OOD
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OOD
be only one infinite being, only one God. Did several
exist, none of them would really be infinite, for, to
have plurality of natures at all, each should have some
perfection not possessed by the others. This will be
readily granted by every one who admits the infinity
of tiod, and there is no need to delay in developing
what is perfectly clear. It should be noted, however,
that some Theistic philosphers prefer to deduce unicity
from self-existence and infinity from both combined,
and in a matter so very abstract it is not surprising
that slight differences of opinion should arise. But
we have followed what seems to us to be the simpler
and clearer line of argument. The metaphysical argu-
ment by which unicity, as distinct from infinity, is
deduced from self-existence .seems to be very obscure,
while on the other hand infinity, as distinct from unic-
ity, seems to be clearly implied in self-existence as
such. If the question, for example, be asked: Why
may there not be several self-existing beings? The
only satisfactory answer, as it seems to us, is this:
Because a self-existent being as such is necessarily
infinite, and there cannot be several infinities. The
unity of God as the First Cause might also be induc-
tively inferred from the unity of the universe as we
know it; but as the suggestion might be made, and
could not be disproved, that there may be another or
even several universes, of which we have no knowl-
edge, this argument would not be absolutely conclu-
sive.
(3) Simplicity of God. — God is a simple being or sub- stance excluding every kind of composition, physi- cal or metaphysical. Physical or real composition is either substantial or accidental — substantial, if the being in question consists of two or more substantial principles, forming parts of a composite whole, as man for example, consists of body and soul; accidental, if the being in question, although simple in its substance (as is the human soul), is capable of possessing acci- dental perfections (like the actual thoughts and voli- tion of man's soul) not necessarily identical with its substance. Now it is clear that an infinite being can- not be substantially composite, for this would mean that infinity is made up of the union or addition of finite parts— a plain contradiction in terms. Nor can accidental composition be attributed to the infinite, since even this would imply a capacity for increased perfection, which the very notion of the infinite ex- cludes. There is not, therefore, and cannot be any physical or real composition in God.
Neither can there be that kind of composition which is known as metaphysical, and which results from "the union of diverse concepts referring to the same real thing in such a way that none of them by itself signifies either explicitly or even implicitly the whole reality signified by their combination". Thus every actual contingent being is a metaphysical compound of essence and existence, and man in particular, accord- ing to the definition, is a compound of animal and rational. Essence as such in relation to a contingent being merely implies its conceivableness or possibility, and abstracts from actual existence ; existence as such must be added before we can speak of the being as actual. But this distinction, with the composition it implies, cannot be applied to the self-existent or in- finite being in whom essence and existence are com- pletely identified. We say of a contingent being that it has a certain nature or essence, but of the self-exist- ent we say that it is its own nature or essence. There is no composition therefore of essence and existence — or of potentiality and actuality — in God ; nor can the composition of genus and specific difference, implied for example in the definition of man as a rational ani- mal, be attributed to Him. God cannot be classified or defined, as contingent beings are classified and de- fined ; for there is no aspect of being in which He is pcrfccth/ similar to the finite, and consequently no genus in which He can be included. From which it
follows indeed that we cannot know God adequately in
the way in which He knows Himself, but not, as the
Agnostic contends, that our inadequate knowledge is
not true as far as it goes. In speaking of a being who
transcends the limitations of formal logical definition,
our propositions are an expression of real truth, pro-
vided that what we state is in itself intelligible and not
self-contradictory; and there is nothing unintelligible
or contradictory in what Theists predicate of God.
It is true that no single predicate is adequate or ex-
haustive as a description of His infinite perfection, and
that we need to employ a multitude of predicates, as if
at first sight infinity could be reached by multiplica-
tion. But at the same time we recognize that this is
not so — being repugnant to the Divine simplicity —
and that while truth, goodness, wisdom, holiness and
other attributes, as we conceive and define them,
express perfections that are formally distinct, yet as
applied to God they are all ultimately identical in
meaning and describe the same ultimate reality — the
one infinitely perfect and simple being.
(4) Divine Personality. — When we say that God is a personal being we mean that He is intelligent and free and distinct from the created universe. Personality as such expresses perfection, and if human personality as such connotes imperfection, it must be remembered that, as in the case of similar predicates, this connota- tion is excluded when we attribute personality to God. It is principally by way of opposition to Pantheism that Divine personality is emphasized by the Theistic philosopher. Human personality, as we know it, is one of the primary data of consciousness, and it is one of those created perfections which must be realized formally (although only analogically) in the First Cause. But Pantheism would require us to deny the reality of any such perfection, whether in creatures or in the Creator, and this is one of the fundamental objections to any form of Pantheistic teaching. Re- garding the mystery of the Trinity or three Divine Persons in God, which can be known only by revela- tion, it is enough to say here that properly understood the mystery contains no contradiction, but on the contrary adds much that is helpful to our inadequate knowledge of the infinite.
C. Relation of God to the Universe. — (1) Essential Dependence of the Universe on God; Creation and Conservation. — In developing the argument of the First Cause we have seen that the world is essentially dependent on God, and this dependence implies in the first place that God is the Creator of the world — the producer of its whole being or substance — and in the next place, supposing its production, that its con- tinuance in being at every moment is due to His sus- taining power. Creation (q. v.) means the total production of a being out of nothing, i. e. the bringing of a being into existence to replace absolute non- existence, and the relation of Creator is the only con- ceivable relation in which the Infinite can stand to the finite. Pantheistic theories, which would represent the varieties of being in the universe as so many determinations or emanations or pliases of one and the selfsame eternal reality — Substance according to Spinoza, Pure Ego according to Fichte, the Absolute, according to Schelling, the Pure Idea or Logical Con- cept according to Hegel — sijnply bristle with contra- dictions, and involve, as has been stated already, a denial of the distinction between the finite and the infinite. And the relation of Creator to created re- mains the same even though the possibility of eternal creation, in the sense already explained [see above A, (1). (a)], be admitted; thelnfi'nite nuist be the producer of the finite even though it lie im]icis.-iil>le to fix a time at which production may not already have taken
Elace. For certain knowledge of the fact that created eing, and time itself, had a definite beginning in the past we can afford to rely on revelation, although, as already stated, science suggests the same fact.
