IGNORANCE
648
ignorance:
not confirm the synod that had deposed Ignatius. In
a letter addressed to Photius, Nicholas I recognized
Ignatius as the legitimate Patriarch of Constantinople.
At the same time a letter was dispatched to the
eastern patriarchs, forbidding tliem to recognize the
usurper, .\fter another unsuccessful effort to obtain
papal confirmation, Photius gave vent to his fury in a
ludicrous declaration of excommunication against the
Roman Pontiff.
In 867 the Emperor Michael was assassinated by Basil the Macedonian, who succeeded him as emperor. Almost his first official act was to depose Photius and recall Ignatius, after nine years of exile and persecu- tion, to the patriarchate of Constantinople, 23 No- vember, S67. .\drian II, who had succeeded Nicholas I, confirmed both the deposition of Photius and the restoration of Ignatius. At the recommendation of Ignatius, Adrian II, on 5 October, 869, convoked the Eighth CEcumenical Council. All the participants of this council were obliged to sign a document approving the papal action in regard to Ignatius and I'hotius. Ignatius lived ten years after his restoration, in the peaceful exercises of the duties of his office. He was buried at St. Sophia, but afterwards his remains were interred in the church of St. Michael, near the Bos- phorus. The Roman Martyrology (23 Oct.) says: ".\t Constantinople St. Ignatius, Bishop, who, when he had reproved Bardas the Csesar for having repu- diated his wife, was attacked by many injuries and sent into e.xile; but having been restored by the Roman Pontiff Nicholas, at last he went to his rest in peace."
NicETAS, Vita Iffnatii in Mansi, Amplissima Collectio Con- cilioTum, XVI, 209 sqq.; Gedeon, Patriarchal Archive* (Greek) (Constautiuople, 1890); Letters of Pope Nicholas I in Mansi, tbiil., XV, 159 sqq.; Harduin', Vila Iffnatii, V, 119 sqq.; Photiu-S. Epistle to Nicholas I in Baronius. ad an. 859: Anas- TASIU.S, Preface to Eighth Council; Stylia-nus, Epistle to Stephen VI; .Metrophanesof Smyrna, Epistle to Manuelin Mansi, XVI, 295. 414, 426; Natalis .\lexander. diss, iv. In Scec. IX et X; Lequien, Oriens Chrislianus, I on. et Phot. I, 246; FoRTESCUE, The Orthodox Eastern Church (London. 1907), gives (160-61) good appreciation of the character of Ignatius apropos of the anti-Roman attitude adopted by the latter after his restoration, when he persuaded the Bulearian prince to expel the Latin hierarchy from that land, aiui thus caused the loss of Bulga- ria to the Roman patriarchate: J. Hergenri)THER. Photius, Patriarch von Conslantinopcl (.1 vols.. Ratisbon. 1.S67), the classical work on the subject: Hefele, Hist, dcs Conciles. new French ven^ion by Leclercq (Paris, 1907), with recent bib- liography and excursus.
John B. O'Connor.
Ignorance (Lat. in, not, and gnarus, knowing) is lack of knowledge about a thing in a being capable of knowing. Fundamentally speaking and with regard to a given oI)ject ignorance is the outcome of the limitations of our intellect or of the obscurity of the matter itself. In this article it is the ethical aspect and consequences of ignorance that are directly under consideration. From this point of view, since only voluntary and free acts are imputable, ignorance which either destroys or lessens the first-named char- acteristic is a factor to lie reckoned with. It is cus- tomary then to narrow somewhat the definition al- ready given of it. It will, therefore, be taken to mean the absence of information which one is required to have. The mere want of knowledge without con- noting any requirement on the part of a person to possess it may be called nescience.
So far as fixing human responsibility, the most important division of ignorance is that designated by the terms invincible and vitmhle. Ignorance is said to be invincible when a person is unable to rid himself of it notwithstanding the emplo^Tnent of moral dili- gence, that is, such as under the circumstances is, morally speaking, possible and obligatory. This man- ifestly includes the states of inadvertence, forgetful- ness, etc. Such ignorance is obviously involuntary and therefore not imputable. On the other hand, ignorance is termed vincible if it can be dispelled by the use of "moral diligence". This certainly does not
mean all possible effort; otherwise, as Ballerini
naively says, we should have to have recourse to the
pope in every instance. We may say, however, that
the diligence requisite mu.st be commensurate with
the importance of the affair in hand, and with the
capacity of the agent, in a word such as a really sen-
sible and prudent person would use under the circum-
stances. Furthermore, it must be remembered that
the obligation mentioned above is to be interpreted
strictly and exclusively as the duty incumlient on a
man to do something, the precise object of which is
the acquisition of the needed knowledge. In other
words the mere fact that one is bound by some extrin-
sic title to do something the performance of which
would have actually, though not necessarily, given the
required information, is negligible. When ignorance is
dehberately aimed at and fostered, it is said to be
affected, not because it is pretended, but rather be-
cause it is sought for by the agent so that he may
not have to relinquish his purpose. Ignorance which
practically no effort is made to dispel is termed crass
or supine.
The area covered by human ignorance is clearly a vast one. For our purposes, however, three divisions may be noted. (1) Ignorance of law, when one is unaware of the existence of the law itself, or at least that a particular case is comprised unrler its provi- sions. (2) Ignorance of the fact, when not the rela- tion of something to the law but the thing itself or some circumstance is unknown. (3) Ignorance of pen- alty, when a person is not cognizant that a sanction has been attached to a particular crime. This is espe- cially to be considered when there is question of more serious punishment. We must also note that igno- rance may precede, accompany, or follow an act of our will. It is therefore said to be antecedent, concomi- tant, or consequent. Antecedent ignorance is in no sense voluntary, neither is the act resulting from it; it precedes any voluntary failure to inquire. Conse- quent ignorance, on the other hand, is so called be- cause it is the result of a perverse frame of mind choosing, either directly or indirectly, to be ignorant. Concomitant ignorance is concerned with the will to act in a given contingency; it implies that the real character of what is done is unknown to the agent, but his attitude is such that, were he acquainted with the actual state of things, he would go on just the same. Keeping these distinctions in mind we are in a position to lay down certain statements of doctrine.
Invincible ignorance, whether of the law or of the fact, is always a valid excuse and excludes sin. The evident reason is that neither this state nor the act resulting therefrom is voluntary. It is undeniable that a man cannot be invincibly ignorant of the nat- ural law, so far as its first principles are concerned, and the inferences easily drawn therefrom. This, how- ever, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, is not true of those remoter conclusions, which are deducible only by a process of laborious and sometimes intri- cate reasoning. Of these a person may be invincibly ignorant. Even when the invinciljle ignorance is concomitant, it prevents the act which it accompanies from being regarded as sinful. The perverse temper of soul, which in this case is supposed, retains, of course, such malice as it had. Vincible ignorance, being in some way voluntary, does not permit a man to escape responsibility for the moral deformity of his deeds; he is held to be guilty and in general the more guilty in proportion as his ignorance is more voluntary. Hence, the essential thing to remember is that the guilt of an act performed or omitted in vincible ignorance is not to be measured by the in- trinsic malice of the thing done or omitted so much as by the degree of negligence discernible in the act.
It must not be forgotten that, although vincible ignorance leaves the culpability of a person intact, still it does make the act less voluntary than if it were
