FREGOSO
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Again, it may be urged that, if logically followed out,
the determinist doctrine would aiuiiliilale human mor-
ality, consequently that such a thc'<irv cannot be true.
(See Fatallsm.) ('J) Psjchological Argument. — ('on-
sciousncs.s testifies to oiu' moral freedom. We feel our-
selves to be free when exercising certain acts. Wc
judge afterwards that we acted freely in those acts.
We distinguish them quite clearly from experiences, in
which we believe we were not free or responsible. The
convict ion is not confined to the ignorant ; even the de-
terininist psj'chologist is governed in practical life by
lliis belief. Ilenry Sidgwick states the fact in the
most moderate terms, when he says: "Certainly in the
case of actions in which I have a distinct consciousness
of choosing between alternatives of conduct, one of
which I conceive as right or reasonable, I find it impos-
sible not to think that I can now choose to do what I
so conceive, however strong may be my inclination to
act unreasonalily, antl however imiformly I may have
yielded to such inclinations in the past" (Methods of
Ethics). The force of the evidence is best realized by
carefully stutlying the various mental activities in
which freedom is exercised. Amongst the chief of
these are: voluntary attention, deliberation, choice,
sustained resistance to temptation. The reader will
find them analysed at length by the authors referred
to at the end of this article; or, better still, he can
think them out with concrete examples in his own
inner experience.
Objcdions. — The main objection to this argument is statetl in the assertion that we can be conscious only of what we actually do, not of our ability to do some- thing else. The reply is that we can be conscious not only of what we do, but of how we do it; not only of the act but of the mode of the act. Observation re- veals to us that we are subjects of different kinds of processes of thought and volition. Sometimes the line of conscious activity follows the direction of spontane- ous impulse, the preponderating force of present mo- tive and desire; at other times we intervene and exert personal causality. Consciousness testifies that we freely and actively strengthen one set of motives, re- sist the stronger inclination, and not only drift to one side but actively choose it. In fact, we are sure that we sometimes exert free volition, because at other times we are the subject of conscious activities that are Tiot free, and we know the difference. Again, it is urged that experience shows that men are determined by motives, and that we always act on this a-ssump- tion. The reply is that experience proves that men are influenced by motives, but not that they are al- ways inexorabh' determined by the strongest motive. It is alleged that we always decide in favour of the strongest motive. This is either imtrue, or the barren statement that we always choose what we choose. A free volition is "a causeless voUtion". The mind it- self is the cause. (For other objections see Fatalism; Energy, The Law of the Conservation of; and the works referred to at the end of this article.)
Nature and Range of Moral Liberty. — Free will does not mean capability of w illin g in the absence of all motive, or of arbitrarily choosing anything what- ever. The rational being is always attracted by what is apprehended as good. Pure evil, misery as such, man could not desire. However, the good presents it- self in many forms and under many aspects — the pleasant, the prudent, the right, the noble, the beauti- ful — and in reflect ive or deliberate action we can choose among these. The clear vision of God would neces- sarily preclude all volition at variance with this ob- ject, but in this world we never apprehend Infinite Good. Nor does the doctrine of free will imply that man is constantly e.xerting this power at every waking momeni, any more than the statement that he is a "rational" animal implies that he is always reasoning. Much the larger part of man's ordinary life is adminis- tered by the machinery of reflex action, the automatic
working of the organism, and acquired habits. In the
series of customary acts which fill up our day, such as
rising, meals, study, work, etc., prob;il ily I he large ma-
jority are merely "spontaneous" and are proximately
determined by tli<>ir antecedents, .according to the com-
bineil force of character and mot ive. 'I'here is nothing
to arouse special volition, or call for interference with
the natural current, so the stream of consciousness
flows smoothly along the channel of least resistance.
For such series of acts we are responsible, as was before
indicated, not because we exert deliberate volition at
each step, but because they are free in causa, because
we have either freely initiated them, or approved them
from time to time when we adverted to their ethical
f}uality, or because we freely acquired the habits which
now accomplish these acts. It is especially when some
act of a specially moral comjilexion is recognized as
good or evil that the exertion of our freedom is brought
into play. With reflective advertence to the moral
quality comes the apprehension that we are called on
to decide between right and wrong; then the con-
sciousness that we are choosing freely, which carries
with it the subsequent conviction that the act was in
the strictest sense our own, and that we are responsi-
ble for it.
Consequences. — Our moral freedom, like other mental powers, is strengthened by exercise. The prac- tice of yielding to impulse results in enfeebhng .self- control. The faculty of inhibiting pressing desires, of concentrating attention on more remote goods, of rein- forcing the higher but less urgent motives, undergoes a kind of atrophy by disuse. In proportion as a man habitually yields to intemperance or some other vice, his freedom diminishes and he does in a true sense sink into slavery. He continues responsible in causa for his subsequent conduct, though his ability to resist temptation at the time is lessened. On the other hand, the more frequently a man restrains mere impulse, checks inclination towards the pleasant, puts forth self-denial in the face of temptation, and steadily aims at a virtuous life, the more does he increase in self- command and therefore in freedom. The whole doc- trine of Christian asceticism thus makes for developing and fostering moral liberty, the noblest attribute of man. Wilham James's sound maxim: " Keep the fac- ulty of effort alive in you by a Uttle gratuitous exercise every day", so that your will may be strong to stand the pressure of violent temptation when it comes, is the verdict of the most modern psychology in favour of the discipline of the Catholic Church.
The literature of the free-will controversy is enormous, nearly all the leading philosophers having dealt with the prob- lem. Perhaps the best general historical treatment of ail the branches of the question — fatalism, predestination, necessarian- ism, determinism — is to be found in Fonsegrive, Essai siir le iibrearbilre (2nd ed., Paris, 1S96). See also Alexander. Theories of the Will (New York, 1SS4); Janet and Seaili.es, History of Problems of Philosophy (tr. New York and London, 1902). Free will is defended by Ward. Philosophy of Theism (London, 1884); Martinead, a Study of Religion, II (Oxford, 1888); Joseph Rickaby, Free-will and Four English Philosophers (London, 1906); James, Principles of Psychology (New York and London, 1901); Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory (New York and London, 1894); Maker, Psychology (6th ed.. New York and London, 1905). The case for determinism will be found in IIobbes. The Leviathan in Works, ed. Molesworth (London, 18:^9-45); 1t>em, Liberty and Necessity; Hume, Treat- ise of Human Nature. Bk. II (London, 1874); Mill, Examina- tion of Hamilton's Philosophy (London, 1895); Bain, Emotions and Will (3rd ed., London, 1875); Spinoza, Ethics, ed. Willis (London, 1S70). See also Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics (6th ed., London and New York. 1901). For anti-determinists: Noel, La Conscience du libre arbitre (Paris, 1897); Piat, La Liberie (Paris, 1895); Ghtberlet, Die Willensfreiheit (2nd ed., Fulda, 1907). On the Scholastic controversy see Schneemann, Con- troversiurum de Divina Gratice Liberique Arbitrii Concordia (Frei- buig, 18S1); DuMMERMUTH. S. Thomas el Doctrina Pra-motionis Physicm (Paris, 1886) ; Frins, S. ThomtB Doctrina de Coopera- tione cum, omni Naturd Creatd praesertim Liberd.
MlCH.\EL MaHER.
Fregoso, Federigo, cardinal; b. at Genoa, about 14S0; d. 22 July, 1541 ; belonged to the Fregosi, one of the four great burgess families who from the end of the
