GRACE
690
GRACE
the king's grace grants life to the criminal condemned
to death; in the latter (objective) sense the king dis-
tributes graces to his lieges. In this connexion grace
also stands for charm, attractiveness; as when we
speak of the three Graces in mythology, or of the
grace poured forth on the lips of the bridegroom (Ps.
xliv, 3), because charm calls forth benevolent love in
the giver and prompts him to the bestowal of benefac-
tions. As the recipient of graces experiences, on his
part, sentiments of gratefulness, and expresses these
sentiments in thanks, the word gratiw (plural of
gratia) also stands for thanksgiving in the expressions
gralias agere and Deo gratias, which have their coun-
terpart in the English, to say grace after meals.
A comparison of these four senses of the word grace reveals a clear relationship of analogy among them, since grace, in its objective signification of " gratuitous gift" or "favour", occupies a central position around which the other meanings may be logically grouped. For the attractiveness of the recipient as well as the benevolence of the giver is the cause, whereas the expression of thanks which proceeds from the grateful disposition is the effect, of the gratuitous gift of grace. This last-mentioned meaning is, consequently, the fundamental one in grace. The characteristic idea of a free gift must be taken in the strict sense and exclude merit in every form, be it in the range of commutative justice as, e. g., in sale and purchase, or in that of dis- tributive justice, as is the ease in the so-called remu- nerations and gratuities. Hence St. Paul says: " If by grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace is no more grace" (Rom., xi, 6).
True, even gratuitous Divine gifts may still fall within the range of mere nature. Thus we petition God, under the guidance of the Church, for mere natu- ral graces, as health, favourable weather, deliverance from plague, famine, and war. Now such natural graces, which appear simultaneously as due and gra- tuitous, are by no means a contradiction in themselves. For, first, the whole creation is for mankind a gratui- tous gift of the love of God, whom neither justice nor equity compelled to create the world. And secondly, the individual man can, in virtue of his title of crea- tion, lay a rightful claim only to the essential endow- ments of his nature. Goods granted over and above this class, though belonging to the just demands of human nature in general, have for him the significance of an actual grace, or favour, as, for example, eminent talents, robust health, perfect limbs, fortitude. We would have omitted mentioning this so-called "grace of creation", had not Pelagius, by emphasizing the gratuitous character of such natural graces, succeeded, at the Synod of Diospolis or Lydda (a. d. 415) in delud- ing the unsuspecting bishops in regard to the dangers of his heresy. The five African bishops, Augustine among them, in their report to Pope Innocent I, rightly called attention to the fact that Pelagius ad- mitted only the grace through which we are men, but denied grace properly so called, through which we are Christians and children of God. Whenever Scripture and tradition speak simply of grace, reference is made to a supernatural grace which is opposed to natural grace as to its contrary and lies so far beyond all right- ful claim and strenuous effort of the creature that it remains positively undue to the already existing na- ture, because it includes goods of a Divine order, as, e. g.. Divine sonship, indwelling of the Spirit, vision of God. .\ctual grace is of this kind, because, as a means, it stands in intrinsic and essential relation to these Divine goods which are the end. As a consequence, the most important element characteristic of its nature must be the supernatural.
As a further determining factor must be added its necessary derivation from the merits of Christ's re- demption ; for there is the question of Christian grace. In the Thomist theory of redemption, which considers not Christ, but the Trinity, as the cause of grace in the
angels and in our first parents in Paradise, the addi-
tion of this new characteristic appears self-explana-
tory. As to the Scotists. they derive each and every
supernatural grace in heaven and on earth solely from
the merits of ChrLst, inasmuch as the God-Man would
have appeared on earth even had Adam not sinned.
But the.v, too, are compelled to introduce, in the pres-
ent dispensation, a distinction between the "grace of
Christ" and the "grace of the Redeemer" for the rea-
son that, in their ideal theorj', neither the angels nor
the inhabitants of Paradise owe their holiness to
the Redeemer. The addition, ex merilis Christi, must
therefore be included in the notion of actual grace.
But there are also merely external graces, which owe
their existence to the merits of Christ's redemption —
as the Bible, preaching, the crucifix, the example of
Christ. One of these, the hypostatic union, marks
even the highest point of all possible graces. The
Pelagians themselves sought to outdo one another in
their encomiums on the excellency of Christ's example
and its effectiveness in suggesting pious thoughts
and salutary resolutions. They thus endeavoured to
avoid the admission of interior graces inherent in the
soul; for these alone were opposed to Pelagius's
proudly virtuous supremacy of the free will (liberum
arbitrium), the whole strength of which resided within
it.self. For this reason the Church all the more em-
phatically proclaimed, and still proclaims, the neces-
sity of interior grace for which exterior graces are
merely a preparation. Vet there are also interior
graces which do not procure the individual sanctifica-
tion of the recipient, but the sanctification of others
through the recipient. These, li.v the extension of the
generic term to sjiecifically designate a new subdivis-
ion, are, by antonomasia, called gratuitously given
graces (gnitioe gratis data;). To this class belong the
extraordinary charismata of the miracle-worker, the
prophet, the speaker of tongues, etc. (see I Cor., xii, 4
sqq.), as well as the ordinary powers of the priest and
confessor. As the object of the.se graces is, according
to their nature, the spread of the kingdom of God on
earth and the sanctification of men. their possession in
itself does not exclude personal unhoHness. The will
of God, however, is that personal righteousness and
holiness should also distinguish the possessor. With
regard to the personal holiness of man, only that in-
terior grace is of importance which is interiorly inher-
ent in the soul and renders it holy and pleasing to God.
Hence its name, ingratiating grace (gratia gratum
faciens). To this category belongs not only sanctify-
ing, but also actual grace.
Taking into account, then, all the elements so far considered, we may define actual grace as a supernat- ural kelp of God for salutary acts granted in consideration of the merits of Christ. — It is called a " help of God for salutary acts", because, on the one hand, it differs from permanent sanctifying grace, in that it consists only in a passing influence of CJod on the soul, and, on the other, it is destined only for actions which have a necessary relation to man's eternal salvation. It is further called a "supernatural help" so as to exclude from its definition not only all merely natural graces, but also, in a special manner, ordinary Divine conser- vation and concurrence (concursus generalis divinus). Finally, the " merits of Christ" are named as its meri- torious cause because all graces granted to fallen man are derived from this one source. It is for this reason that the prayers of the Church either invoke Christ directh' or conclude with the words: Through Jesus Christ Our Lord.
We have laid down above, as the most important characteristic of the nature of actual (and of every • Christian) grace, its supernatural character. This was done partly because a deeper insight into its na- ture may be gained from the analysis of this element. As pure nature is in itself completely incapable of per- forming salutary acts through its own strength, actual
