INTENDENCIA
69
INTENTION
(See also Faculties of the Soul; Dialectic;
Epistemology; Empiricism; Idealism; Positivism.)
Aristotle, Psychology^ tr. Hammond (New York and London. 1902). especially introduction, section VIII. On the Creative Reason; Wallace. 3d., De Anima, Gr. and Eng. with introd. (Cambridge, 1882); Brentano, Die Psychologic des Aristoteles (Mainz, 1867); Kampb, Die Erkenntnisthcorie des Aristoteles (Leipzig. 1870); Hamilto-V. Reid, notes A and M; Andres. Die Lehre des Aristoteles vom vovt (Gross-Strelitz, 1906).
St. Thomas (on difference between intellect and sense), De Anima. III. lect. vii; Contra Gent., II. Ixvi; cf. Alamannus. Summa Philosophic, ed. Bringmann (Paris. 1890); van den Berg. De ideis divinis (Bois-le-Duc. 1872); Peillaube, Thcorie des concepts (Paris. 1894) ; Balmes, Fundamental Philosophy, especially bk. IV (tr.. New York and London, 1856) ; Kleutgen, La Phiiosophie Scholaslique (French tr., Paris, 1868); de VoRGES. La Perception et la Psychologic Thomiste (Paris, 1892); Rousselot, L Intellectualisme de ,St Thorrias (Paris, 1908) ; Maher, Psychology (6th ed., New Y'ork and London, 1905) ; RiCKABT, First Principles (4th ed., New York and London, 1901); MlvART, On TriUh (London, 188B), xv; Grathy, De la Connaissance de Vdme (6th ed., Paris. 1906); Liberatore, Delia conoscema irUellettitale (Rome, 1858); Idem, On Universals (tr., London, 1889); Zigliara, Delia luce intellettuale (Rome, 1874); Seewis, DeZ^ conoscema sensitiva (Prato, 1881).
On nature and origin of necessary truths: Ward. Phil- osophy of Theism, I (London, 1884); McCosH. Examination of Mill (London, 1866), ,xi, xii; Idem, Intuitions of Mind (New York and London, 1865); jyE Reqnos, Metaphysique des caitses (Paris. 1880). bk. I. ii, iv. v.
Histories: Stockl. tr. Finlat (Dublin. 1887); Janet and Seailles. The History of the Problems of Philosophy (New York and London, 1902); Porter, The Human Intellect (London, 1872): Green, Introduction to Hume's Treatise on Human Na- ture (new ed-, London, 1S7S), contains an able examinat-on of Sensism; Lotze, Metaphysik (Leipzig, 1841), especially bk.
For the Sensationist view: Bain, The Senses and the In- tellect (London. 1855); Taine, De V Intelligence (P.iris, ISTO).
Michael Maker.
Intendencia Oriental y Llanos de San Martin, Vicariate Apostolic of, in the province of Saint Martin, Colombia, South America, created 24 Marcli, 1908, and entrusted to the Society of Mary. In place of this vicariate there were formerly two pre- fectures .Apostolic, one created on 23 June, 1903, and the other on S January, 1904, after negotiations (dating from 1902) between the Holy See and the Colombian Government for the evangelization of these vast provinces. Surrounded by the Cordil- leras, and watered by the Batatas, Garagoa, Guavio, Humades, Meta, and Orinoco Rivers, the territory is still inhabited largely by the uncivilized natives, in number about 50,000, of whom scarcely 10,000 have been baptized. U. Benigni.
Intention (Lat. intendere, to stretch toward, to aim at) is an act of the will by which that faculty efficaciously desires to reach an end by employing the means. It is apparent from this notion that there is a sharply defined difference between intention and volition or even velleity. In the first instance there is a concentration of the will to the point of resolve which is wholly lacking in the others. With the purpose of determining the value of an action, it is customary to distinguish various sorts of intentions which could have prompted it.
First, there is the actual intention, operating, namely, with the advertence of the intellect. Sec- ondly, there is the virtual intention. Its force is borrowed entirely from a prior volition which is ac- counted as continuing in some result produced by it. In other words, the virtual intention is not a present act of the will, but rather a power {virtue) come about as an effect of a former act, and now at work for the attainment of the end. The thing therefore that is wanting in a virtual, as contrasted with an actual, in- tention is not of course the element of will, but rather the attention of the intellect, and that particularly of the reflex kind. So, for example, a person having made up his mind to uMdert:ike a journey may during its progress be entiri'ly i)r('(iceu|iicd with other thoughts. He will nevertliclcss he said to have all the while the virtual intention of reaching his destination. Thirdly, an habitual intention is one that once actually
existed, but of the present continviance of which there
is no positive trace; the most that can be said of it
is that it has never been retracted. And fourthly,
an interpretative intention is one that as a matter of
fact has never been really elicited ; there has Ijeen and
is no actual movement of the will; it is simply the
purpose which it is assumed a man would have had
in a given contingency, had he given thought to the
matter.
It is a commonplace among moralists that the inten- tion is the chief among the determinants of the con- crete morality of a human act. Hence, when one's motive is grievously bad, or even only slightly so, if it be the exclusive reason for doing something, then an act which is otherwise good is vitiated and reputed to be evil. An end which is only venially bad, and which at the same time does not cont;iin the complete cause for acting, leaves the operation which in other respects was unassailable to be qualified as partly good and partly bad. A good intention can never hallow an action the content of which is wrong. Thus it never can be lawful to steal, even though one's intention be to aid the poor with the proceeds of the theft. The end does not justify the means. It may be noted here in passing, as somewhat cognate to the matter under discussion, that the explicit and fre- quently renewed reference of one's actions to Almighty (jod is not now commonly thought to be necessary in order that thej^ may be said to be morally good. The old-time controversy on this point has practically died out.
Besides affecting the goodness or badness of acts, intention may have much to do with their validity. Is it required, for instance, for the fulfilment of the law? The received doctrine is that, provided the subject is seriously minded to do wliat is prescribed, he need not have the intention of satisfying his obli- gation ; and much less is it required that he should be inspired by the same motives as urged the legislator to enact the law. Theologians quote in this con- nexion the saying, "Finis priecepti non cadit sub pripcepto " (the end of the law does not fall under its binding force). What has been said ajiphes with even more truth to the class of obligations called real, enjoining for instance the payment of debts. For the discharge of these no intention at all is demanded, not even a conscious act. It is enough that the cred- itor gets his own.
The Church teaches very unequivocal!}' that for the valid conferring of the sacraments, the minister must have the intention of doing at least what the Church does. This is laid down with great emphasis by the Council of Trent (sess. VII) . The opinion once defended by such theologians as Catharinus and Salmeron that there need only be the intention to perform deliber- ately the external rite proper to each sacrament, and that, as long as this was true, the interior dissent of the minister from the mind of the Church would not invalidate the saerament, no longer finds adherents. The common doctrine now is that a real internal intention to act as a minister of Christ, or to do what Christ instituted the sacraments to effect, in other words, to truly baptize, absolve, etc., is required. This intention need not necessarily be of the sort called actual. That would often be practieaily im- possible. It is enough that it be virtu:ii. Neither habitual nor interpretative intention in the minister will suffice for the validity of the sacrament. The truth is that here and now, when the sacrament is being conferred, neither of these intentions exists, and they can therefore exercise no determining influence upon what i.s done. To administer the sacraments with :i conditional intention, which makes their effect contingent upon a future event, is to confer them in- validly. This holds good for all the sacraments except matrimony, which, being a contract, is suscep- tilile of such a limitation.
