DUTY
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DUTY
accordingly as they produce a surplus of pleasure over
pain, or contribute to or diminish welfare. Then, we
ask, must I always pursue what seems to me the most
pleasurable or the most remunerative? If theanswer
is yes, we are again landed in determinism. If the
reply is that I can choose, but that I ought to choose
what produces the most happiness, then I ask, why
ought I to choose the course which produces most
happiness or pleasure if I prefer to do otherwise? To
this question the epicurean and the egoist have no
answer. Besides, the most pleasurable conduct may
be one that all reasonable men condemn as wrong, be-
cause it is injurious to some one else. Here the egoist
is compelled to hand the difficulty over to the altruist.
The latter endeavours to dispose of it by pointing out
that the object of good conduct is not merely the
agent's own happiness, but that of everybody con-
cerned. But again, why am I bound to take into
account the welfare of others? and the altruist is
silent. The evolutionist of the Spencerian type inter-
venes with a ponderous theory that in gauging the
measure in which actions produce welfare or diminish
it, not merely the immediate, but also and more espe-
cially, the remote results must be considered. He
then proceeds to show that, as an hereditary conse-
quence of our ancestors' experience that remote results
are more important than immediate, we have come to
fancy that remote results have a certain authoritative-
ness. Also, from unpleasant experiences of our ances-
tors, we inherit a tendency, when tliinking of injurious
actions, to think too of the external penalties which
were attached to such actions. These two elements,
blending into one, give rise, we are told, to the feeling
of moral obligation. So the common conviction that
moral obligation has really any binding authority is a
mere delusion. Spencer is honest enough to draw the
inevitable corollary of this doctrine which is that our
sense of duty and moral obligation is transitory and
destined to disappear. Ethical writers of the " inde-
pendent morality" schools have devised a beautifully
simple way of escaping from the embarrassment of
accounting for the validity of moral obligation. They
ignore the subject altogether and refer the disap-
pointed inquirer to the metaphysician. Ethics, they
blandly declare, is a descriptive, not a normative
science; hence that imposing array of works profes-
sing to treat scientifically of morals, yet calmly ignor-
ing the pivotal factor of the moral life.
Historic Development of the Idea of Duty. — To trace the development of the concept of duty would be to review the history of the human race. Even in the lowest races there is to be found some moral code, however crude and erroneous. Another universal fact is that the race has, everywhere and always, placed morals under a religious, or quasi- religious, sanction. The savage, in a measure corre- sponding to his crude moral and intellectual develop- ment, witnesses to this universal impulse by observing innumeralile customs because he believes them to have some sanction higher than that of his fellow tribesmen or their chief. The great nations of antiquity, Chinese, ('lialdean, Babylonian, Egyptian, saw in their deities the source or sanction of their moral codes — at least until the religious and the moral ideal became simul- taneously corrupted. In Greece and Rome, likewise, religion and morals were intimately associated, until religion proved false to its trust. The same phenom- enon is found in the Aryan race of India and Persia, while the Semitic peoples, especially the Jews, always continued to look to religion for the reason of their moral codes. When classic paganism had introduced among the gods the vices of men, the ancient tradition continued to be vindicated by the poets, and by some of the philosophers. The magnificent testimonies of the Greek tragic poets, of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero to the su[)erhuman origin of the moral law and duty need not be quoted here. But when religious tradi-
tion lost its force and philosophy became the guardian
of morality, a conflict of rival schools, none of which
possessed sufficient authority to make its tenets pre-
vail with the mass of the people, was the inevitable
result; and as religious faith declined, the tendency to
find a non-religious basis for duty became more pro-
nounced. The consequence was that the idea of duty
faded; and systems arose, which, like our present day
" independent morality ", had no place for moral obli-
gation.
The unity of the moral and religious ideal was re- stored and rendered perfect by Christianity. The Gospel vindicated the Divine origin of duty, and de- clared that its fulfilment constituted the very essence of religion. This idea has been the chief motor force to raise the Western world out of the moral chaos into which decaying paganism had dragged it. The doc- trine that every man is an immortal being created by God to be united with Himself in an endless existence, provided that he observe the law of righteousness, in which God's will is e.xpressed, sets forth the dignity of man and the sacredness of duty in their full nobility. The wickedness of moral delinquency reveals itself in this, that it is a sin against the Most High — an idea scarcely known to antiquity outside the Hebrew peo- ple. 'The Christian religion brought out more clearly and taught with the authority of God, the code of the natural law, much of which unaided reason developed only in hesitating accents and without the authority necessary to impose it effectively as obligatory on all. The Christian was taught that the fulfilment of duty is the one supreme concern of life to which all other interests must be made to bow, and that its fulfilment is enforced by the most tremendous sanctions conceiv- able. The Gospel gave a satisfactory solution to the anomaly which had perplexed philosophers and misled them to erroneous doctrines concerning the meaning of the moral life. How can virtue be man's perfection, good, and end, when the fulfilment of tluty means in many cases, the frustration of many natural desires and wants? The history of duty, replies the Christian, lies not all within the confines of earthly life; its ulti- mate goal is beyond the grave. The Christian doc- trine of the Fatherhood of God and the sonship of man leads to a clearer perception of the chief duties and of their importance. Human life is seen to be a sacred, inviolable thing in ourselves and in others; woman is the equal, not the slave of man; the family is ordained of God, and its corner-stone is monogamous marriage. The State, too, is placed on a firmer basis, since Chris- tian doctrine teaches that it draws the warrant of its existence not from force, or a mere consensus of human wills, but from God. Finally, the Christian law of love correlates the outer circle of righteousness with the inner one of strict duty. Love of God be- comes the adequate motive for striving after the high- est personal sanctity; love of our neighbour for the widest exercise of benevolence far beyond the limits of strict duty. In the person of the Master, Christianity offers to us the flawless Exemplar of the moral ideal, the perfect conformity of will and action to the Divine Will. His example has proved potent enough to in- spire with heroic loyalty to duty " the millions who, countless and nameless, the stem hard path have trod". The moral standards of our civilization have been developed and maintained by the efficiency of the Christian idea of duty. Contemporary conditions fur- nish unmistakable indications that these standards become debased and discredited when they are torn from the ground whence they sprang.
Duties. — The obligation of living according to on rational nature is the parent of all particular duties. The.se are generally divided into three group.s — (1) duties to God, (2) duties towards ourselves, and (.3) duties to others. — (1) To God, the Supreme Master of the universe, our Creator, the All Holy, All Good, we owe honour, service, obedience, and love. These
