9.
23 Whilst the plaintiff is also a restricted prisoner, as defined in the CS Act, the president of the parole board has neither made, nor considered whether or not to make, a restricted prisoner declaration in relation to the plaintiff.
24 The special case poses the following questions for determination:
"(a) Is s 175L of the [CS Act] invalid because it enables the Queensland Executive to impermissibly interfere with the exercise of judicial power by State Courts, contrary to the principle established in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51?
(b) Is s 175E of the [CS Act] invalid because it enables the Queensland Executive to impermissibly interfere with the exercise of judicial power by State Courts, contrary to the principle established in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51?
(c) If the answer to Question (a) is 'yes', does s 193A of the [CS Act] as in force before the commencement of the amendments made by pt 3 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2021 (including omissions and substitutions) apply to the plaintiff?
(d) Who should pay the costs of the proceeding?"
25 The plaintiff's case relevantly turns upon an application of the principle to be derived from Kable. The plaintiff's reliance upon Kable was founded upon two propositions. The first was that one of the defining characteristics of a State Supreme Court is that the punishments imposed by it consequent upon the adjudgment of criminal guilt are final and conclusive unless set aside upon appeal. The second was that ss 175L and 175E empower the executive to alter punishments imposed by the Supreme Court of Queensland. It followed, it was said, that each provision was enacted for the purpose of imposing additional punishment on a prisoner, in the traditional sense of a sentence imposed by the sentencing judge upon adjudgment of criminal guilt, and that this offended the Kable principle because each operated to amend the sentence originally determined by the Supreme Court, thereby substantially impairing the institutional integrity of that Court. This was the premise of the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff supported that premise in two ways.
