CASUISTRY
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CASUISTRY
chological conditions that fix motive and consent;
but, borrowing from the moralist the principles that
determine these elements of a volitional act, its in-
quiry regards the extent of their presence or absence
in a given case. Neither does it establish the exis-
tence of moral obligation; but, assuming the precepts
of morality as already established, its only office is to
determine the subjective morality of an individual
act. In subordination to the sciences which it sub-
serves, its sphere comprises the whole range of man's
free activity. The decisions of the casuist are right
or wrong, therefore, in so far as they are or are not in
accord with a science of morality, which is itself a
right interpretation of the natural or positive laws
promulgated by the Supreme Legislator of the uni-
verse. They are of no worth, when based on an
arbitrary or purely self-sanctioned autonomous phi-
losophy of conduct.
Since the special function of casuistry is to deter- mine practically and in the concrete the presence or absence of a definite moral obligation, it does not fall within its scope to pass judgment on what would be more advisable, or on what may be recommended as a counsel of perfection. It leaves these judgments to the sciences to which they belong, particularly to pastoral and ascetical theology. The prudent direc- tor of consciences, however, being more than a casuist, ought in giving advice to make use of these other sciences in so far as they are applicable. Should he fail to do so, the blame cannot be attributed to casuis- try.
The necessity of casuistry and its importance are obvious. From the nature of the case, the general principles of any science in their concrete application give rise to problems which trained and expert minds only can solve. This is especially true regarding the application of moral principles and precepts to in- dividual conduct. For, although those principles and precepts are in themselves generally evident, their application calls for the consideration of many com- plex factors, both objective and subjective. Only those who unite scientific knowledge of morality with practice in its application may be trusted to solve promptly and safely problems of conscience. Per- sonal, social, commercial, and political experience proves this abundantly. Moral education requires long, patient, and delicate training, and few acquire it without the aid of casuistry. The objections that are urged against casuistry arise from misconception of its purpose and scope, or from errors and abuses that have sometimes accompanied its practice. The former are sufficiently disposed of; the latter no more discredit its legitimate use than the corresponding difficulties which may be raised against therapeutics or civil law impair the value of these sciences. His- torically considered, casuistry in some form or another is as old as human conscience. Wherever civilization has developed along moral lines, there the casuist has been for the interior forum of conscience what the judge was for the exterior forum of civil legality. The scope of this article, however, is con- fined to Catholic casuistry. The history of this may be divided into three periods: —
I. From the First to the Thirteenth Century. — During this period, though there are no works treat- ing of casuistry in a formal and scientific way, prac- tical applications of Christian morality to the conduct of life are numerous and continuous; first, in the works of the Fathers and other ecclesiastical writers, in the decisions of popes and bishops, and in the decrees of councils; later, in the Scriptural commentaries, the Books of Sentences, ami the Penitential Books.
II. Thirteenth to the Middle of the Six- teenth Century.— After the Fourth Council of Lateran the reduction to a scientific form of the casuistic doctrine, which had been gradually devel- oped and elaborated during the patristic period, began
concurrently with an awakening of interest in theo-
logical studies and the apostolic activity of the now
nourishing mendicant orders. The work of the
Dominican, Raymund of Pennafort, entitled " Summa
de Pcenitentia. et Matrimonio", and published about
12.3.5, opened an era in the scientific study of casuis-
try, and fixed the manner of treatment which the
science retained for over two hundred years. Two
other books exercised an influence during this period
on the formation of scientific casuistry: The " Summa
Astesana", published in 1317 by a Franciscan of
Asti in Piedmont; and the "Summa Pisana", written
by the Dominican Bartholomew of San Concordio,
or of Pisa (d. 1347), which treated casuistic subjects
alphabetically, and was the first of a long series of
similar works. The "Summa Summarum", of Syl-
vester Prierias, O. P. (d. 1523), practically brings
the age of the great "Summists" to a close. St.
Antoninus, O. P., of Florence (d. 14,59) is notable
in this period for his "Summa Confessionalis" and
"Summula Confessorum", which were followed by
many manuals of a like kind. He was probably the
first who treated moral theology as a distinct science,
and thus prepared the way for that closer union of
treatment between it and casuistry which finally ob-
tained in the following period.
III. Middle of the Sixteenth Century to the Present Time. — The first hundred years of this period are characterized by a splendid development of theo- logical sciences, due to the ecclesiastical reformation begun and carried out by the Council of Trent, to the institution of a new religious order, the Society of Jesus, and to the intellectual activity evoked in de- fence of the Church against the pseudo-Reformation of Luther and of contemporaneous heresiarchs. In this progress casuistry shared. Besides the various "Summa= Casuum" which were published, the great theologians of the time, in commenting on the second part of the "Summa Theologica" of St. Thomas Aquinas, treated fully and profoundly casuistical questions regarding personal, social, political, and religious duties, regarding the mutual relations of states, and regarding the relative rights of Church and State. During this time moral theology finally attained the dignity of a special science, and became the explicit basis of casuistry. Prominent in bring- ing about this development were John Azor, S. J. (d. 1603), whose " Institutions Morales" was printed at Rome in 1600; Paul Laymann, S. J. (d. 1635), who published at Munich in 1625 his "Theologia Moralis"; and Hermann Busembaum (d. 1668), whose " Medulla Theologia 1 Moralis " became the text for the celebrated commentaries of Claude La Croix, S. J. (d. 1714), of St. Alphonsus Liguori, and in our time of Anthony Ballerini, S. J. The progress of casuistry was inter- rupted towards the middle of the seventeenth century by the controversy which arose concerning the doc- trine of probabilism. This controversy might have been conducted with scientific calm and finally dis- posed of by the Holy See, but by the injection into it of Jansenistic fanaticism, sophistry, and satire, real issues were confused, and an embittered strife arose, which for nearly two centuries disturbed Catholic schools. The effects on casuist ry were deplorable. Two extreme schools, the Rigorists and the Laxists, came into being, and centred attention upon them- selves. The vast body of conservative theologians were practically ignored, or charged with laxity be- cause they dkl not hold the opinions of a narrow school. The Laxists were taken as typical casuists, and because some of them were Jesuits. Jesuit moral- ity became a byword of reproach. The tenets of both Rigorists and Laxists were repeatedly con- demned by ecclesiastical authorities; nevertheless the repute of sane casuistry suffered not only among the enemies of the Church, but even to a degree among Catholics also. So much so, that by the middle of
