DOUBT
141
DOUBT
Catholic Bible published in England in modern times
is perhaps Haydock's, which was first issued at Man-
chester in fortnightly parts in 1811-12. The Irish
editions are mostly known by the names of the bishops
who gave the imprimatur: as Dr. Carpenter's New
Testament (1783); Dr. Troy's Bible (1791); Dr.
Murray's (1825); and Dr. Denvir's (1836)— the last
two of which have often been reprinted, and circulate
largely at the present day in England as well as in Ire-
land. Of late years the issue of the sixpenny New
Testament by Burns and Oates of London has by its
large circulation made the text adopted therein —
Challoner's of 1749 — the standard one, especially as
the same is adopted in Dr. Murray's and Dr. Denvir's
Bibles. In America an independent revision of the
Douay Version by Archbishop Kenrick (1849-59) is
much used.
Cotton, Rheims and Douay {Oxford, 1855), an exhaustive analysis of all the editions issued; Wiseman, Essays (1853); Newh.\n, Tracts Thcol. and Eccles. (1859); Westcott, Hist of the Eng. Bible (1S6S); Carleton, Rheims and the Eng. Bible (O.Kford, 1902); Ward, St. Luke (1897), introduct.; English Hexapla (London); Milligan in Hastings, Diet, of the Bible, XV, 858.
Bernard Ward.
Doubt (Lat. dubium, Gr. airopla, Fr. douie, Ger. Zweifel), a state in which the mind is suspended be- tween two contradictory propositions and unable to assent to either of them. Any number of alternative propositions on the same subject may be in doubt at the same time; but, strictly speaking, the doubt is attached separately to each one, as between the proposition and its contradictory, i. e. each proposi- tion may or may not be true. Doubt is opposed to certitude, or the adhesion of the mind to a proposition without misgiving as to its truth; and again to opin- ion, or a mental adhesion to a proposition together with such a misgiving. Doubt is either positive or negative. In the former case, the evidence for and against is so equally balanced as to render decision impossible; in the latter, the doubt arises from the absence of sufficient evidence on either side. It is thus possible that a doubt may be positive on the one side and negative on the other (po.sitivo-negative or negativo-positi ve), i. e. in cases where evidence on one side only is attainable and does not, of itself, amount to absolute demonstration, as, for instance, in circum- stantial evidence. Again, doubt may be either theo- retical or practical. The former is concerned with abstract truth and error; the latter with questions of duty, or of the licitness of actions, or of mere expe- diency. A further distinction is made between doubt concerning the existence of a particular fact (dubium jacti) and doubt in regard to a precept of law (dubium juris). Prudent doubts are distinguished from im- prudent, according to the reasonableness or unreason- ableness of the considerations on which the doubt is based. It should be observed that doubt is a purely subjective condition; i. e. it belongs only to the mind which has to judge of facts, and has no ap- plication to the facts themselves. A proposition or theory which is commonly called doubtful is, therefore, one as to which sufficient evidence to determine assent is not forthcoming; in itself it must be either true or false. Theories which have at one time been re- garded as doul^tful for want of sufficient evidence, frequently become certainly true or false by reason of the discovery of fresh evidence.
As certitude may be produced either by reason (which deals with evidence) or by faith (which rests on author- ity), it follows that theoretical doubt may be in like manner concerned with the subject-matter of either reason or faith, that is to say, with philosophy or with religion. Practical doubt is concerned with conduct ; and since conduct must be guided by principles afforded by reason or by faith, or liy both conjointly, doubt con- cerning it regards the application of principles already accepted under one or other of the foregoing heads. The
resolution of doubt of this kind is the province of moral
theology, in regard to questions of right and wrong;
and in regard to those of mere practical expediency,
recourse must be had to the scientific or other prin-
ciples which properly belong to the suljject-matter of
the doubt. Thus, for example, doubt as to the actual
occurrence of an historical event can only be resolved
by consideration of the evidence ; doubt as to the doc-
trine of the sacraments, by ascertaining what is of
faith on the subject; doubt as to the morality of a
commercial transaction, by the application of the au-
thoritative decisions of moral theology; while the
question of the wisdom or the reverse of the transac-
tion in regard to profit and loss must be determined
by commercial knowledge and experience. The
legitimacy, or the reverse, of doubt in regard to
matters of fact is made evident by the forms of logic
(induction and deduction), which, whatever maybe
the extent of their function as a means of acquiring
knowledge, are indispensably necessary as a test of the
correctness of conclusions or hypotheses already
formed.
Doubt in Philosophy. — The validity of human per- ception and reasoning in general as guides to objective truth has been frequently called in question. The doubt thus raised has been sometimes of the character called methodic, fictitious, or provisional, and some- times real, or sceptical, as embodying the conclusion that objective truth cannot be known. Doubt of the former kind is the necessary preliminary to all inquiry, and in this sense philosophy is said by Aristotle (Metaph., Ill, i) to be "the art of doubting well". Sir W. Hamilton points out (Lect. on Metaphysics, v) that doubt, as a preliminary to philosophical inquiry, is the only means by which the necessary removal of prejudice may be effected; as the Baconian method insisted on the primary necessity of putting aside the "idols", or prejudices, by which men's minds are nat- urally influenced. Thus the Scholastic proof of a proposition or thesis begins by the statement of "doubts", or contrary arguments; after which the evidence for the thesis is given, and finally the doubts are resolved. This, it need hardly be said, is the method pursued in the "Summa" of Saint Thomas Aquinas and still in use in the formal disputations of theological students. An instance of this kind of doubt is the Sic et Non (Yes and No) of Abelard, which consists of a long series of propositions on theological, Scriptural, and philosophical subjects, with a counter-proposition attached to each. The solution of the doubts in the sense of the orthodox thesis, which was clearly intended to follow, was never written ; or if so, has not been preserved. (See Victor Cousin's "Fragments Philosophiques".) The philo- sophical system of Descartes begins with a universal methodic doubt; the famous cogito, ergo sum, on which the whole system is based, is the solution of the philosopher's fundamental doubt of his own existence. This solution had been anticipated by St. Augustine, who took the subjective certainty of one's o\vn exist- ence as the ground of all certainty [e. g. " Tu, qui vis te nosse, scis esse te? Scio. Untie scis? Nescio. Cogitare te scis? Scio." (Sol., II, i); "Utruin aeris sit vis Vivendi, an ignis, dubitaverunt homines; vivere se tamen et meminisse et intelligere et velle et cogi- tare et scire et judicare quis dubitet? Quandoquidem etiam si dubitet vivit ; si dubitat, dubitare se intel- ligit" etc. (De Trin., X, xiv)]. In general it may be said that doubt, either expressed or implied, is in- volved in all intellectual research.
Among the systems in which doubt as to the trust- worthiness of human faculties is not merely provis- ionally assumed, but is genuine and final, tho.se which find in a supernatural revelation the guide to truth which natural reason fails to provide must be distin- guished from those which hold doubt to be the final conclusion of all inquiry into truth. The former de-
