THIRTY
654
TmRTY
through the treachery of Pignerolo, retained it. He
made the flight to Lorraine of Gaston of Orleans, who
Uved in discord with his brother Louis XIH, a pre-
text to carry the war into Lorraine and there to seize
one fortress after another. In this way his troops
were kept near the seat of war, between the Germans
and Dutch. In January, 1632, Gustavus Adolphus
urged that Richelieu should take Hagenau and Za-
bern in Alsace from the Habsburgs. Richelieu hesi-
tated, and Pere Joseph persuaded him for religious
reasons to reject the proposal. During all these
months the emperor had had no commander to whom
he could entrust the direction of his forces. His son,
Ferdinand III, was still too young, so from necessity
he turned again to WaUenstein. The latter kept him
in suspense and
only consented
when granted pow-
ers so great as to
raise suspicion
against himself.
The contract was
made on 13 April,
1632, although
WaUenstein actu-
ally assumed com-
mand several
weeks earlier.
Gustavus reopened
the campaign in
February. 16 3 2,
and began the siege
of Bamberg. But
Tilly came with
fresh troops and
relieved the city.
He wished to open
communications
with WaUenstein
at Eger and thus force Gustavus to withdraw from the
interior of Germany, but WaUenstein did not stir;
consequently Gustavus was free to advance directly
towards Bavaria. On 15 April there was an unde-
cided battle at Rain on the Lech; Tilly was mortally
wounded and the Bavarians withdrew from the battle-
field. This left the road to Munich open to the
Swedes and permitted them to phmder the Bavarian
lowlands. However, Maximilian retained Ingol-
stadt and Ratisbon, the two strategically imjjortant
points of his country. Gustavus Adolphus sim])ly
lost time in the Bavarian campaign. In north-west-
ern Germany Pappenheim was successful in his under-
takings. New imperial forces gathered both in
Bohemia and Swabia. In June WaUenstein con-
quered Bohemia, formed a junction then with Maxi-
milian, and kept Gustavus inactive at Nuremberg for
weeks. In vain Gustavus tried to draw WaUenstein
into a battle, and when he attempted to storm Wal-
lenstein's position (3 September) he was defeated.
For about six weeks he marched aimlessly through
Franconia and Swabia pursued by WaUenstein. The
latter suddenly drew off towards Saxony in order to
unite there with Pappenheim, and cut off Gustavus's
road to the Baltic. Gustavus followed and on 16 No-
vember, forced a battle at Liitzen near Leipzig, just
as the forces of WaUenstein and Pappenheim met.
The Swedes gained the victory, but they paid for it
with the life of Gustavus Adolphus. On the im-
perial side Pappenheim, the emperor's most daring
and capable cavalry general, was killed.
The death of the Swedish king did not make any essential cliange. His policies were carried on in the same manner and with equal skill by his trusted coim- cillor Axel Oxenstiern. The strength of the Swedish forces had been declining throughout the year 1632. The important questions to be decided were: whether, as the Swedish power declined, the Protestant princes
Bernhard, Duke of Saxe-Weimar
From an old engraving
would act independently of if under the leadership of
Saxony, taking upon themselves the cause of Prot-
estantism and of the independence of the princely
rulers; also whether the emperor could find a com-
mander who would make the unreliable and sluggish
WaUenstein unnecessary. On account of these diffi-
culties the next two years were more occupied with
negotiations than with battles. O.xenstiern brought
Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, who had been
trained under Gustavus Adolphus and who was the
ablest of the younger commanders among the Ger-
man Protestants, and with him Saxony into closer
union with Sweden; he also made an agreement
with the Protestant rulers of the central Ger-
man states at the assemblv at Heilbron (March,
1633). In November, 1633, Bernhard by a
daring advance took Ratisbon; Austria lay open
to him, while a revolt of the Bavarian peasants
crippled Bavaria's strength. The duke, however, did
not venture into Austria and by January MaximiUan
had subdued the peasants. Sweden rapidly lost its
popularity even among the Protestants of central
Germany, for it demanded much. In addition,
O.xenstiern flooded these states with Swedish copper
coin and sent their good silver to Sweden, thus ruining
them economically. As early as 1634 the influence of
Richelieu over these states was greater than that of
Sweden. WaUenstein used his army but little in
1633. He was constantly occupied with negotia-
tions, chiefly with Saxony, but also with Sweden, with a
view to imposing a peace on the Habsburgs. The
commander of the Saxon forces, von Arnim, per-
suaded him to agree to one truce after another. In
this way Saxony saved its strength and gained time
to improve its position in the empire both as regards
Sweden and the emperor. Although he afterwards
denied it, even Richelieu beUeved early in 1634 that
WaUenstein was ready to enter into relations with
France also. Ferdinand and Maximilian, however,
had already planned his downfall; he was murdered at
Eger on 25 February, 1634.
France was the only country successful in war and politics from 1632 to the middle of 1634. An in- creasing number of fortresses in Lorrainecameunderits control. In the spring of 1632, after making a treaty with the Archbishop of Trier to protect him from the Swedes, French troo])s occupied Coblenz and Ehren- breitstein on the opposite side of the Rhine. Rich- elieu also carried on negotiations with the Archbishop of Cologne, who was Bishop of Liege as well, by which he hoped to bring French troo])s into north-western Germany in the flank of the imjierial forces there, and also to garrison Dinan which belonged to the Diocese of Liege. From this latter point France would be able to exercise a strong influence on the war between Spain and the Netherlands. Dinan was not obtained owing to a revolt of the citizens of Cologne. How- ever, from this time on, Richelieu pressed steadily for- ward towards Alsace. He wished the Protestant princes to request him to garrison the fortified Alsa- tian towns, and for a time in 1634 he occupied Mont- b(liard, which belonged to Wurtemberg, and the Diocese of Basle. Spain had already, in 1633, sent troops both from Italy and from the Netherlands to the upper Rhine as protection. Richelieu's plans were held in check by the slow progress of the war in the Netherlands. Notwithstanding the treaty of 1630. by which France granted subsidies, the States General showed but litlU' warlike .spirit, whUc the southern part of the Netherlands was positively averse to war. .\ Spanish attack by sea on the Netherlands ended in September. lti;{2, in a complete defeat. On the other hand, an attack by the Stadtholder of the Netherlands on Maastricht iii 1633 led to the capture of the fortress, not. as li(>i)cd and planned, to a revolt of the so\ithern i)rovinccs against Sj)ain. Xi-ither did it force France to openly take part in the war. Nego-
