ETHICS
550
ETHICS
letters", evidently an interpreter for Latin corre-
spondence. Hugh, who does not seem to have held
any official post at court, but was a very learned theo-
logian, had many opportunities of discussing the
questions at issue between the Orthodox and Catholics
(so he tells us: Adv. Griiec., Praef. I., Migne, P. L..
ecu, 165). As a result of these disputes he wrote a
work in three books: "De heeresibus quas Gra-ci in
Latinos devolvunt. sive quod Spiritus Sanctus e.x
utroque Patre et Filio procedit" (P. L., CTII, gener-
ally quoted as "Adv. Grcecos")- This work, the first
exhaustive and scientific defence of the Filioque, was
composed in both languages, Latin and Greek. The
author sent copies to the Orthodox Patriarch of Anti-
och, Aimerikos, and to Pope Alexander III (1159-
1181), whose letter of acknowledgment is still e.xtant
(Ep.xlix, Baronius, an. 1177, n. 37, oS). Hugh Etheri-
anus by this treatise obtains a verj- important place
among Catholic controversialists against the Eastern
Church. It appears that the emperor, who was well
disposed towards Latins, had suggested that he should
write it, laving asked him whether they have "any
authorities of saints who sav that the Holv Ghost pro-
ceeds from the Son" (ib.," Praef. I, CCII, col. 165).
Hugh had used his knowledge of Greek and his op-
portunities of studj-ing their Fathers so well that he
was able to produce texts from nearly all the recog-
nized authorities on both sides. He quotes especially
.Sts. Athanasius, Cyril of Alexandria, Basil, Gregory
Nazianzen, Chrj-sostom, John Damascene, etc.
From the Latins he produced witnesses from Sts. Au-
gustine, Jerome, Gregory I, Ambrose, Hilary. He
was also well acquainted with the writings of his ad-
versaries and quotes Photius, Xicetas of Thessalonica,
Theophylactus of Achrida, etc. The Latin version is
verj' corrupt and imtrustworthy. There are also
some incorrect expressions noted by the later editors,
such as that God the Father is the cause of the Son
(this is a concession to the Greeks that was, however,
tolerated by the Council of Florence; Denzinger, En-
chiridion, n. 586). Nevertheless, since it was written
this work has been the foundation of nearly all Latin
controversy with the Greeks. St. Thomas Aquinas
used it for his "Opusc. I, contra errores Graecorum"
and Cardinal Bessarion refers to it with great praise
(Ep. ad Alex.. P. L.,CLXI, 328). Hugh^Etherianus
also wrote a treatise "De regressu animarum ab in-
feris", in answer to a petition of the clergy of Pisa,
and (probably) a short work " De Graecorum malis con-
suetudinibus ". A " Liber de immortali Deo ", written
by him, is lost.
MiGXE. P. L., CCII; Hehgenrother, Pholius (Ratisbon. 1S67-1869). II, 646; III, 175 sqq., 814 sqq., etc.; Werner, Thomas i-on Aquin (Ratisbon, 1858), 731-738.
Adrian Fortescue.
Ethics. — I. Definition". — Many writers regard ethics (Gr. iidiK-^) as any scientific treatment of the moral order and divide it into theological, or Christian, ethics (moral theology) and philosophical ethics (mor- al philosophy). What is usually understood by ethics, however, is philosophical ethics, or moral philosophy, and in this sense the present article will treat the subject. Moral philo.sophy is a division of practical philosophy. Theoretical, or speculative, philosophy has to do with being, or with the order of things not dependent upon reason, and its object is to attain by the natural light of reason a knowledge of this order in its ultimate causes. Practical philosophy, on the other hand, concerns itself with what ought to be, or with the order of acts which are hu-nan and which therefore depend upon our reason. It is also divided into logic and ethics. The former rightly orders the intellectual activities and teaches the proper method in the acquirement of truth, while the latter directs the activities of the will; the object of the former is the true; that of the latter, the good. Hence ethics may be defined as the science of the moral rectitude of
human acts in accordance with the first principles of
natural reason. Logic and ethics are normative and
practical sciences, because they prescribe norms or
rules for human activities and show how, according to
these norms, a man ought to direct his actions.
Ethics is pre-eminently practical and directive; for
it orders the activities of the will, and the latter it is
which sets all the other faculties of man in motion.
Hence, to order the will is the same as to order the
whole man. Moreover, ethics not only directs a man
how to act if he wishes to be morally good, but sets
l)efore him the absolute obligation he Ls under of doing
good and avoiding evil.
A distinction must be made between ethics and morals, or morality. Every people, even the most un- civilized and uncultured, has its own morality or sum of prescriptions which govern its moral conduct. Na- ture has so provided that each man establishes for himself a code of moral concepts and principles which are applicable to the details of practical life, without the necessity of awaiting the conclusions of science. Ethics is the scientific or philosophical treatment of ■morality. The subject-matter proper of ethics is the deliberate, free actions of man; for these alone are in our power, and concerning these alone can rules be prescribed, not concerning those actions which are performed without deliberation, or through ignorance or coercion. Besides this, the scope of ethics includes whatever has reference to free human acts, whether as principle or cause of action (law, conscience, virtue), or as effect or circumstance of action (merit, punish- ment, etc.). The particular aspect (formal object) under which ethics considers free acts is that of their moral goodness or the rectitude of order involved in them as himian acts. A man may be a good artist or orator and at the same time a morally bad man, or, conversely, a morally good man and a poor artist or technician. Ethics has merely to do with the order which relates to man as man, and which makes of him a morally good man.
Like ethics, moral theology also deals with the moral actions of man; but unlike ethics, it has its origin in supernaturally revealed truth. It pre- supposes man's elevation to the supernatural order, and. though it avails itself of the scientific conclusions of ethics, it draws its knowledge for the most part from Christian Revelation. Ethics is distinguished from the other natm-al sciences which deal with moral conduct of man, as jurisprudence and pedagogy, in this, that the latter do not ascend to first principles, but borrow their fimdamental notions from ethics, and are there- fore subordinate to it. To investigate what constitutes good or bad, just or unjust, what is virtue, law, con- science, duty, etc., what obligations are common to all men, does not lie within the scope of jurisprudence or pedagogy, but of ethics; and yet these notions and principles must be presupposed by the former, must serve them as a ground-work and guide ; hence they are subordinated to ethics. The same is true of political economy. The latter is indeed immediately con- cerned with man's social activity inasmuch as it treats of the production, distribution, and consumption of material commodities, but this activity is not in- dependent of ethics; industrial life must develop in accordance with the moral law and must be dominated by justice, equity, and love. Political economy was wholly wrong in trying to emancipate itself from the requirements of ethics. Sociologj^ is at the present day considered by many as a science distinct from ethics. If, however, by sociology is meant a philo- sophical treatment of society, it is a division of ethics; for the inquiry into the nature of society in general, into the origin, nature, object, and purpose of natural societies (the family, the state) and their relations to one another forms an essential part of Ethics. If, on the other hand, sociology be regarded as the aggre- gal;e of the sciences which have reference to the social
