GOD
020
GOD
(7) When a free creature chooses what is evil, he
does not choose it formally as such, but only szib
specie boni, i.e., what his will really embraces is some
aspect of goodness which he truly or falsely believes
to be discoverable in the evil act. Moral evil ulti-
mately consists in choosing some such fancied goo<f
which is known more or less clearly to be opposed to
the Supreme Good, and it is obvious that only a finite
being can be capable of such a choice. God neces-
sarily loves Himself, who is the Supreme Good, and
cannot wish anything that would be opposed to Him-
self. Yet He permits the sins of creatures, and it has
always been considered one of the gravest problems
of theism to explain why this is so. We cannot enter
on the problem here, but must content ourselves with
a few brief observations. First, however difficult,
or even mysterious, may be the problem of moral evil
for the theist, it is many times more difficult for every
kind of anti-theist. Secondly, so far as we can judge,
the possibility of moral defection seems to be a natural
limitation of created free will, and can only be ex-
cluded supernaturally; and, even viewing the ques-
tion from a purely rational standpoint, we are con-
scious on the whole that, whatever the final solution
may be, it is better that God should have created free
Ijeings capable of sinning than that He should not
have created free beings at all. Few men would
resign the faculty of free will just to escape the danger
of abusing it. Thirdly, some final solution, not at
present apparent to our limited intelligence, may be
expected on merely rational grounds from the infinite
wisdom and justice of God, and supernatural revela-
tion, which gives us glimpses of the Divine plan, goes
a long way towards supplying a complete answer to
the questions that most intimately concern us. The
clearly perceived truth to be emphasized here is that
sin is hateful to God and essentially opposed to His
infinite holiness, and that the wilful discord which sin
introduces into the harmony of the universe will
somehow be set right in the end.
There is no need to delay in discussing mere physi- cal as distinct from moral evil, and it is enough to remark that such evil is not merely permitted, but willed by God, not indeed in its character as evil, but as being, in such a universe as the present, a means towards good and in itself relatively good. _
(5) As distinctions are made in the Divine knowl- edge, so also in the Divine will, and one of these latter is of sufficient importance to deserve a passing notice here. This is the distinction between the antecedent and consequent will, and its principal application is to the question of man's salvation. God, according to St. Paul (ITim.,ii, 4), "will have all men to be saved", and tliis is explained to be an antecedent will; that is to say, abstracting from circumstances and con- ditions which may interfere with the fulfilment of God's will (e.g., sin on man's part, natural order in the universe, etc.). He has a sincere wish that all men should attain supernatural salvation, and this will is so far efficacious that He provides and intends the necessary means of salvation for all — sufficient actual graces for those who are capable of co-operating with them and the Sacrament of Baptism for infants. On the other hand the consequent will takes account of those circumstances and conditions and has reference to what God wills and executes in consequence of them. It is thus for example that He condemns the wicked to punishment after death and excludes un- baptized infants from the beatific vision.
(iii) Providence. Predestination. Reprobation. — Several attributes and several aspects of Divine activ- ity partake both of an intellectual and a volitional character and must be treated from the combined point of view. Such are omnipotence, holiness, jus- tice, blessedness, and so forth, but it is unnecessary to delay on such att^ibut(^s which are self-explanatory. Some notice, on the other hand, must be devoted to
providence and to the particular aspects of provi-
dence which we call predestination and reprobation;
and with a brief treatment of these which are else-
where full.v treated tliis article will he concluded.
(a) Proxidence may be defined as the scheme in the Divine mind by which all things treated are ordered and guided efficiently to a common end or purpose (ratio perductionis rerum in finem in mente diving e.xistens). It includes an act of intellect and an act of will, in other words knowledge and power. And that there is such a thing as Divine Providence by which the entire universe is ruled clearly follows from the fact that God is the author of all things and that ortler and purpose must characterize the action of an intelligent creator. Nor is any truth more insist- ently proclaimed in revelation. What the author of Wisdom (xiv, .3) says of a particular thing is applic- able to the universe as a whole: "But thy provid- ence, O Father, governeth it"; and no more beautiful illustration of the same truth has ever been given than that given by Christ Himself when He instances God's care for the birds of the air and the lilies of the field (Matt., vi, 25 sq.). But to rational creatures God's providential care is extended in a very special way, yet not so as to do away with the utility and efficacy of prayer, whether for temporal or spiritual favours (Matt., vii, 8), nor to disturb or override the efficiency of secondary causes. It is in and through secondary causes that providence ordinarily works, and no miracle as a rule is to be expected in answer to prayer.
((3) Predestination and reprobation are those special parts of Divine Providence which deal specially with man's salvation or damnation in the present super- natural order. Predestination is the foreknowledge on the part of God of those who will de facto be saved and the preparation and bestowal of the means by which salvation is obtained; while reprobation is the foreknowledge of those who will de facto be damned and the permission of this eventuality by God. In both cases an act of the intellect, infallible foreknowl- edge, and an act of the will are supposed; but whereas in predestination the antecedent and consequent will is the same, in reprobation God wills consequently what He does not antecedently will at all but only permits, viz., the eternal punishment of the sinner.
Many controversies have arisen on the subject of predestination and reprobation, into which we cannot enter here. But we shall briefly summarize the lead- ing points on which Catholic theologians have agreed and the points on which they differ.
First, that predestination exists, i. e. that God knows from eternity with infallible certainty who will be saved and that He wills from eternity to give them the graces by which salvation will be secured, is ob- vious from reason and is taught by Christ Himself (John, X, 27), and by St. Paul (Rom., viii, 29, 30).
Second, while God has this infallible foreknowledge, we on our part cannot have an absolutely certain assurance that we are among the number of the predestined — unless indeed by means of a special Divine revelation such as we know from experience is rarely, if ever, given. This follows from the Tri- dentine condemnation of the teaching of the Refor- mers that we could and ought to believe with the certainty of faith in our own justification and election (Sess. VI, cap. ix, can. xiii-xv).
Third, the principal controverted point regarding predestination between Catholic theologians is con- cerned with its gratuity, and in order to understand the controversy it is necessary to distinguish between predestination in intention, i. e. as it is a mere act of knowledge and of purpose in the Divine mind, and in execution, i. e. as it means the actual bestowal of grace and of glory; and also between predestination in the adequate sense, as referring both to grace and to glory, and in the inadequate sense, as referring partic- ularly to one's destination to glory, and alistracting
