SUICIDE
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SUICIDE
kill himself if ordered to do so by the judge? Some
authors answer this question in the affirmative, bas-
ing their argument on the right which society pos-
sesses to punish certain malefactors with death and to
commission any executioner, hence also the malefac-
tor himself, to carry out the sentence. We share the
most widely accepted opinion, that this practice, prev-
alent in certain countries of the East, is not lawful.
Vindictive, and for that matter all, justice requires a
distinction between tlie subject of a right and that of
a duty, hence in the present case between the one
who punishes and the one who is punished. Finally,
the same principle which forbids anyone to personally
compass his own death also forbids him to advise, di-
rect, or command, with the direct intention of suicide,
that another should slay him.
B. Positive but Indirect Suicide committed without Divine consent is also unlawful unless, everj'thing considered, there is sufficient reason for doing what will cause death to follow. Thus, it is not a sin, but an act of exalted virtue, to go into savage lands to preach the Gospel, or to the bedside of the plague- stricken, to minister to them, although they who do so have before them the prospect of inevitable and speedy death; nor is it a sin for workmen in the discharge of duties to climb on roofs and buildings, thus ex-posing themselves to danger of death, etc. AU this is lawful precisely because the act itself is good and upright, for in theory the persons in question have not in view either as end or means the evil result, that is, death, that will follow, and, moreover, if there be an evil re- sult it is largely compensated for by the good and use- ful result which they geek. On the other hand there is sin in exposing oneself to danger of death to display courage, to win a wager, etc., because in all these cases the end does not in any way compensate for the dan- ger of death that is run. To judge whether or not there is sufficient reason for an act w-hich will appar- ently be followed by death, all the circumstances must be weighed, namely, the importance of the good result, the greater or less certainty of its being at- tained, the greater or less danger of death, etc., all questions which may in a specific case be very difficult to solve.
C. Xegalivc and Direct Siticide without the consent of God constitutes the same sin as positive suicide. In fact man has over his life only the right of use with corresponding obligations to preserve the object of God's dominion, the substance of his life. Hence, it follows obviously that he fails in this obligation of usufructuary who neglects the necessary means for the preservation of life, and this with the intention of destroying the latter, and consequently violates the rights of God.
D. Indirect and Negative Suicide without the con- sent of God is also an attempt against the rights of the Creator and an injustice towards Him whenever with- out sufficient cause a man neglects all the means of preservation of which lie should make use. If a man as usufructuary is obliged in justice to preserve his life, it follows that he is equally bound to m.ake use of all the ordinary means which are indicated in the usual course of things, viz. : (1) he should employ all the or- dinary means which nature itself provides, such as to eat, drink, sleep, and so on; (2) moreover, he should avoid all dangers which he may easily avoid, e. g. to flee from a burning house, to escape from an infuri- ated animal when it may b? done without difficulty. In fact to neglect the ordinarj' means for preserving life is equivalent to kilhng one's .self, but tlie same is not true with regard to extraordinary means. Thus theologians teach that one is not bound in order to pre- serve life to employ remedies which, considering one's condition, are regarded as extraonlinary and involv- ing extraordinary expenditure; one is not obliged to undergo a very painful surgical operation, nor a con- siderable amputation, not to go into exile in order to
seek a more beneficial climate, etc. To use a com-
parison, the lessee of a house is bound to take care of
it as becomes a good father of a family, to make use of
the ordinary means for the preservation of the prop-
erty, for instance, to extinguish a fire which he may
easily extinguish, etc., but he is not bound to employ
means considered extraordinary, such as to procure
the latest novelties invented by science to prevent or
extinguish fire.
The principles which have been outlined in the four propositions or divisions above given should serve for the solution of particular cases; however, the applica- tion may not always be equally easy, and thus a per- son may by an objectively unlawful act take his life and nevertheless consider it permissible and even an act of exalted virtue. It may be asked whether by performing or omitting a certain act a person may in- jure his health and shorten his life. To apply the foregoing principles: it is first of all clear (1st and 3rd propositions, A and C) that one may not have in view this hastening of death, but, this hypothesis aside, it may be said on the one hand that to expose oneself without sufficient reason to a considerable shortening of life constitutes a serious injury to the rights of the Creator; but on the other hand if the danger of death be not imminent, although it is to be feared that fife may be shortened even by several years, it is not a, grave but only a venial sin. This is the case with the drunkard who by his intemperance causes his prema- ture death. Again it must be borne in mind that with the addition of a reasonable motive the thing may be entirely lawful and even an act of virtue; thus the workman docs not sin by devoting himself to the rough labour of the mines, glass-works, etc., and the saints performed a very meritorious and highly vir- tuous act when in order to overcome their passions they lacerated and tortured their flesh by penance and fasting and were thus the cause of their earlier death.
III. Frequence of Suicide; Chief Causes. — The plague of suicide belongs especially to the period of decadence of the civilized peoples of antiquity, Greeks, Romans, and Egyptians. The Christian Middle Ages were unacquainted with this morbid tendency, but it h;is reappeared at a more recent period, has developed constantly since the Renaissance, and at present has reached such an intensity among all civilized nations that it may be considered the special evil of our time. At. present the increase in the tendency to suicide is, with that to mental alienation, the saddest and thereby the most important characteristic fact of our era (Masarj-k, 140). The officially established num- ber of suicides during the ninete<-nth century was a million and a half, of which 1,300,000 were in Europe. Again Father Krose estimates the real number for Europe alone at two millions. During the last ten years of the nineteenth century there were 400,000 suicides, of which France and Germany alone fur- nished half. The following details are given by Nieuwbarn and Jacquart. Taking the countries in the order of the frequency of the rate of suicides, and faking as a scale the number of the latter to the mil- lion of inhabitants, we have the following results for the last ten years of the nineteenth century: France, 2.39; Denmark, 2.34; Switzerland, 232; Germany, 206 (in Saxony especially the sinister rate was 308, which figure rose to 32.5 for 1901-0.5); Austria, 158; Sweden, 147; Hungar}', 145; Belgium, 124; England, 84; Nor- way, 63; Italy, 60; Scotland, .59; Low Countries, 56; Russia, 32; Ireland, 26; Spain, 21. But, as is shown by the indications funii.shcd by Jacquarl for this period of 1901-05 (64 s(i(i.), this figure hjis risen in recent years to an alarming extent. For instance, England in 1905 had risen to 103 to the million inhabitants; Switzerland to 232; the Ixiw Countries to ()4; and Ire- land to 33. In the United States the annual average of suicides from 1901-5 was 4548 or 107 per million of population; in 1908, the latest available statistics,
