CARDINAL
344
CARDINAL
men; they were the providers for the bodily needs,
for the carnal appetites, which require the restraint
of temperance (aoKppoavvri) . Next came the police or
soldier class, whose needful virtue was fortitude
(dvdpcla). In this pair of cardinal virtues is exhib-
ited a not very precise portion of Greek psychology,
which the Scholastics have perpetuated in the divis-
ion of appetites as concupiscibtte and irascibile, the
latter member having for its characteristic that it
must seek its purpose by an arduous endeavour
against obstacles. This is a Scholastic modification
of rb l-KiBvix-qTinbv and to Svnoeiois, neither of which are
rational faculties, while they are both amenable to
reason (/wra \470u); and it is the latter of them
especially which is to help the reason, as leading
faculty fVd Tiytnovticiv), to subdue the concupiscence
of the former. This idea of leadership gives us the
third cardinal virtue, called by Plato o-o<pla and <pi\oo-o-
4>la, but by Aristotle 4>povT)o-is, the practical wisdom
which is distinguished from the speculative. The
fourth cardinal virtue stands outside the scheme
of the other three, which exhaust the psychological
trichotomy of man: rb i-ni6vp.-r\TiKbv, rb 6vp.oec8ts, rb
\oyiniv. The Platonic justice of the "Republic",
at least in this connexion, is the harmony between
these three departments, in which each faculty dis-
charges exactly its own proper function without
interfering in the functions of the others. Obviously
the senses may disturb reason; not so obviously,
yet clearly, reason may disturb sense, if man tries
to regulate his virtues on the principles proper to
an angel without bodily appetites. In this idea of
justice, viz., as concordant working of parts within
the individual's own nature, the Platonic notion dif-
fers from the Scholastic, which is that justice is
strictly not towards self, but towards others. Aris-
totle, with variations of his own, describes the four
virtues which Plato had sketched; but in his "Eth-
ics" he does not put them into one system. They are
treated in his general discussion, which does not aim
ai a complete classification of virtues, and leaves in-
terpreters free to give different enumerations.
The Latins, as represented by Cicero, repeated Plato and Aristotle: "Each man should so conduct himself that fortitude appear in labours and dangers: temperance in foregoing pleasures: prudence in the choice between good and evil: justice in giving every man his own [in suo cuiquc tribuendo]" (De Fin., V, xxiii, 67; cf. De Offic. I, ii, 5). This is a departure from the idea prominent in Platonic justice, and agrees with the Scholastic definition. It is a clearly admitted fact that in the inspiration of Holy Scrip- ture the ministerial author may use means supplied by human wisdom. The Book of Wisdom is clearly under Hellenic influence: hence one may suppose tin- repetition of the four Platonic virtues to he connected with their purpose. In Wis., viii, 5, <i, 7. occur ao<t>ia or (ppbvrjo-ts , SiKatcKrvvTj, o-iatppoavv-q, avbptia. The same list appears in the apocryphal IV Mach., v, 22,23, except that for <ro<j>La is put fiW/taa. Philo compares them to the four rivers of Eden.
Doctrine of St. Thomas. — St. Thomas (Summa Theol., III. Q. lxi.aa. 2 and 4) derives the cardinal virtues both from their formal objects or the per- ceived kinds of rational good which they generally seek, and from the subjects, or faculties, in which they reside and which they perfect. The latter con- sideration is the more easily intelligible. In the in- tellect is prudence; in the will ia justice; in the sen- sitive appetites are temperance restraining pleasure. and fortitude urging on impulses of resistance to fear which would deter a person from strenuous action under difficulties; also checking the excesses of fool- hardy audacity, as seen in some who gratuitously courted martyrdom in times of persecution. On the side of the formal object, which in all cases is rational good, we have the four specific variations. The ra-
tional good as an object for the action of intellect
demands the virtue of prudence; inasmuch as the
dictate of prudence is communicated to the will for
exertion in relation to other persons, there arises the
demand for justice, giving to every man his due. So
far the actions are conceived; next come the passions:
the concupiscible and the irascible. The order of ob-
jective reason as imposed on the appetite for pleas-
ures demands the virtue of temperance; as imposed
on the appetite which is repelled by fear-inspiring
tasks, it demands fortitude. St. Thomas found four
cardinal virtues in common recognition and he tried
to give a systematic account of the group as far as it
admitted of logical systematization. In so doing he
naturally looked to the faculties employed and to the
objects about which they were employed. He found
it convenient to regard the action of reason, prudence,
and the two passions of the sensitive appetite, lust and
fear, as internal to the agent; while he regarded the
action of the will as concerned with right order in re-
gard to conduct towards others. As one exponent
puts it: "Debitum semper est erga alteram: sed
actus rationis et passiones interiores sunt: et ideo
prudentia qua? perficit rationem, sicut fortitudo et
temperantia qua? regulant passiones. dicuntur vir-
tutes ad nos." Thus with three virtues ad intra and
one ad extra were established four cardinal virtues,
contrary to Plato's scheme, in which all were directly
ad intra, referring to the inner harmony of man.
If it be urged against the cardinal virtues being moral, that all moral virtues are in the rational will and only justice among the four cardinal is so seated, St. Thomas replies that prudence is practical, not speculative; and so it has regard to the will, while the two passions, the concupiscible and the irascible, re- ceiving in their own department, at the dictate of reason, the improving qualifications or habits which are the effects of repeated acts, are thereby rendered more docile to the will, obeying it with greater promptness, ease, and constancy. Thus each cardinal virtue has some seat in the will, direct or indirect. At times Aristotle seems to imply what the Pelagians taught later, that the passions may be trained so as never to offer temptat inn: as a fact, however, he fully allows elsewhere for the abiding peccability of man. Those whose passions are more ordered may in this regard have more perfect virtue; while from another standpoint, their merit is less than that of those who are constant in virtue by heroic resistance to perpet- ual temptations of great strength.
In the above account of the doctrine propounded by St. Thomas, a number of his nice abstractions are left out: for example, he distinguishes prudence as concerned with means to good ends, which it belongs to another virtue to assign: "ad prudentiam pert met non pra^stituere finem virtutibus moralibus, sed de his disponere qua- sunt ad finem." He relies on sytir deresis, or synteresis, for primary, universal principles; on wisdom for knowledge of the Divine; on counsel for judging what prudence is to dictate; '>n what he calls "the "potential parts" of the cardinal virtues for filling up the description of them in various depart- ments under cognate names, such as appear in the relation of modesty, meekness, and humility to tem- perance.
The theological virtues are so thoroughly super- natural that to treat them as they might appear in the order of nature is not profitable: with the cardinal virtues the ease is different. What has been said
above about them makes no reference to grace: the remarks are confined t<> what may belong simply to
natural ethics. There is a gain in the restriction, for
a natural appreciation of them is exceedingly useful, and many characters suffer from a defective knowl- edge of natural goodness, si Thomas introduces the discussion of cardinal virtues also as gifts, hut much that he says omits reference to this aspect.
