THEOLOGY
009
THEOLOGY
a division of labour may also bo advanlagoous for
the sciencp of moral thrology, thai the particular
purpose of manuals and lectures may be limited to
the education of skilled confessors and that this
purpose may very well be fulfilled by centring
attention on the dark side of luniian life. Neverthe-
less, it must be granted that this cannot be the only
purpose of moral theology: a thorough discussion of
all Christian virtues and the menus of acciuiring them
is indispensable. If at any time tliis jiart of moral
theology should be pushed to the background, moral
theology would become one-sided and would need a
revision, not by cutting down ea-suistry, but by devot-
ing more time and energy to the doctrine of virtues
in their scientific, parenetical, and ascetical aspect.
In all these branches of moral theology, a great advance was noticeable at the time of the Council of Trent. That more stress was laid on casuistry in particular, finds its cx]ilanation in the growing frequency of sacramental confession. This is freely conceded by our adversaries. Dollinger and Reusch Bay (op. cit., 19 sqq.): "The fact that casuistry underwent a further development after the sixteenth century, is connected with further changes in the penitential discipline. From that time on the custom prevailed of approaching the confessional more frequently, regular]}' before Communion, of confessing not only grievous, but also venial sins, and of asking the confessor's advice for all troubles of the spiritual life, so that the confessor became more and more a spiritual father and guide." The confessor needed this schooling and scientific train- ing, which alone could enable him to give correct decisions in complex cases of human life, to form a correct estimate of moral goodness or defect, duty or violation of duty, virtue or vice. Now, it was inevitable that the confessor should meet cases where the existence or exact measure of the obligation remained obscure even after careful examination, where the moralist was therefore confronted by the question what the final decision in these cases should be: whether one was obliged to consider oneself bound when the duty was obscure and doubtful, or how one could remove this doubt and arrive at the definite conclusion that there was no strict obli- gation. That the former could not be the case, but that an obligation, to exist, must first be proved, had always been known and had been variously expressed in practical rules: "In dubiis benigniora sequenda", "odiosa sunt rcstringenda", etc. The basic principle, however, for solving such dubious cases and attaining the certitude necessary for the morality of an action was not always kept clearly in view. To establish this universal principle, was equivalent to establishing a moral system ; and the various systems were distinguished by the principle to which each adhered.
The history of Probabilism is given under this title, suffice it to .say here that from the middle of the seventeenth centurj' when the violent discuasion of this question begins, the development of moral theology coincides with that of Probabilism and of other Probabihstic .systems; although these .systems touch only a small portion of morals and of moral truths and nothing is farther from the truth than the opinion, so wide-spread among the adversaries of Catholic morals, that Probabilism gave a new shape and a new spirit to the whole of moral theology. Probabilism and the other systems of morals are con- cerned only .about cases which are objectively doubt- ful; hence they abstract entirely from the wide sphere of certain, established truths. Now, the latter cia.ss is by far the larger in moral theology also; were it not 80, human reason would be in a sorry plight, and Divine providence would have bestowed little care on the noblest of its visible creatures and on their high- est goods, even in the supernatural order, in which a XIV.— .39
full measure of gifts and graces was showered upon
those ransomed in Christ. The certain and un-
doubted portion includes all the fundamental ques-
tions of Christian morals; it comprises these principles
of the moral order by which the relations of man to
himself, to God, to his neighbour, and to the various
communities are regulated; it embraces the doctrine
of the last end of man and of the supernatural means
of attaining this end. There is only a conii)aratively
small number of objectively obscure and doubtfid
laws or duties that appeal to Probabihsm or Anti-
probabilism for a decision. However, as has been
said, since the middle of the seventeenth century, the
interest of moral theologians centred in the question
about Probabihsm or Antiprobabilism.
Just as far from the truth is the second opinion of the adversaries of Probabilism, viz., that this system induces people to evade the laws and hardens them into callousness. On the contrary, to moot the ques- tion of Probabilism at all, was the sign of a severely conscientious soul. He who proposes the question at all knows and confesses by that very fact: first, that it is not lawful to act with a doubtful conscience, that he who performs an action without being firmly con- vinced of its being allowed, commits sin in the sight of God; secondly, that a law, above all the Divine law, obliges us to take cognizance of it and that, therefore, whenever doubts arise about the probable existence of an obligation we must api)ly sufficient care in order to arrive at certainty, so that a frivolous disregard of reasonable doubts is in itself a sin against the submis- sion due to God. In spite of all this, it may happen that all our pains and inquiries do not lead us to cer- tainty, that solid reasons are found both for and against the existence of an obligation: under these circumstances, a conscientious man will naturally ask whether he must consider himself bound by the law or whether he can, by further reflections — reflex princi- ples, as they are called — come to the plain conclusion that there is no obligation either to do or to omit the act in question. Were we obliged to consider our- selves bound in every doubt, the result, obviously, would be an intolerable severity. But since before performing an action the final verdict of our con- science must be free from doubt, the necessity of removing in one way or another such doubts as may have arisen, is self-evident.
At first there was a lack of clearness with regard to Probabilism and .the questions connected with it. Conflicting definitions of opinion, probabiUty, and certitude, could not but cause confusion. When works on mor.al theology and practical manuals began to multiply, it was inevitable that some individuals should take the word "probable" in too wide or in too lax a sense, although there can be no doubt that in itself it means "something acceptable to reason", in other words, since reason can accept nothing unless it has the appearance of truth, ".something based on reasons which generally lead to the truth". Hence it is that opinions were actually advanced and spread as practicable which were little in accord with the de- mands of the Christian Faith, and whichbroughtdown upon them the censure of the Holy See. We refer particularly to the theses condemned by Alexander VII on 24 Sept., 166.5, and on 18 March, 1666, and by Innocent XI on 2 March, 1679. It, is not Probabihsm that must be made responsible for them, but the vagaries of a few Probabilists.
As a result of these condemnations, some theolo- gians thought themselves obliged to oppose the sys- tem itself and to .side with Probabiliorism. Previous to this turn of affairs, the .lan.senists had been the most pronounced adversaries of Probabilism. But they, too, had received a setback when Innocent X condemned (.31 May, 16.53) in the"Augustinus"of.Iansenius, then recently deceased, the projmsition: ".lust men, with the strength now at their disposal, cannot keep cer-
