CAUSE
CAUSE
given event, in the instant A, is uniformly followed
by a second given event in the instant B. No impli-
cation of power, or dependence, is conceived or stated.
Similarly, a group of events, in one instant, is fol-
lowed by another group in the next; the total sum of
things comprising the world is succeeded by the total
sum of things comprising the world in two succeeding
instants. In all these cases, as far as they are consid-
ered by science, the event or events of the prior
instant are always the cause of what follows, provided
the succession is invariable. Thus the same thing
may conceivably be, and is sometimes said to be. both
cause and effect, identical in all respects but that of
succession in time. There need be no necessary con-
tradiction between such a view and that of philosophy ;
for science, as such, does not consider the questions
of metaphysics or seek to determine the essential
causes of beings. A relationship, given that it is
invariable, as the unconditional constant succession
of John Stuart Mill, between the two or more phe-
nomena, is all that science demands and, under the
particular abstractions with which it deals, this is
enough to ensure scientific results. A knowledge of
the conditions of the existence of certain phenomena
is the principal aim of science; and this is strictly pur-
sued by observation, experiment, and the application
of mathematical methods. There is, consequently,
no Tadical opposition between the two provinces of
knowledge, since both the ends sought and the means
employed in their search differ. Indeed were a man
of science to make any pronouncement as to the
nature of essential causes or their mode of causality,
he would have overstepped the boundaries drawn by
his science and declared himself a metaphysician.
As a matter of fact, there have not been wanting
scientists, whose habit of mind and training are
entirely scientific and in no sense metaphysical, who
have done this very thing and attempted to give a
scientific solution of a purely metaphysical problem.
There will be no need to give any detailed account of
such an attempt, the success of wluch is obviously
impossible. The scientific means at disposal are not
equal to the task. But, on the other hand, in its own
sphere and working with its own particular abstrac-
tions, science is quite competent to reach its own
results in its own way, and this without any necessary
correction on the part of metaphysics.
It will be perceived that the period of groping for the concrete causes of things gave place to one in which the synthesis of causes provided an explanation of causality. The concept of the efficient cause — not of the causal nexus and interaction as a whole — was, in the next stage, submitted to a critical analysis resulting in scepticism, then rehabilitated either on idealistic or mechanical lines. But the critical analy- sis, though it certainly led indirectly to both these later views as to causality, was answered, by the appeal to "common sense , in a way that, but for one missing factor, would probably have turned the current of philosophic thought back to Scholasticism and the Aristotelean doctrine, as the only one pro- viding a satisfactory account, either of the action of what we call causes and the production of effects in t he world, or of the true origin of the idea of necessary causality. For the theory of Aristotle and the Schoolmen can lay claim, most truly, to a character of common sense. It is based upon the observation, by the senses, of individual cases of causal action in
tlic plicuiimi iial world So far it is no i c than in
agrei unit with the common experience of mankind. But , beyond this, it provides a suitable account of the manner in which an observation of individual cases can become an intellectual concept. This it does in its theory of the origin of ideas. In this point, then, i lie Scholastic system of philosophy can be repre- sented as in full accord with, and built out of, the common judgments of mankind. It parts company
with this only in requiring clearer evidence, using
stricter analysis and sharper criticism. Also, it pro-
ceeds farther, though still along the lines traced by
common sense, in its analyses and syntheses, until
it has presented natural knowledge as a complete and
co-ordmate whole.
The fact, already alluded to, that several of the systems given to the world, even after Hume's criti- cism, have much in common with, yet lack the con- clusive and convincing force of, the Scholastic system on this issue, would seem to argue in favour of the claim of the latter to common sense or naturalness. As a metaphysical theory, it has the merit of being straightforward, clear, and consistent; and it accounts for that for which it professes to account without ambiguity or circumlocution. That, as a matter of history, modern speculation on this point did not return, confirmed and justified, to the earlier lines, after the criticism of Hume, is probably due, in the main, to the fact that the full concept of causality had been more or less lost sight of during the period pre- ceding him. His criticism was aimed at the possi- bility of a knowledge of causal efficiency; and without an adequate theory of cognition, as well as a proper grasp of the relationships between efficient cause and effect in the process of becoming, the idea of efficiency, or power, is indeed inexplicable. Thus, while in the idealistic theories the attempt is made to restate the problem on a new basis, and solve it by reference to the manifestation, in one or another form, of Spirit, modern science pursues its own course and limits itself to the investigation of purely scientific conditions. Neither the one nor the other, properly speaking, raises the question as to the true and immediate causes of the qualities or essences of entities, for both have abandoned that standpoint from which alone the problem, in this sense, is envisaged.
Cause, in iaw, embraces any action, suit, or other original proceeding, between a plaintiff and a de- fendant. A cause of action is the entire set of facts that give rise to an enforceable claim. It includes the right of action; but the right does not necessarily include the cause. Thus, by lapse of time, a cause may cease to be actionable; or by legal enactment, as in the ease of a solicitor, who cannot sue for his bill of costs until one month after its delivery. Until the expiry of the time there is no cause of action.
Histories of Philosophy. — Hitter and Preller, Historia Philosophic GriFca- (7th pit.. Gotha, 1888); Ueberweg, Grund- nss der Gescli. tier Philosophic (Berlin, 1862 66). tr. .Mourns, A History of Philosophy (London, 1S72-74); Stanley. The. History of Philosophy <2j eel., London. 16S7); Turner, History of Philosophy (Boston, 1903); Gomperz. Griechische Denker (Leipzig, 1896), tr. Magnus. Greek Thinkers (London. 1901); Erdmann, Grundriss tier Grschichte der Philosophie (Berlin, Jena, 1866), tr. Hough (London. 1892); Merz. A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh. Lon- don, 1903); de Wulf, Histoire de la philosophie medo vole (Louvain, 1900).
Sources. — Plato, Works, especially Timivus; Aristotle. Works, especially the Physies and Metaphysics; St. Augustine, ll'ort.s, especially Confessions, ed. Congregation of St. M mr (Paris. 1689-1700), also P. L.; St. Thomas Aquinas, Workt (Parma. 1S52-73), especially the following; Summa theol.. Contra Gentiles, Commentaries on the Physies and \felaphysics, De veritate, De prineipns naiunp, De pluralitnte fammram, De formis, De principio individuation^, De at, nutate mundi, De natura materia*; Bacon, Works, ed. Ellis, Spedding, and Heath (London, 1858-59); Berkeley, Works, ed. Phaser (Oxford, 1901); Malebranche, De la rechi the tie la veriiS (Amsterdam, 1688; Paris, 1712); Leibniz, Second et troisi me
i iloi ieis:.,in, nt ilu nu>ii,,iu si,sl,iu, .A to ,,■■:■•:
substances in Works (Berlin. 1840); Hume. The Philosophical Works of David Hume, ed. Green and Grose i London, 1878), especially, Treatise on Human Xalure, and Essay; Of Qu Idea of Necessary Causation; EIeid, The Works of Thomas Itcid.
preface, notes, etc. by Sir William HAMILTON ( Edinburgh, lslli 63); Brown, In fnquirii into the liclnthn of fa:,, a, el Effect (Edinburgh, 1804); InEM, Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Edinburgh, 1S20); Kant, Kritik der Vernunft (Riga. 1781), tr Meiki.kjoiin (London. 1S44); Hegel, Werke (Berlin. L832): Schopenhauer, Werke -l - Is'.H); von Hkrtmann, Philosophie d* ' ' 1869): Stewart. Elements of Philosophy of th, Human Mind i Edinburgh, London, 1792 -1827 '; Hvmii.ton, Notes on Works of lieid (Edinburgh, 1S46-C3); Idem, Lectures on Metaphysial
