FICEER
68
FIDEISM
to the same source, giving us at the same time a view
of the attributes of God and of his relations to the
world. His style is not always clear. Perhaps his
distinctive merit rests on the fact that he introduced
Platonic philosophy into Europe. Besides the works
already mentioned, he left: "De religione Christiana
et fidei pietate", dedicated to Lorenzo de' Medici; " In
Epistolas Pauli commentaria"; Marsilii Ficini Epis-
tolse (Venice, 1491; Florence, 1497). His collected
works: Opera (Florence, 1491, Venice, 1516, Basel,
1561).
ScHELiioRN, De Vila, vioribus et scriplis Marsilii Ficini com- mcntalio in his Amocnit. Lit., Tom. I; CoRSi, Commaitarius, etc., seu M. Ficini vita, ed. Bandini (Pisa, 1771); ^Sieveking, Gesch. d. plalonisch Akademie zu Florenz (Gottingen, 1S12); TlRABOSCHl, jSioria delta letteratura italiana (Modena. 1771-S2); RoBCOE, Life of Lorenzo de' Medici (London, 1865); J. A. Symonds, The Renaissance in Italy (Scribner's, New York, 1898), II; Stockl, Gesch. d. Philosophie d. Miltclalters (Mainz, 1866), III; Gabotto, L' epicurcismo di Ficino (Milan, 1891). M. Schumacher.
Ficker, Julius (more correctly Caspar) von, his- torian, b. at Paderborn, Germany, 30 April, 1826; d. at Innsbruck, 10 June, 1902. He studied history and law at Bonn, Munster, and Berlin, and during 1848-49 lived in Frankfort-on-the-Main, where he was closely as- sociated with the noted historian, Bohmer, who proved himself a generous friend and patron. In 1852 he pro- ceeded to Bonn, but shortly afterwards accepted an invitation from Count Leo Thun, the reorganizer of the Austrian system of education, to settle at Innsbruck as professor of general history. In 1863, however, he joined the faculty of jurisprudence, and his lectures on political and legal history drew around him a large circle of devoted and admiring pupils. In 1866 he was elected member of the Academy of Sciences, but re- tired, after being ennobled by the Emperor of Aus- tria, in 1879. His numerous and important works extend over three branches of scientific history (i. e. political and legal history and the science of diplo- macy), and in each division he discovered new methods of investigation. Among his writings those of especial note are: "Rainald von Dassel, Reichskanzler und Erzbischof von Koln" (Cologne, 1850); "Munster- ische Chroniken des Mittelalters" (Mimster, 1851); "Engelbert der Heilige, Erzbischof von Koln" (Co- logne, 1853) ; " Die Ueberreste des deutschen Reichs- archivs in Pisa" (Vienna, 1855). The second division of his works includes " Ueber einen Spiegel deutscher Leute" (Vienna, 1857); Ueber die Entstehungs- zeit des Sachsenspiegels" (Innsbruck 1859); "Vom Reichsf urstenstande " (Innsbruck, 1S61); "Forschun- genzurReichs-u. Rechtsgeschichte Italiens" (4 vols., Innsbruck, 1868-74) ; " Untersuchungen zur Rechts- geschichte" (3 vols., Innsbruck, 1891-97). Finally he proved himself a master in diplomatics in his "Beitriige zur Urkundenlehre" (2 vols., Innsbruck, 1877-78). During the period 1859-1866, he was en- gaged in a literary controversy with the historian, Heinrich von Sybel, on the significance of the German Empire. Ficker advocated and defended the theory that Austria, on account of its blending of races, was best fitted as successor of the old empire to secure the political advancement both of Central Europe and of Germany. In support of his theory, he wrote "Das deutsche Kaiserreich in seinen universalen und nation- alen Beziehungen" (Innsbruck, 1871), and "Deut- sches Konigtum und Kaisertum" (Innsbruck, 1872). As legatee of Bohmer's literary estate, he published the "Acta Imperii seleeta" (Innsbruck, 1870) and directed the completion and revision of the " Regesta Imperii".
Jung, Zur Erinnemnij an J. Ficker, in Allgemein-e Zcitunfr, supplement (1902). 293-9.'5; Idem, Beitrag zur deutschen Gelehr- tengeschichte (Innsbruch, 1908); Bettelheim, Biographischcs Jahrbuch, VII (1905), 299-306.
Patricius Schlager.
Fidatus, Simeon a Cascia. Sec Simon of Cassia.
Fideism (Lat. fides, faith), a philosophical term
meaning a system of philosophy or an attitude of
mind, which, denying the power of unaided human
reason to reach certitude, affirms that the funda-
mental act of human knowledge consists in an act of
faith, and the supreme criterion of certitude is author-
ity. Fideism has divers degrees and takes divers
forms, according to the field of truth to which it is ex-
tended, and the various elements which are affirmed
as constituting the authority. For some fideists, hu-
man reason cannot of itself reach certitude in regard
to any truth whatever; for others, it cannot reach
certitude in regartl to the funtlamental truths of meta-
physics, morality and religion, while some maintain
that we can give a firm supernatural assent to revela-
tion on motives of credibility that are merely prob-
able. Authority, which according to fideism is the
rule of certitude, has its ultimate foundation in divine
revelation, preserved and transmitted in all ages
through society and manifested by tradition, common
sense or some other agent of a social character. Fide-
ism was maintained by Huet, Bishop of Avranches, in
his work " De imbecillitate mentis humana; " (Amster-
dam, 1748); by de Bonald, who laid great stress on
tradition in society as the means of the transmission
of revelation and the criterion of certitude; by Lamen-
nais, who assigns as a rule of certitude the general
reason (la raison g^n^rale) or common consent of the
race (Defense de 1 essai sur I'indill^rence, chs. viii, xi) ;
by Bonnetty in " Annales de philosophie chr^tienne";
by Bautain, Ventura, Ubaghs, and others at Louvain.
These are sometimes called moderate fideists, for,
though they maintained that human reason is unable
to know the fundamental truths of the moral and reli-
gious orders, they admitted that, after accepting the
teaching of revelation concerning them, human intel-
ligence can demonstrate the reasonableness of such
a belief (cf. Ubaghs, I^ogica; seu Philosophise ratio-
nalis elementa, Louvain, 1860).
In addition to these systematic formulae of fideism, we find throughout the history of philosophy from the time of the sophists to the present day a fideistic atti- tude of mind, which became more or less conspicuous at different periods. Fideism owes its origin to dis- trust in human reason, and the logical sequence of such an attitude is scepticism. It is to escape from this conclusion that some philosophers, accepting as a principle the inipotency of reason, have emphasized the need of belief on the part of human nature, either asserting the primacy of belief over reason or else af- firming a radical separation between reason and belief, that is, between science and philosophy on the one hand and religion on the other. Such is the position taken by Kant, when he distinguishes between pure reason, confined to suljjectivity, and practical reason, which alone is able to put us by an act of faith in relation with objective reality. It is also a fideistic attitude which is the occasion of agnosticism, of posi- tivism, of pragmatism and other modern forms of anti- intellectualism. As against these views, it must be noted that authority, even the authority of God, can- not be the supreme criterion of certitude, and an act of faith cannot be the primary form of human knowledge. This authority, indeed, in order to be a motive of assent, must be previously acknowledged as being certainly valid; before we believe in a proposition as revealed by God, we must first know with certitude that God ex- ists, that He reveals such and such a proposition, and that His teaching is worthy of assent, all of which questions can and must be ultimately decided only by an act of intellectual assent based on objective evi- dence. Thus, fideism not only denies intellectual knowledge, but logically ruins faith itself.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Church has condemned such doctrines. In 134S, the Holy See proscribed certain fideistic propositions of Nicholas d'Autrecourt (cf. Denzinger, Enchiridion, lOtb ed., nn.
