ORACE
710
GRACE
LAiioussE, De virtutibus theologicis (Louvain, 1890); Mazzblla,
De virtutibus infusis (Rome, 1894); Satolli. De habilibus
(Rome, 1897); Bouquillon, De virtutibus theologicis (Bruges,
1890); SCHIFFINI, De virtutibus infusis (Freiburg, 1904); C.
Weiss, 5. Thoma- de septem donis doctrina (Vienna, 1895);
Oberdorffer, De inhabitatione Spiritus S. in animabus Justo-
rum (Tournai, 1890); B. Froget, De V inhabitation du St.
Esprit dans les dtnes juMes (Paris, 1901); De Bellevue,
L'tFuvre du St. Esprit ou la sanclification des dmes (Paris, 1901);
Deharbe, Die voUkommene Liebe Gottes (Ratisbon. 1856);
Marchant, Die theol. Tugenden (Ratisbon, 1864); Kirsch-
KAMP, Der Geist des Katholicismus in der Lehre vom Glnuben und
von der Liebe (Paderborn, 1894); J. Hegler, Die sieben Gaben
det hi. Geistes (Ratisbon, 1899).
J. PoHLE.
Grace, Controversies on.— These are concerned chiefly with the relation between grace and free will. How can the all-persuasiveness of grace, which exer- cises such a potent influence on the human will and elicits therefrom such good works, reside harmoni- ously in the SiVme subject with the simultaneous con- sent of the free will? Since merely sufficient grace (gratia mere sufficiens) in its very concept contains the idea of a withholding of consent on the part of free will, and is therefore at the very outset destined to inefficiency (gratia incfficax), the question in its last analysis reduces itself to the relation between free will and efficacious grace (gratia efficax), which contains the very idea that by it and with it the free will does pre- cisely that which this grace desires should be done. The most radical solution would be simply to cut the Gordian knot, and with the Pelagians set aside super- natural grace, or with the Reformers and Jansenists banish entirely all free will. For whether we boldly set aside the first or the second alternative, in either case the great problem of the relation between grace and free will will have been disposed of, and the great mystery solved in the simplest manner possible. For if there be no grace, why. then, all things are accom- plished by the libentm arbitrium; if there be no free- dom, then grace reigns supreme. As against the Pelagians and Semipelagians the existence and neces- sity of eflttcacious grace for all meritorious acts was duly treated in the article GR.icE. Here we propose to defend briefly the preservation of free will with grace as against the systems of the Reformers and Jansenists, which are hostile to free will.
I. Heretical Solutions. — According to Luther's theory, man's free will was so impaired by original sin that like a horse it could perform good or bad acts only as " it was ridden either by God or the de\'il ' '. Nor did the Redemption by Christ restore the will as it was enjoyed in Paradise; therefore the will influenced by grace must by an interior necessity follow in all things the coercion of grace. Of all the Reformers, Calvin (Instit., lib. II) has given the most consistent and scholarly theory of the loss of free will under grace. He maintains that the sin of Adam annihi- lated the freedom of the will ; that the Redemption did not restore this primitive freedom, though it released man from the bondage of Satan ; that, however, the will influenced by grace does not remain entirely pas- sive, but preserves the spontaneity of its unfree acts. The later Lutherans, as well as those of the present time, scarcely ever emphasize as harshly as their master the moral impotence of nature in the domain of ethical good, but the followers of Calvin still cling stubbornly to his teaching (cf. G. van Noort, "De gratia Christi", Amsterdam, 1908, p. 10). In opposi- tion to both sects, the Council of Trent (.Sess. VI, can. iv-v) defined as dogma not only the survival of moral freedom in spit« of original sin, but also the preserva- tion of the freedom of the will acted upon and working with grace, especially eflScacious grace.
The definition of Jansei: (d. Ifi.S.S) is not materially different from that of Lutlier an<l C.alvin, save only that, in <listinguishing more cluscly between freedom from external coercion (liljertus a i<;iicti<)nc) :ind free- dom from intrinsic necessity (liherta." ab inlrinsecA ne- cessitate), he concedes to the will under the influence of
grace only the former kind of liberty, at thcsame time
maintaining against all sound ethics that in our fallen
state the mere freedom from external coercion is suffi-
cient for merit and demerit, and that therefore the really
decisive freedom from intrinsic necessity is not required.
In its exterior form this system seeks to clothe itself
completely in Augustinian attire, and to give the im-
pression that even St. Augustine taught unqualified
Jansenism. The system teaches that the will of fallen
man sways like a reed between two delights, the heav-
enly delight of grace (dclectatio ca-lestis s. caritas) and the
earthly delight of concupiscence (tlelectatio terrena s.
concupiscentia). Both are ever present in man; like
hostile forces, each strives for the mastery, the irre-
sisting will being necessarily overcome by whichever
delight happens to be the stronger. If the heavenly
delight be stronger than the opposing earthly one, it
overcomes as efficacious grace {gratia efficax s. magna),
the will with an irresistible impulse for good. If, on
the other hand, the evil delight be the stronger, it
compels the will to sin and this in spite of the likewise
present heavenly delight, which as sufficient grace
(gratia sufficiens s. pan^a) is just too weak to gain the
ascendancy over the other. If both these delights are
e-xactly equal in strength so as to maintain a perfect
equilibrium, then the will remains trembling in the
balance. It will be seen that this theory is conceived
in perfect accord with the parallelogram of forces, and
reduces itself in its last analysis to the most extreme
determinism, and absolutely kills all freedom. Not
the conquering pow-er of the heavenly delight Ulelecta-
tio coelestis victrix), which is emphasized in the Augus-
tinian system also, but the idea that this delight cannot
be resisted (gratia irresistibilis) was branded as heresy
by Innocent X on 31 May, 1653 (cf. Denzinger, "En-
chiridion Symbolorum ", ed. Bannwart, S.J., 1908, n.
1093 and 1095).
The sources of our faith record a decided protest against the subjugation of free will by efficacious grace. For if grace, instead of eleva ting and ennobl ing free will, subverts it, then all the Biblical counsels and prohibi- tions relative to the affairs of salvation which can be accomplished only with the help of efficacious grace, become vain and meaningless. Onlyin the event of the will remaining free have the words of Christ any signifi- cance: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the command- ments "(Matt., xix, 17). Saint Paul presupposes the co- operation of free will when he writes to his disciple Timothy : " Exercise thyself (exerce te ipsum) unto godli- ness" (I Tim., iv, 7), and again when he says generally: "And every man shall receive his own reward , according to his own labour" (I Cor., iii,8). Tradition, as Calvin candidly admits (Instit., II, 3, 10), regards freedom of will and the efficacy of grace not as antagonistic principles, but as harmonious factors. Like Jansen, however, Calvin believes that he can regard St. Au- gustine as a supporter of his heresy. How unfounded and mistaken is this claim has been clearly demon- strated in the article Augustine, Saint.
II. Catholic Systems of Grace. — According as the theological examination of grace and free will in its efforts to demonstrate the mutual relations between the two took as its starting-point respectively either grace or free will, two pairs of closely related systems were evolved: Thomism and Augustinianism, which take grace as the starting-point, and Molinism and Congruism, which set out from free will. These are the extremes. The middle ground is held by Syncre- tism, which may be regarded as an eclectic system making an effort at compromise.
(1) Thomism. — This system rests upon thoughts to which St. Thomas himself in his time gave expression. It received its most significant development from the subtle Michael I'antv. ( l.'>l'S-lCi04), a Dominican gifted with a remaiiiably clear and acute mind, who was the chief oppor.ent of Molina. From the idea that God is the priinal cause (causa prima) and the
