tigation tour of the Philippines where agitation had been aroused among the population over the American plans to establish rubber plantations there. The honorable colonel returned with an extraordinarily optimistic report that the population of the Philippines had no strivings for independence but instead entertained a passionate desire to plant rubber for Mr. Firestone. At the same time, he was compelled to admit, however, that "the propaganda of certain politicians for the independence of the Philippines was finding response among the less-cultured strata."
At the present time there can be no great colonial movement that fails to cut deeply into the diplomatic web of international relations of the big capitalist bandits. Such a movement radically changes the relation of forces between them, sharpens their struggles, and stimulates their appetite. The Chinese Revolution and the colonial revolutionary movements have prospects of success because they occur at a time in which antagonisms on the Pacific are not lessening, but sharpening. A third circumstance that plays a certain role in the sharpening of the rivalry in the Pacific is the question of the British dominions. The struggle between Great Britain and the United States over such dominions as Canada, Australia, etc. is well-known. Under the pressure of extraordinary political and economic difficulties, England is more and more forced to orientate itself towards its colonies and dominions. Voices are already being heard in the British press asking whether it would not be better for Great Britain "to turn its back to Europe" and to direct its whole forces to the maintenance, regulation and establishment of closer economic relations with all the far-flung parts of the Empire scattered over land and sea. If England should actually embark upon this course, it would in a certain sense signify the victory of the policy of Pacific orientation.
Finally, the actuality of the Pacific problem is increased by changes within world economy. The whole
33
