FAITH
756
FAITH
truth be a self-evident one — e. g., that the whole is
greater than its part — the will cannot affect the intel-
lect's adhesion to it; it can, however, move it to think
of something else, and tlius distract it from the con-
templation of that particular truth. If, now, the will
moves the intellect to consider some debatable point —
e. g. the Copernican and Ptolemaic theories of the re-
lationship between the sim and the earth — it is clear
that the intellect can only assent to one of these views
in proportion as it is convmced that the particular
view is true. But neither view has, as far as we can
know, more than probable truth, hence of itself the
intellect can only give in its partial adherence to one
of these views, it must always be precluded from ab-
solute assent by the possibility that the other view
may be right. The fact that men hold much more
tenaciously to one of these than the argimients war-
rant can only be due to some extrinsic consideration,
e. g. that it is absurd not to hold what the vast major-
ity of men hold. And here it should be noted that, as
St. Thomas says repeatedly, the intellect only assents
to a statement for one of two reasons: either because
that statement is immediately or mediately evident in
itself — e. g. a first principle or a conclusion from
premises — or because the will moves it to do so. Ex-
trinsic evidence of course comes into play when in-
trinsic evidence is wanting, but though it would be
absurd, without weighty evidence in its support, to
assent to a truth which we do not grasp, yet no amount
of such evidence can make us assent, it could only
show that the statement in question was credible, our
ultimate actual assent could only be due to the in-
trinsic evidence which the statement itself offered, or,
failingthat, duetothewill. Hence it is that St. Thomas
repeatedly defines the act of faith as the assent of the
intellect determined bv the will (De Veritate, xiv, 1;
II-II, Q. ii, a. 1, ad 3""; 2, c.; ibid., iv, 1, c, and ad 2"°).
The reason, then, why men cling to certain beliefs more
tenaciously than the arguments in their favour would
warrant, is to be sought in the will rather than in the
intellect. Authorities are to be foimd on both sides,
the intrinsic evidence is not convincing, but some-
thing is to be gained by assenting to one view rather
than the other, and this appeals to the will, which
therefore determines the intellect to assent to the
view which promises the most. Similarly, in Divine
faith the credentials of the authority which tells us
that God has made certain revelations are strong, but
they are always extrinsic to the proposition, " God has
revealed this or that", and consequently they cannot
compel our assent; they merely show us that this
statement is credible. When, then, we ask whether
we are to give in our free assent to any particular
statement or not, we feel that in the first place we can-
not do so unless there be strong extrinsic evidence in
its favour, for to believe a thing merely because we
wished to do so would be absurd. Secondly, the
proposition itself does not compel our assent, since it is
not intrinsically evident, but there remains the fact
that only on condition of our assent to it shall we have
what the human soul naturally yearns for, viz., the
possession of God, Who is, as both reason and author-
ity declare, our ultimate end ; " He that believeth and
is baptized, shall be saved", and "Without faith it is
impossible to please God." St. Thomas expresses
this by saying: "The disposition of a believer is that
of one who accepts another's word for some statement,
because it seems fitting or useful to do so. In the
same way we believe r)ivine revelation because the
reward of eternal life is prorni.sed us for so doing. It
is the will which is moved !)y the prospect of this re-
ward to assent to what is said, even though the intel-
lect is not moved by something which it understands.
Hence St. Augustine .says (Tract, xxvi in Joannem,
2): 'Cetera potest homo nolens, credere nonnisi vo-
lens' [i. e. other things a man can do against his will,
but to believe he must will]" (De Ver., xiv, 1).
(e) But just as the intellect needed a new and special
light in order to assent to the supernatural truths of
faith, so also the will needs a special grace from God in
order that it may tend to that supernatural good
which is eternal life. The light of faith, then, illu-
mines the understanding, though the truth still re-
mains obscure, since it is beyond the intellect's grasp;
but supernatural grace moves tlie will, which, having
now a supernatural good put before it, moves the in-
tellect to assent to what it does not understand.
Hence it is that faith is described as " bringing into
captivity every understanding unto the obedience of
Christ" (II Cor., x, 5).
VI. Definition of Faith. — The foregoing analyses will enable us to define an act of Divine supernatural faith as "the act of the intellect assenting to a Divine truth owing to the movement of the will, which is itself moved by the grace of God" (St. Thomas, II-II, Q. iv, a. 2). And just as the light of faith is a gift super- naturally bestowed upon the understanding, so also this Divine grace moving the will is, as its name im- plies, an equally supernatural and an absolutely gratuitous gift. Neither gift is due to previous study, neither of them can be acquired by human efforts, but "Ask and ye shall receive."
From all that has been said two most important corollaries follow: (a) That temptations against faith are natural and inevitable and are in no sense con- trary to faith, "since", says St. Thomas, "the assent of the intellect in faith is due to the will, and since the object to which the intellect thus assents is not its own proper object — for that is actual vision of an intelligi- ble object — it follows that the intellect's attitude towards that object is not one of tranquillity, on the contrary it thinks and inquires about those things it believes, all the while that it assents to them unhesi- tatingly ; for as far as it itself is concerned the intellect is not satisfied" (De Ver., xiv, 1). (b) It also follows from the above that an act of supernatural faith is meritorious, since it proceeds from the will moved by Divine grace or charity, and thus has all the essential constituents of a meritorious act (cf. II-II, Q. ii, a. 9). This enables us to understand St. James's words when he says, " The devils also believe and tremble" (ii, 19). "It is not willingly that they assent", says St. Thomas, "but they are compelled thereto by the evidence of those signs which prove that what believers assent to is true, though even those proofs do not make the truths of faith so evident as to afford what is termed vision of them" (De Ver., xiv, 9, ad 4™); nor is their faith Divine, but merely philosophical and natural. Some may fancy the foregoing analyses superfluous, and may think that they savour too much of Scholasticism. But if anyone will be at the pains to compare the teaching of the Fathers, of the Scholastics, and of the divines of the Anglican Ch\irch in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with that of the non-Catholic theologians of to-day, he will finil that the Scholastics merely put into shape what the Fathers taught, and that the great English divines owe their solidity and genuine worth to their vast patristic knowledge and their strictly logical training.
Let anyone who doubts this statement compare Bishop Butler's "Analogv of Religion", chaps, v, vi, with the paper on "Faith" contrilnited to "Lux Mundi". The writer of this latter paper tells us that "faith is an elemental energy of the soul", "a tenta- tive probation", that "its primary note will be trust", and finally that "in response to the demand for definition, it can only reiterate: 'Faith is faith. Believing is just believing"'. Nowhere is there any analysis of terms, nowhere any distinction between the relative parts played by the intellect and the will; and we feel that those who read the paper must have risen from its perusal with the feeling that they had been wandering thro\igh — we use the writer's own expression — "a juggling maze of words".
