derogatory to Virtue, that it is an Evidence of our loving it the more sincerely and for its own sake. Nor can this Principle be justly call'd selfish: for if the Love of Virtue be not mere Self-Interest, the Love and desire of Life for Virtue's sake cannot be esteem'd so. But if the Desire of Life be only thro' the Violence of that natural Aversion to Death; if it be thro' the Love of something else than virtuous Affection, or thro' the Unwillingness of parting with something else than what is purely of this kind; then is it no longer any sign or token of real Virtue.
Thus a Person loving Life for Life's sake, and Virtue not at all, may by the Promise or Hope of Life, and Fear of Death, or other Evil, be induc'd to practise Virtue, and even endeavour to be truly virtuous, by a Love of what he practises. Yet neither is this very Endeavour to be esteem'd a Virtue. For tho he may intend to be virtuous: he is not become so, for having only intended, or aim'd at it, thro' love of the Reward. But as soon as he is come to have any Affection towards what is morally good, and can like or affect such Good for its own sake, as good and amiable in it-self; then is he in some degree good and virtuous, and not till then.
