operation of his free will with God's preventing and helping grace (gratia præveniens et cooperans). Con- sidered as a state or habit (habitus justificationis), it denotes the continued possession of a quality inherent in the soul, which theologians aptly term sanctifying grace. Since the sixteenth century great differences have existed between Protestants and Catholics re- garding the true nature of justification. As the dog- matic side of the controversy has been fully explained in the article on Grace, we shall here consider it more from an historical point of view.
I. The Protestant Doctrine on Justification.— The ideas on which the Reformers built their system of justification, except perhaps fiduciary faith, were by no means really original. They had been conceived long before either by heretics of the earlier centuries or by isolated Catholic theologians and had been quietly scattered as the seed of future heresies. It was especially the representatives of Antinomianism (q. v.) during the Apostolic times who welcomed the idea that faith alone suffices for justification, and that consequently the observance of the moral law is not necessary either as a prerequisite for obtaining justification or as a means for preserving it. For this reason St. Augustine (De fide et operibus, xiv) was of the opinion that the Apostles James, Peter, John, and Jude had directed their Epistles against the Antinomians of that time, who claimed to have taken their doctrines—so dangerous to morality—from the writings of St. Paul. Until quite recently, it was almost universally accepted that the Epistle of St. James was written against the unwarranted conclusions drawn from the writings of St. Paul. Of late, however, Catholic exegetes have become more and more convinced that the Epistle in question, so remarkable for its insisting on the necessity of good works, neither aimed at correcting the false interpretations of St. Paul's doctrine, nor had any relation to the teaching of the Apostle of the Gentiles. On the contrary, they believe that St. James had no other object than to emphasize the fact—already emphasized by St. Paul—that only such faith as is active in charity and good works (fides formata) possesses any power to justify man (cf. Gal., v, 6; I Cor., xiii, 2), whilst faith devoid of charity and good works (fides informis) is a dead faith and in the eyes of God insufficient for justification (cf. James, ii, 17 sqq.). According to this apparently correct opinion, the Epistles of both Apostles treat of different subjects, neither with direct relation to the other. For St. James insists on the necessity of works of Christian charity, while St. Paul intends to show that neither the observance of the Jewish Law nor the merely natural good works of the pagans are of any value for obtaining the grace of justification (cf. Bartniann, "St. Paulus u. St. Jacobus und die Rechtfertigung ", Freiburg, 1897).
Whether Victorinus, a neo-Platonist, already defended the doctrine of justification by faith alone, is immaterial to our discussion. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that in the Middle Ages there were a few Catholic theologians among the Nominalists (Occam, Durandus, Gabriel Biel), who went so far in exaggerating the value of good works in the matter of justification that the efficiency and dignity of Divine grace was unduly relegated to the background. Of late. Fathers Denifle and Weiss have shown that Martin Luther was acquainted almost exclusively with the theology of these Nominalists, which he naturally and jiistly found repugnant, and that the "Summa" of St. Thomas and the works of other great theologians were practically unknown to him. Even Ritschl ("Christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung", I, .3rd ed., Bonn, 1889, pp. 10.5, 117) admits that neither the Church in her official teaching nor the majority of her theologians ever sanctioned, much less adopted, the extreme views of the Nominalists. Nevertheless it was not a healthy reaction against Nominalism, but Luther's own state of conscience that caused his change of views. Frightened, tormented, worn out by constant reflexions on his own sinfulness, he had finally found, even before 1517, relief and consolation only in the thought that man cannot overcome concupiscence, and that sin itself is a necessity. This thought naturally led him to a consideration of the fall of man and its consequences. Original sin has so completely destroyed our likeness to God and our moral faculties in the natural order, that our will has lost its freedom regarding works morally good or bad, and we are consequently condemned to commit sin in every action. Even what we consider good works are nothing but sin. Since, according to Luther, concupiscence, of which death alone shall free us, constitutes the essence of original sin, all our actions are corrupted by it. Concupiscence as an intrinsically evil disposition, has instilled its deadly poison into the soul, its faculties, and its action (cf. M{subst:o:}}hler, "Symbolik", § 6). But here we are forced to ask: If all our moral actions be the outcome of an internal necessity and constraint, how can Luther still speak of sin in the true meaning of the word? Does not original sin become identical with the "Evil Substance" of the Manichsans, as later on Luther's follower, Flacius Illyricus, quite logically admitted?
Against this dark and desolate background there stands out the more clearly the mercy of God, who for the sake of the Redeemer's merits lovingly offers to despairing man a righteousness (justitia) already complete in itself, namely the exterior righteousness of God or of Christ. With the "arm of faith " the sinner eagerly reaches out for this righteousness and puts it on as a cloak of grace, covering and concealing therewith his misery and his sins. Thus on the part of God, justification is, as the Formidary of Concord (1577) avows, a mere external pronouncement of justification, a forensic absolution from sin and its eternal punishments. This absolution is based on Christ's holiness which God imputes to man's faith. Cf. Solid. Declar. Ill de fide justif., § xi: "The term justification in this instance means the declaring just, the freeing from sin and the eternal punishment of sin in consideration of the justice of Christ imputed to faith by God."
What then is the part assigned to faith in justification? According to Luther (and Calvin also), the
faith that justifies is not, as the Catholic Church
teaches, a firm belief in God's revealed truths and
promises (fides theoretica, dogmatica), but is the infallible conviction (fides fidvcialis, fiducia) that God for
the sake of Christ will no longer impute to us our sins,
but will consider and treat us, as if we were really just
and holy, although in our inner selves we remain the
same sinners as before. Cf. Solid. Declar. Ill, § 15:
"Through the obedience of Christ by faith the just are
so declared and reputed, although by reason of their
corrupt nature they still are and remain sinners as
long as they bear this mortal body." This so-called
"fiduciary faith " is not a religious-moral preparation
of the soul for sanctifying grace, nor a free act of co-
operation on the part of the sinner; it is merely a means
or spiritual instrument (instrumentum, (
Greek characters))
granted by God to assist the sinner in laying hold of
the righteousness of God, thereby to cover his sins in a
purely external manner as with a mantle. For this
reason the Lutheran formularies of belief lay great
stress on the doctrine that our entire righteousness
does not intrinsically belong to us, but is something
altogether exterior. Cf. Solid. Declar., §48: "It is settled beyond question that our justice is to be sought
wholly outside of ourselves and that it consists entirely in our Lord Jesus Christ." The contrast between Protestant and Catholic doctrine here becomes
very striking. For acccording to the teaching of the
Catholic Church the righteousness ans sanctity which
justification confers, although given to us by God as
