HOPE
466
HOPE
helps, particularly such as are necessary for our salva-
tion, but also things in the temporal order, inasmuch
as they can be means to reach the supreme end of
human life, may be the material objects of super-
natural hope. It is worth while noting here that in a
strict construction of the term we cannot properly
hope for eternal life for someone other than ourselves.
The reason is that it is of the nature of hope to desire
and expect something apprehended precisely as the
good or happiness of the one who hopes (bomim
proprium). In a qualified sense, however, that is so
far as love may have united us with others, we may
hope for others as well as for ourselves.
By the formal object of hope we understand the motive or motives which lead us to entertain a confi- dent expectation of a happy issue to our efforts in the matter of eternal salvation notwithstanding the diffi- culties which beset our path. Theologians are not of one mind in determining what is to be assigned as the sufficient reason of supernatural hope. Mazzella (De Virtutibus Infusis, disp. v, art. 2), whose judgment has the merit of simplicity as well as that of adequate analysis, finds the foundation of our hope in two things. It is based, according to him, on our appre- hension of God as our supreme supernatural good Whose communication in the beatific vision is to make us happy for all eternity, and also on those Divine attributes such as omnipotence, mercy and fidelity, which unite to exhibit God as our unfailing helper. These considerations, he thinks, motive our wills or furnish the answer to the question why we hope. Of course it is taken for granted that the yearning for God, not simply because of His own mfinite perfections but explicitly because He is to be ' our reward, is a righteous temper of soul; otherwise the spiritual attitude of hope in which such a longing is included would not be a virtue at all. Luther and Calvin were at one in insisting that only the product of the perfect love of God, i. e., the love of God for His own sake, was to be regarded as morally good. Con- sequently they rejected as sinful whatever was done only through consideration of eternal reward or, in other words, through that love of God which the Scholastics call "amor concupiscentiae ". The Coun- cil of Trent (Sess. vi, can. .31) stigmatized these errors as heresy: "If anyone says that a justified person sins when such a one does what is right through hope of eternal reward, let him he anathema ". In spite of this unequivocal pronouncement of the council, Baius, the celebrated Louvain theologian, substan- tially reiterated the false doctrine of the Reformers on this point. His teaching on the matter was formu- lated in the thirty-eighth proposition extracted from his works, and was condemned by St. Pius V. Ac- cording to him there is no true act of virtue except what is elicited by charity, and as all love is either of God or His creatures, all love which is not the love of God for His own sake, i. e. for His own infinite per- fections, is depraved cupidity and a sin. Of course in such a theory there could not properly speaking be any place for the virtue of hope as we understand it. It is easy also to see how it fits in with the initial Protestant position of identifying faith and confidence and thus making hope rather an act of the intellect than of the will. For if we may not hope, in the Catholic sense, for blessedness, the only substitute available seems to be belief in the Divine mercy and promises.
It is a truth constantly acted upon in Catholic life and no less explicitly taught, that hope is necessary to salvation. It is necessary first of all as an indispen- sable means (neccssitafc/nprft/) of attaining salvation, so that no one can enter upon eternal bliss without it. Hence even infants, though they cannot have elicited the act, must have had the habit of hope infused in Baptism. Faith is said to lie "the substance of things hoped for" (Hebrews, ii, 1), and without it "it is im-
possible to please God " (ibid., xi, 6). Obviously, there-
fore, hope is required for salvation with the same abso-
lute necessity as faith. Moreover, hope is necessary
because it is prescribed by law, the natural law which, in
the hypothesis that we are destined for a supernatural
end, obliges us to use the means suited to that end.
Further, it is prescribed by the positive Divine law, as,
for instance, in the first Epistle of St. Peter, i, 13:
"Trust perfectly in the grace which is offered you in
the revelation of Jesus Christ". There is both a nega-
tive and a positive precept of hope. The negative
precept is in force ever and always. Hence there can
never be a contingency in which one may lawfully
despair or presume. The positive precept enjoining
the exercise of the virtue of hope demands fulfilment
sometimes, because one has to discharge certain (chris-
tian duties which involve an act of this supernatural
confidence, such as prayer, penance, and the like. Its
obligation is then said, in the language of the schools,
to be per accidens. On the other hand, there are times
when it is binding without any such spur, because of
its own intrinsic importance, or per se. How often this
is so in the lifetime of a Christian, is not susceptible of
exact determination, but that it is .so is quite clear
from the tenor of a proposition condemned by Alex-
ander VII: "Man is at no time during his life bound
to elicit an act of faith, hope and charity as a conse-
quence of Divine precepts appertaining to these vir-
tues". It is, however, perhaps not superfluous to
note that the explicit act of hope is not exacted. The
average good Christian, who is solicitous about living
up to his beliefs, implicitly satisfies the duty imposed
by the precept of hope.
The doctrine herein set forth as to the necessity of Christian hope was impugned in the seventeenth cen- tury by the curious mixture of fanatical mysticism and false spirituality called Quietism. This singular array of errors was given to the world by a Spanish priest named Miguel Molinos. He taught that to arrive at the state of perfection it was essential to lay aside all self-love to such an extent that one became indifferent as to one's own progress, salvation, or damnation. The condition of soul to be aimed at was one of absolute quiet brought about by the absence of every sort of desire or anything that could he con- strued as such. Hence, to quote the words of the seventh of the condemned propositions taken from Molinos's "Spritual Guide", "the soul must not occupy itself with any thought whether of reward or punishment, heaven or hell, death or eternity". As a result one ovight not to entertain any hope as to one's salvation; for that, as a manifestation of .self- will, implies imperfection. For the same reason petitions to Almighty God about anything whatever are quite out of place. No resistance, except of a purely negative sort, should be offered to temptations, and an entirely passive attitude should be fostered in every respect. In the year 1687 Innocent XII con- demned sLxty-eight propositions embodying this extraordinary doctrine as heretical, blasphemous, scandalous, etc. He likewise consigned the author to perpetual confinement in a monastery, where, having previously abjured his errors, he died in the year 1(396. About the same time a species of pseudo- mysticism, largely identical with that of Molinos, but omitting the objectionable conclusions, was defended by Madame Guyon. It even found an advocate in F^jnelon who engaged in a controversy with Bossuet on the subject. Ultimately twenty- three propositions drawn from F^nelon's "Explana- tion of the maxims of the Saints on the interior life " were proscribed by Innocent XII. The gist of the teaching, so far as we are concerned, was that there is in this life a state of perfection with which it is im- possible to reconcile any love of God except that which is absolutely disinterested, which therefore does not contemplate the possession of God as our reward.
