TIMBRIAS
725
TIMBRIAS
During the era of peace up to 1620, Tilly created
the Bavarian army, the flower of the army of the
League, and the first standing army in the empire
that was paid and fed, not by plundering and enforced
contributions, but out of the regular revenues of the
State. With these troops as his mainstay he took
part in the prolonged war in Bohemia and the empire
during the years 1620-30. In 1620 the force of his
attack gained the victory at the battle of the White
Mountain (8 November) over the Bohemians who
had revolted against the emperor. For four years
Tilly was engaged in a contest with Ernst of Mansfeld
and his confederates. Ernst transferred the war
from Bohemia to the lands of the empire, so that
Tilly was often hampered by political considerations.
In 1622 Tilly forced Mansfeld to give battle at Wies-
loch, but the result was indecisive. He then de-
stroyed the army of George Frederick of Baden at
Wimpfen, and that of Christian of Halberstadt at
Hochst, and took Heidelberg and Mannheim. After
this Mansfeld's army dispersed and Tilly had now
the strategic control of the whole of southern Ger-
many. But in the next year, Mansfeld and Christian
entered north-western Germany with fresh armies.
As the estates of Hesse and some of those of Lower
Saxony were still adherents of the imperial cause,
Tilly was able to make an energetic advance against
Mansfeld and to defeat hira at Stadtlohn in 1623.
Political considerations, however, prevented his
pursuit of Mansfeld. The inhabitants of north-
western Ciermany were roused to fanaticism against
Tilly by the suggestion that he would force them to
become Catholics. The districts on the middle
course of the Weser which he garrisoned after his
victory at Stadllolm yielded so lillle that, in spite of
all his efforts to feisl liis anny by orderly nii'tlKjds, the
soldiers suffered pi'ivati<jns and took to phuiiiering,
which increased still more the animosity against
them. The danger that the King of Denmark would
take part in the war led Tilly in 1025 to beg the em-
peror to raise an army in the empire and to place it
under Wallenstein's command. WaUenstein kept
all the prosperous territories for himself and limited
TUly more than ever to the districts poor in revenue
of south-western Germany. TiUy now found it
increasinglj' difficult to maintain discipline because
WaUenstein collected mercenary soldiers by the
promise of rich booty, and raised these troops on a
larger scale and more successfully than any previous
commander on account of his imposing personality.
Moreover, from 1627, and especially after the Edict
of Restitution of 1629 Tilly was obliged to carry out
numerous orders to restore to the Church lands which
had been taken from it contrary to the religious
peace; in this way he gained the reputation of being
a bitter enemy of Protestantism. By force of char-
acter, however, he overcame all difficulties.
In 1626 Tilly prevented the union of the Danes with the Landgrave of Hesse who had revolted, and later, in August, destroyed the Danish army at Liitter on the Barenberg. In 1(527 he drove the Danes over the Elbe, but on account of a wound, which prevented him from partaking in the war, WaUen- stein gained the honours of the victory in the cam- paign in Holstein. When he had recovered TiUy took Stade at the mouth of the Elbe, and thus gained control over the whole of north-western (iermany excepting Bremen. He wa-s not able to advance against this latter city on account of the effects of Wallenstein's failures about the same time at Stralsund and Magdeburg. The great success he had later led him to hope for a time that peace could be restored in the empire, but in this he was disappointed. Once more for political reasons he could not gain permission to attack the Dutch, who exerted them- selves to keep alive the disorders in the empire. On the other hand, the leaders of the League, owing to
their hostility to WaUenstein, refused to give TiUy
permission to go to Wallenstein's aid at Stralsund,
and thus to bar Gustavus Adolphus from entering
the empire. They also obliged Tilly and WaUen-
stein to dismiss a large part of their troops, a course
that aroused a bitter and suspicious feeling in the
experienced general and politician. Short Ij' after
the arrival of Gustavus .'\dolphus, WaUenstein was
dismissed and Tilly was entrusted by the emperor
with the command of the imperial army in addition
to his own. It was a difficult task to reorganize
the imperial troops which were in process of being
disbanded. The last period of TiUy's activities as
a general began when he took command of the imperial
army. As usual, he took the offensive as soon as
he could and began operations near the Baltic coast.
Gustavus Adolphus, however, avoi<lcd a battle and
sought to tire Tilly out by marching about so as to
wrest the initiative from him. I'illy put an end to
this by marching against Magdeburg in March, 1630;
this was the boldest stroke of his entire career as a
commander. Gustavus seized the opportunity to
advance up the Oder into the territories ruled by
the emperor; probably, however, Tilly's bold measures
forced Gustavus to follow him, in order to relieve
Magdeburg.
When Tilly stormed Magdeburg on 20 May, its Swedish garrison laid the city in ashes, and it lost its strategic importance; he w;i.s, therefore, obliged to retreat towards Thuringia. Gustavus Adolphus now showed himself to be superior to Tilly in tactics at the battle of Breitenfeld on 17 September. TiUy followed the methods of Alexander Farnese, but these proved vmsuccessful against Gustavus Adolphus's more modern generalshij). Tilly's army was nearly destroyed, and he, now seventy-two years old, was for a short time crushed by the blow. However, in the same autumn he advanced from the Weser with new troops to prevent the Swedes from marching into the territories of the chiefs of the League in Franconia. But on account of the insufficient means at his disposal, the fear of the Swedes, and the timid- ity of the emperor and of the CathoUc estates, his army disbanded on the way. Undismayed, "TiUy began again on a smaller scale. In March, after carefully making his arrangements, he stormed Bam- berg, which had faUen into the hands of the Swedes, and gained here the first \ictory over them. He now planned to advance towards Eger in order to join WaUenstein, who had again entered the imperial service, but the latter kept him waiting. In the meantime Gustavus Adolphus had advanced from the Main towards Tilly. Abandoning Donauworth, Tilly took up a position at the Village of Rain on the Lech, being supported by Aldringen, the imperial quartermaster-general. The battle took place 1,5 April, and at its very beginning Tilly and Ald- ringen were severely wounded; this gave Gustavus Adolphus the victory. Before his death Tilly pro- vided for the timely garri.soning of IngoLstadt and Ratisbon by the Bavarian troojis, a measure which proved of importance for the subsequent course of the war. TiUy was always victorious in every cam- paign in which he had sufficient resources. He died when the camimign against (Justavus had hardly begiin. It is, therefore, unjust to judge of his ability as a commander by his failure at the beginning of this campaign. He was inferior to no commander of his own time.
Klopp, Tilhi im SO-jahriaen Kriege (.Stuttgart, 1801): Viller- MONT, Tilly "" In gurrre de Irenle ans (Tournay, 1860).
Mahtin Spahn.
Timbrias, a titular see in Pisidia, suffragan of Antioch. It is called Thymbrium in the official lists of the Roman Curia, the name being more or less mis- spelled in documents, but the spelling here adopted is that found on coins where the inhabitants are
