INGULF
10
INJUSTICE
painting, and wished only to be the painter of the
ideal. Yet he was less so now than ever before. In
his latest works his deficiency of composition becomes
more and more evident. His life was uneventful.
In 1820 he left Rome for Florence, and in 1824 he
settled in Paris, which he never left save for six years
(1836-1842) which he spent in Rome as director of the
Villa Medici. He died at the age of 87, having con-
tinued to work up to his last day. Perhaps his
prestige and his high authority counted for something
in the renaissance of decorative painting tliat took
place in the middle of the nineteenth century. But
his undoubted legacy was a principle of quaintness or
oddity and eccentricity, which was copied by artists
like Signol and Jeanniot. Ingres was a naturalist who
persisted in practising the most idealistic style of art
which was ever attempted in the French School.
Like his great rival Delacroix, he may be said to have
been a lonely phenomenon in the art of the nineteenth
century.
Gautier, Les Beaux-Arts en Europe (Paris, 1855); Dele- CLUZE, Louis David, son ccole et son temps (Paris, 1855); Dela- BORDE, Ingres, sa vie, sa doctrine (Paris, 1870); Blanc, Ingres (Paris. 1870); Duval, L' Atelier d' Ingres (Paris, 1878); Lapauze, Les Dessins d'lngres (Paris. 1901; 7 vols, in folio, and 1 vol. of printed matter); de Wtzewa, L'wuvre peint de J. D. Ingres (Paris, 1907); d'Agen, Ingres d'apres une correspondance in- edite (Paris, 1909). LOUIS GiLLET.
Ingulf, Abbot of Croyland, Lincolnshire; d. there 17 December, 1109. He is first heard of as secretary to William the Conqueror, in which capacity he visited England in 1051. After making a pilgrimage to Jerusalem he entered the Norman monastery of Fontenelle, or Saint-Wandrille, under Abbot Gerbert, who appointed him prior. The English Abbacy of Croyland falling vacant, owing to the deposition by Lanfranc of Abbot Ulfcytel, Ingulf was nominated to the office in 1087 at the special instance of King Wil- liam. He was not only an able but a kindly man, as was shown by his successful efforts to obtain his pred- ecessor's release from Glastonbury, where he was confined, and his return to Peterborough (the house of his profession), where he died. Ingulf governed Croyland for twenty-four years, and with success, though in the face of many difficulties, not the least being his own bad health, for he suffered greatly from gout. Another of his troubles was the partial destruction by fire of the abbey church, with the sacristies, vestments, and books. An event of his abbacy was the interment in Croyland church of the Saxon Earl Waltheof of Northumbria, who was executed by William's orders, and was a martyr as well as a national hero in the popular estimation.
Ordericus Vitalis, Historia Ecclesiastica, pars II, lib. IV (ed. MiGNE, Paris, 1855), 364 [Ordericus is the only extant authority for the few facts known about Ingulfs life. The chronicle known as his Historia Anglicana, containing many autobiographical details, is a fourteenth- or fifteenth-century forgerj']; see also Freeman, Conquest of England. IV (O-xford, 1871). 600, 601, 690. D. O. HnNTEn-BL.\IR.
Ingworth (Ingewrthe, Indewubde), Richard OF, a Franciscan preacher who flourished about 1225. He first appears among the friars who accompanied Agnellus to England in 1224, and is supposed to have been the first of the Franciscans to preach north of the Alps. He was already a priest and well on in years at the time of his arrival, and was responsible for the establishment of the first Franciscan house in London. The first convents at Oxford and North- ampton were likewise indebted to his efforts, and he served for a time as custodian at Cambridge. In 12.30 he acted as vicar of the English Province during the absence of Agnellus at a general chapter at Assisi, and was subsequently appointed provincial minister of Ireland by John Parens. In 12.39, during the generalship of Albert of Pisa, he relinquished this
Eosition and set out as a missionary for the Holy and, during which pilgrimage he died. EccLESTON, De Adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam;
Brewer, ed., Man. Franciscana, I, in Rolls Series; Little in
Diet. Nat. Biog., s. v.; Eng. Hist. Rev.. Oct., 1890.
Stanley J. Quinn.
Injustice (Lat. in, privative, and jus, right), in the large sense, is a contradiction in any way of the virtue of justice. Here, however, it is taken to mean the violation of another's strict right against his reasonable will, and the value of the word right is determined to be the moral power of having or doing or exacting something in support or furtherance of one's own advantage. The goods whose acquisition or preservation is contemplated as the object of right belong to different categories. There are those which are boimd up with the person, whether there is <]ues- tion of body or soul, such as life and limb, liberty, etc., as likewise that which is the product of one's deserts, such as good name; and there are those things which are extrinsic to the individual, such as property of whatever sort. The injury perpetrated by a trespass on a man's right in the first instance is said to be personal, in the second real. All injury, like every kind of moral delinquency, is either formal or material according as it is culpable or not. It is customary also to distinguish between that species of injurious action or attitude which involves loss to the one whose right is outraged, such as theft, and another which carries with it no such damage, such as an insult which has had no witnesses. The im- portant thing is that in every kind of injury such as we are considering, the offence is against commutative justice. That is, it is against the virtue which, taking for granted the clear distinction of rights as between man and man, demands that those rights be cons('r\od and respected even to the point of arithmetical equality. Consequently, whenever the equilibrium has been wrongfully upset, it is not enough to atone for the misdeed by repentance or interior change of heart. There is an unabatable claim of justice that the wronged one be put back in possession of his own. Otherwise the injury, despite all protestations of sorrow on the part of the offender, continues. Hence, for example, there must be apology for con- tumely, retraction for calumny, compensation for hurt to life and limb, restitution for theft, etc. No one therefore can receive absolution for the sin of injustice except in so far as he has a serious resolution to rehabilitate as soon as he can and in such measure as is possible the one whose right he has contemned.
It is an axiom among moralists that "scienti et volenti non fit injuria ", i. e., no injury is offered to one who knowing what is done consents to it. In other words, there are rights which a man may forego, and when he does so, he cannot complain that he has been deprived of them. Some limitations, however, are necessary to prevent the abuse of a principle which is sufficiently obvious. First of all a man must really know, that is, he must not be the victim of a purely subjective persuasion, which is in fact false and whicn is the reason of his renunciation. Secondly, the con- sent which he gives must not be forced, such as might be yielded at the point of a pistol, or such as might be elicited under pressure of extreme necessity taken advantage of by another. Lastly, the right must be such as can be given up. There are some rights which as a result of either the natural or the positive law cannot be surrendered. Thus a husband cannot by his antecedent willingness legitimize the adultery of his wife. His right is inalienable. So also one could not accede to the reijuest of a person who would not only agree to be killed, but would plead for death as a means of release from suffering. The right which a man has to life cannot be renounced, particularly if it be remembered that he has no direct dominion over it. This ownership resides with (jod alone. Hence the infliction of death liy a private person, even in response to the entreaties of a suf- ferer to be put out of misery, would always be murder.
