po.sition that the State prescinds from God: the State, it says, is athe- istic. Undertaking, with the elimination of revela- tion and the Divine Positive Law, to get back to
