LABOUR
725
LABOUR
A. The Strike. — This is probably the most import-
ant of the methods, from the side of morals. It can-
not be condemned absolutely, but it is an extreme
method and ought not to Ijc employed unless certain
grave conditions are verified. Whether they are all
present in a given case, is rarely easy, and sometimes
impossible, to determine with certainty. At any rate,
the following seem to be the general conditions that
ought to be iulfilhid before a strike can be justified ob-
jectively: The advantage which is sought by the
workers must be one to which they have a lawful or
equitable claim; a peaceful solution of the difficulty
must have been tried and foimd ineffective; the griev-
ance must outweigh the evil results that are likely to
follow from the strike; and there must be good grounds
for hoping that the strike will be successful. One of
the good effects of well-established unions has been to
lessen the number of strikes, and to moderate their
excesses and abuses. Violence and the sympathetic
strike are less frequent than formerly in connexion
with the strike proper, but they are still so prominent
as to deserve discussion. In so far as any attempt is
made to justify the former, it is usually based on the
claim that the labourer has a right to his job, or that
he has at least the right to decent conditions of em-
ployment, and consequently that he may use force to
protect this right against the unjust aggression of the
man who has usurped it. From the nature of the case
this so-called right to a job cannot be a right in the
same sense as the right to a horse or a hat; for it lacks
all the customary titles to physical property, and its ob-
ject or content may be destroyed by a private individ-
ual even in the absence of extreme necessity of any sort.
For example, the employer may go out of business, and
thus abolish the job, without doing the labourer any
injustice. At most, the right to a job is merely the
right to continue economic relations with a particular
employer. It is, consequently akin to the right of a
merchant to the patronage of his customers, or the
right of any man to pursue a lawful good by lawful
means. Hence it is a right to a social relation, which
leads to a material good, rather than a right to the
material good itself. In a general way it is a right to
liberty rather than to property; a right to pursue
rather than a right to possess. Consequently, it may
he violated as truly as the right to patronage is vio-
lated by an unjust boycott; as truly as the right to
obtain a promised gift is violated through slander
which prevents the would-be giver from carrying out
his intention. The nature of the right to patronage
will be discussed presently in connexion with the
boycott.
Now it would seem that a right to his job in this sense of the phrase does inhere in the labourer who would suffer grave inconvenience if compelled to seek some other occupation; for example, a man with a family who owns a home where he works, and who would be unal)le to get employment at his trade from another employer in the same city. There is good reason to maintain that the employer who should dis- charge such an employee without grave reason would sin against not merely charity but justice. Con- versely, cases can occur in which the laljourers who quit their employer ■ivithout a sufficiently grave reason will be guilty of inj ustice toward the latter. If these propositions are not sound, no boycott, however un- reasonable, will be unjust merely because of the dam- age inflicted through the withdrawal of patronage. The labourers that take the places of the striking workers, who are assumed to have this right to their jobs, ^vill likewise \'iolate justice unless they have a sufficiently grave reason for the act. The right of the strikers to their jobs is not valid against other workers who are in grave need. For example, if the latter can- not without great difficulty find employment else- where, they will offend neither against charity nor justice when they take the places of the former; for
they, no less than the strikers, have a right to seek and
obtain a livelihood on reasonable terms. Both classes
of workers are contending for advantages that both
have a right to pursue, and their respci'tive rights
must be interpreted and determined by reference to
their respective conditions and needs. Hence it may
happen that the prior right of the old employees to
their jobs will give way before the sufficientlj- grave
needs of the new-comers. Thus far we have- assumed
that the employer is attempting to compel his old em-
ployees to accept unjust conditions, but that he accords
full justice to the new ones. If, however, he is willing
to treat the former justly they do wrong to strike, and
their right to their jobs would seem, generally speak-
ing, to be forfeited by such conduct. On the other
hand, if the new men submit to unjust conditions, at
least if they consent to work for less than living wages,
they commit an illicit action, and consequently use im-
moral means to prevent the okl employees from obtain-
ing an advantage that the latter have a right to seek.
And yet, the needs of the new men may be sufficiently
grave to justify them in submitting to these harsh
terms for themselves, and in depriving the older men of
their jobs. Suppose, however, that the action of the
new-comers finally results in the old employees, or some
of them, returning to work on the old, unjust condi-
tions. This is what usually happens when a strike is
lost through the employment of new men. In this case
the new men undoubtedly co-operate in producing an
unjust effect, that is, in causing injustice to the old
employees. The latter are unjustly treated, yet the
instrumental agents of such injustice, namely, the new
men, will be justified if their needs are such as to com-
pel them to work under unsatisfactory terms. They
sometimes lack such justification, particularly when
they are professional "strike breakers", and when
they would better their condition by holding off, and
assisting the striking workers to obtain the just terms
that are sought.
In view of the foregoing outline of the equities of the situation, the question concerning the morality of violent methods of supporting a strike may be an- swered somewhat as follows: As against the employer, the strikers have no right to destroy his property; for this is la'svf ul only as one of the extreme measures of war, and a strike, no matter how just, has not the moral standing of a just war. As against the men who take the places of the strikers, no violence is lawful when the action of the former is justified by their own needs. Will it be lawful when there is no such justification? May not the strikers forcefully repel unjust assaults upon their rights to decent conditions of employ- ment, just as a man may use force to withstand the attack of a burglar? Pottier hesitates about giving a categorical answer, contenting himself with the state- ment that force will certainly not be justifiable when less objectionable means would be effective, or when the good effects to be expected are not great and cer- tain in proportion to the evil effects (De Jure et Jus- titia, pp. 228, 229). Now, it is certain that the good effects to be obtained through the use of violence are practically never sufficient to outweigh the evil effects; for the benefits that labour would thus secure are in- significant compared with the social disorder and an- archy through which they would be obtained. The interests and rights of a class must yield before the interest and rights of the community.
The sympathetic strike occurs when labourers who have no personal grievance quit work in order to aid their fellows. It can be directed either against the employer of the latter, or against some other em- ployer who is not concerned in the original dispute. We have an example of the first kind when the brake- men on a railway strike out of s.vmpathy with the trackmen who have left work because they have been refused an increase in wages. If the cause of the trackmen is just, the brakemen will not be wrong in
